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Preface 
 
 
The lectures on which this book is based, were originally given during a seminar on 
the Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards 
for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted). This seminar took place in Nijmegen, at the Centre for Migration 
Law, Radboud University, on Friday 6 October 2006. This was four days before the 
date the Member States should have implemented the Directive in their national 
legislation. In light of the very substantial level of interest, we have decided to publish 
a book on the results of the seminar so that people who were not able to attend may 
benefit from the wealth of knowledge and information which was shared. I would 
like to thank the lecturers – Jane Mc Adam, Jean-Yves Carlier, Ján Šikuta, Hemme 
Battjes, Madeline Garlick, Dirk Vanheule, Gregor Noll, Vincent Chetail, Roland 
Bank, and Lyra Jakuleviciene – for coming to speak and for giving permission to 
publish their lectures in this book. I would especially like to thank Jane Mc Adam for 
revising the English of some of the contributions. I am grateful for the contribution 
of Olga Sidorenko, who was unable to lecture on that day – but who nevertheless 
allowed us to publish this lecture.  
 
Karin Zwaan 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
Karin Zwaan* 
 
 
On 10 October 2006, the deadline for the implementation of the Directive 
2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who other-
wise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (Qualifi-
cation Directive)1 expired. By 9 October only 6 Member States (France, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia and Estonia) had notified the European Commission 
on the measures taken for transposition.2 This book is on the central themes, prob-
lem issues, and the implementation of the Qualification Directive.  
 
The book is divided in three sections. The first section, containing two lectures, one 
by Jane Mc Adam and one by Jean-Yves Carlier, goes into the central themes of the 
Qualification Directive. Jane Mc Adam describes how the Qualification Directive was 
the result of a two-and-a-half year drafting process, but was only finally agreed just 
two days before ten new Member States joined the European Union. In her contribu-
tion she gives an overview of the main provisions of the Qualification Directive as 
they relate to eligibility for international protection in the European Union and the 
status accorded to beneficiaries. The article of Jean-Yves Carlier describes the (future) 
role of the European Court of Justice. He goes into two elementary questions of this 
role. Firstly, the question of when. When is there a possibility or an obligation of 
preliminary question? Secondly, the question of what. What shall be the question? It 
is also the question of the direct effect of a directive and also it is a question of con-
tent. According to Carlier in theory, a solution could be found for every difficulty of 
interpretation of the Qualification Directive, if necessary by a preliminary rule in 
Luxembourg. He argues that this will not be so easy in practice. 
The second part of the book is on the problem issues of the Qualification Direc-
tive. Hemme Battjes indicates the problems with regard to subsidiary protection and 
reduced rights. Subsidiary protection beneficiaries do partly have the same rights as 
refugees (for example, as regards access to accommodation and freedom of move-
ment) but other rights are reduced as compared to those for refugees. The contribu-
tion of Ján Ŝikuta makes clear that the Qualification Directive seeks to incorporate 
Member States’ obligations both under the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the 
1950 European Human Rights Convention (ECHR). He recalls that all EU Member 
States are parties to the ECHR. It is thus clear that the Qualification Directive will 
have its impact on national law, which in turn has an effect on the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg and its jurisprudence. 
                                                        
*  Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
1  OJ 2004, L 304/12. 
2  According to press releases on www.EUobserver.com, www.euractiv.com. 
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The third part of the book focuses on the implementation of the Qualification 
Directive in a selected number of Member States. This part starts with a contribution 
of Madeline Garlick in which she indicates that the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Refugees followed closely the process of preparation and negotiation of the 
Qualification Directive. The European Council summit in Tampere had called for 
measures to establish a common European asylum system, based on the full and 
inclusive application of the 1951 Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is 
sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement. UNHCR has 
signalled its concern that the codification of subsidiary protection in EC law in the 
Directive could potentially lead to undermining of grants of refugee status under the 
1951 Convention. She reaches the conclusion that it remains difficult to assess the 
full impact of the Qualification Directive, and its success or otherwise in delivering 
protection to entitled applicants, with relatively few States having transposed it and 
little comprehensive data regarding its application. She notices that concerns in some 
key areas persist, and clarifications have not been achieved to date through Member 
States discussions, guidance from the Commission, through jurisprudence or other-
wise.  
 
The other six contributions are on the implementation of the Qualification Directive 
in selected Member States.  
In Belgium, the Qualification Directive is a milestone in Belgian asylum law. It has 
resulted in the introduction of new grounds to obtain asylum status in Belgium, as is 
described by Dirk Vanheule. He indicates that with the implementation of the Direc-
tive and the introduction of subsidiary protection status, the Belgian legislator has 
also changed the asylum procedure. 
In the contribution of Gregor Noll on Sweden he indicates that when the trans-
position period elapsed, Sweden had failed to notify the European Commission of its 
transposition measures. The incoming government decided to handle the transposi-
tion of the Qualification Directive and the Draft Directive on Asylum Procedures in 
one and the same process, which provided for further delay. A governmental inquiry 
had been assigned to draw up a comprehensive report on legislative changes neces-
sary to transpose the Directive. The report delivered by the governmental Inquiry 
must be seen as the only document available offering indications on what course the 
Swedish transposition process might take. This article describes and analyses this 
document. 
Vincent Chetail describes the situation in France. The position of France regard-
ing the implementation of the Qualification Directive can best be described as un-
usual because France incorporated the Qualification Directive five months before its 
very adoption. But to be noticed is that French Parliament explicitly integrates only 7 
of the 34 Articles of the Directive. Chetail notes that the necessary recognition of 
non-state persecution cannot divert attention from the fact that the majority of the 
other changes initiated by the Parliament are much more restrictive and other impor-
tant aspects of the Directive were simply ignored. 
In Slovakia, Olga Sidorenko stresses, that he complete harmonisation of the Slo-
vak asylum law with the Community law had to progress in three stages, starting with 
the adoption of the amending 309/2000 Law. The next proposed stages have been 
the adoption of an entirely new Asylum Law; and finally the complete implementa-
INTRODUCTION 
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tion of the EU law in the field of asylum achieved upon Slovakia’s accession to the 
European Union. Slovakia did not meet the transposition deadline; nevertheless, its 
transposition is in process. 
For Germany, the implementation of the Qualification Directive meant that it is 
currently seeking to transpose into German law the Qualification Directive together 
with all other instruments adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty as can be read in 
the article of Roland Bank. The application of the Directive before and after its 
transposition will provide an important impulse towards bringing German practice of 
refugee law in line with the 1951 Convention. As has been indicated in the other 
contributions on the implementation, also looking at the German draft transposition 
provisions in detail one may encounter various examples of selective transposition of 
the Directive. Bank argues that the application of the Qualification Directive in Ger-
man Law with direct effect since 10 October 2006 as well as the future transposition 
legislation will lead to some significant changes in the German system of asylum and 
refugee law. 
The book ends with a contribution by the hand of Lyra Jakuleviciene, who de-
scribes the implementation in Lithuania. Lithuania had started incorporating into its 
national law the provisions of then draft EU legislation on asylum even before its 
formal adoption by the Council. But as no formal transposition has yet taken place, a 
number of provisions remain to be introduced into Lithuanian legislation. Currently, 
there are three forms of protection (asylum) recognised by the Lithuanian legislation: 
refugee status, subsidiary protection and temporary protection. 
 
This book offers insight in all the different aspects of the Qualification Directive: the 
central themes, the problem issues and the implementation. It emerges that the 
Qualification Directive may play a valuable role with regard to the recognition of 
refugees and persons benefiting from subsidiary protection in establishing core bind-
ing obligations on member states. It is also clear that the Qualification Directive will 
and cannot overrule the Refugee Convention. The judicial meaning of the refugee 
concept is now to be found in the Refugee Convention read together with the Quali-
fication Directive. I will conclude therefore with a reference to preamble 3 of the 
Qualification Directive: ‘The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the corner-
stone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees’. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part One: 
Central Themes 
  
 
7 
The Qualification Directive: An Overview 
 
Jane McAdam* 
1. Introduction 
On 29 April 2004, the Member States of the European Union adopted the Directive 
on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals 
or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International 
Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted.1 This Directive represented 
the fourth building block in the first phase of the Common European Asylum Sys-
tem,2 intended to harmonize and streamline legal standards relating to asylum in the 
Member States of the EU.3 The Directive was the result of a two-and-a-half year 
drafting process, but was only finally agreed just two days before ten new Member 
States joined the EU. As one commentator observed, 
 
The final impulse to reach agreement came not from the need to integrate, or even from 
the pressure of the May 1 deadline for completing the Amsterdam/Tampere programme. 
Rather, it was the need to get agreements, even imperfect ones, in place before ten new 
Members came to the table and made it impossible to get the perfect agreement for any, let 
                                                        
*  BA (Hons) LLB (Hons) (Sydney) DPhil (Oxon); Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of 
New South Wales, Australia. Parts of this article derive from my earlier publications on the 
Qualification Directive, in particular J. McAdam, ‘The European Union Qualification Directive: 
The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime’ (2005) 17 IJRL, p. 461. 
1  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification 
and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who 
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted [2004] OJ 
L304/12 (Qualification Directive). 
2  The other instruments were: Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum 
Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons 
and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving Such 
Persons and Bearing the Consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212/12; Council Directive 
2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers [2003] OJ L31/18; Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national [2003] OJ 50/1; Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum 
Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status 
[2005] OJ L326/13. For the second phase of the CEAS, see the Hague Programme (adopted 5 
November 2004). 
3  Under the Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the Protocol on 
the Position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union [2002] OJ C325/5, those 
countries may elect not to adopt the asylum Directives. The UK and Ireland have, however, 
elected to adopt the Qualification Directive. 
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alone all, of the Member States. If the 15 had a hard time deciding unanimously, how would 
25 manage?4  
  
The Qualification Directive has been described as ‘unquestionably the most impor-
tant instrument in the new legal order in European asylum because it goes to the 
heart of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’.5 It ‘clarifies’ the 
constitutive elements of the Convention refugee definition and the rights that flow 
from refugee status, and seeks to establish a harmonized approach towards de facto 
refugees in the Members States of the EU – called ‘beneficiaries of subsidiary protec-
tion’ – by setting out the eligibility criteria for persons with an international protec-
tion need falling outside the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and codifying 
their resultant status. In doing so, the Qualification Directive is the first supranational 
instrument to elaborate a distinct status for extra-Convention refugees.6 
It was inspired by the notion that harmonized laws on qualification for interna-
tional protection ‘should help to limit the secondary movements of applicants for 
asylum between Member States, where such movement is purely caused by differ-
ences in legal frameworks’,7 and its main objectives are described as ensuring that (a) 
Member States apply common criteria for identifying people genuinely in need of 
international protection, and (b) a minimum level of benefits is available for such 
people in all Member States. The Directive therefore has two components: clarifying 
the eligibility or threshold criteria for protection, and setting out the resultant status 
for persons who qualify. Accordingly, it seeks to clarify who is a ‘refugee’ for the 
purposes of protection in the EU, thereby intersecting with article 1A(2) of the Refu-
gee Convention, and who else may have an international protection need – beneficiar-
ies of subsidiary protection. Purely humanitarian and compassionate claims fall out-
side the scope of the Qualification Directive, since they are not based on an interna-
tional protection need. These remain subject to the discretion of individual Member 
States.  
The Directive is based on pre-existing Member State practice, and aims simply to 
harmonize existing concepts by drawing on the ‘best’ elements of the Member States’ 
national systems.8 It is therefore not intended as a comprehensive overhaul of protec-
                                                        
4  J. van Selm and E. Tsolakis, ‘The Enlargement of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”: 
Managing Migration in a European Union of 25 Members’, MPI Policy Brief (May 2004), p. 2 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/eu_enlargement.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2006). 
5  H. Lambert, ‘The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, Its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the 
United Kingdom and International Law’, (2006) 55 ICLQ 161, p. 161. 
6  Note that the regional OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration apply Convention 
refugee status rather than a separate status: Organization of African Unity Convention Gov-
erning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (adopted 10 September 1969, 
entered into force 20 June 1974) 1001 UNTS 45; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (22 No-
vember 1984) in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev.1, p. 190–193 (1984–85). 
7  Qualification Directive, recital 7. 
8  ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ in Commission of the European Communities Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country 
Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International 
Protection COM (2001) 510 final (12 September 2001) 5. Note that it was drafted prior to 1 
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tion, but as a codification of existing State practice that, as a legal instrument, has 
sought to balance the divergent political views of the various Member States. While 
this approach is a pragmatic response to the political realities of the EU and the need 
to create an instrument of compromise, it also means that the Directive does not the 
product of a systematic analysis of all protection possibilities under international and 
regional human rights and humanitarian law. Indeed, it has been criticized for ‘equal-
izing down’ at the refugee’s expense,9 adopting minimum standards which do not pre-
clude Member States with higher standards in place from reducing them.10 Further-
more, it is probable that the Directive will not lead to more people being granted 
protection in the EU11 because it is based on a restrictive interpretation of existing 
practices rather than a new regime. Indeed, the instruction in the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (TEC)12 to adopt ‘minimum standards’ on asylum has 
been taken very literally, with the asylum Directives frequently adopting lowest com-
mon denominator standards instead of aiming for the higher standards afforded by 
some Member States.13 As such, it may be described as a regionally-specific political 
manifestation of the broader legal concept of complementary protection.14 
This paper seeks to give an overview of the main provisions of the Qualification 
Directive as they relate to eligibility for international protection in the EU and the 
status accorded to beneficiaries. Other contributions in this collection highlight na-
tional implementation and interpretation of such provisions, and the ‘fit’ between the 
Directive as an instrument of EC law vis-à-vis Member States’ pre-existing obliga-
tions under international law.  
                                                        
May 2004 enlargement of the EU and hence relied on the State practice of the 15 Member Sta-
tes at that time. 
9  G. Gilbert, ‘Is Europe Living up to its Obligations to Refugees?’, (2004) 15 European Journal of 
International Law, p. 963, 969. 
10  Qualification Directive, art 3. On this point, see Lambert (n. 5). 
11  T. Spijkerboer, ‘Subsidiarity in Asylum Law: The Personal Scope of International Protection’, in 
D. Bouteillet-Paquet (ed.), Subsidiary Protection of Refugees in the European Union: Complementing the 
Geneva Convention?, Brussels: Bruylant 2002, p. 39. 
12  Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated text) OJ C 325/33 of 24 December 
2002, art. 63. 
13  This means that Member States which followed higher standards may reduce them as part of 
harmonization, or may choose to maintain them: Qualification Directive, art 3, recital 8. This 
calls into question how effective ‘harmonization’ will actually be: see e.g. H. Storey and others, 
Complementary Protection: Should There Be a Common Approach to Providing Protection to Persons Who Are 
Not Covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention? (Joint ILPA/IARLJ Symposium 6 December 1999) 
(copy with author). 
14  On this point, McAdam (n. 1) 462. During discussions in the EU, Commission Services de-
scribed subsidiary protection as an asylum issue that was ‘more of a political nature’: Note from 
Commission Services, ‘Horizontal Issues in the Asylum Proposals’, 13636/01 ASILE 53 (9 No-
vember 2001) 2. ‘Complementary protection’ describes protection granted by States on the ba-
sis of an international protection need outside the 1951 Convention framework, based on a 
human rights treaty or on more general humanitarian principles, such as providing assistance to 
persons fleeing from generalized violence. 
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2. Refugee Status under the Directive 
2.1 Inclusion Clauses 
Although harmonization was supposed to take place ‘in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status 
of refugees and other relevant treaties’,15 there are a number of areas where interna-
tional law has been undermined by regional interpretations. The Directive’s definition 
of a ‘refugee’16 is substantively identical to article 1A(2) of the Convention with one 
exception: it applies only to third country nationals. This restrictive interpretation of 
the refugee definition has a regional precursor: the 1997 Protocol on Asylum for 
Nationals of Member States of the European Union.17 This has drawn sharp criticism 
from UNHCR and other commentators,18 who rightly argue that imposing such a 
restriction on the definition of a refugee contravenes article 42 of the Refugee Con-
vention, which prohibits States from limiting the personal scope of article 1 or mak-
ing reservations to article 3.  
From a political perspective, one might appreciate why this is so. First, some 
would question whether individuals can be subject to persecution (or other forms of 
serious harm19) in a region in which all Member States have, as a condition of mem-
bership, accepted various human rights treaties as a matter of both law and practice. 
Secondly, even if it were possible for an EU national to be persecuted in his or her 
                                                        
15  TEC (n. 12) art. 63(1). 
16  Directive art. 2(c). See also the earlier Council Joint Position on the Harmonized Application of 
the Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’ in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (4 March 1996) OJ L63/2 (13 March 1996). 
17  For criticism of it at the time of drafting, see UNHCR’s Position on the Proposal of the Euro-
pean Council concerning the Treatment of Asylum Applications from Citizens of European 
Union Member States (January 1997); K. Landgren, ‘Deflecting International Protection by 
Treaty: Bilateral and Multilateral Accords on Extradition, Readmission and the Inadmissibility 
of Asylum Requests’, UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 10 (Geneva 
June 1999); N. Sitaropoulos, ‘Entwurf einer “EU-Anerkennungs-Richtlinie”’ (2003) 23 Zeitschrift 
für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik, p. 379.  
18  UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless 
Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection’, 14109/01 
ASILE 54 (16 November 2001) [11]; Amnesty International EU Office, ‘Amnesty Interna-
tional’s Comments on the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Stan-
dards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country National [sic] and Stateless Persons as 
Refugees or as Persons Who Are Otherwise in Need of International Protection, COM (2001) 
510 final’ (2 October 2002) <http://www.amnesty-eu.org> (accessed 21 October 2002), p. 2; 
European Parliament, ‘Report on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards 
for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees 
or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection’, ‘Explanatory Statement’, PE 
319.971 (8 October 2002) 53; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Defin-
ing Refugee Status and Those in Need of International Protection, London: The Stationery Office 2002 
[54]. Although not formally a party to the negotiations, UNHCR maintained a close interest in 
the development of the Directive since it goes to the heart of its own mandate.  
19  Subsidiary protection, based on human rights abuses, is also restricted to third country nation-
als.  
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country of origin, by virtue of that regional ‘citizenship’, he or she has a right to free-
dom of movement and can therefore escape persecution by relocating to another 
Member State. Accordingly, the argument goes, such a person is not a refugee and 
there is no need for asylum to be granted. Both these arguments are flawed, however, 
not least because there is evidence of groups severely discriminated against in certain 
parts of Europe (such as the Roma), and the right to residence in other EU countries 
is not as simple as having a right to free movement. As the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the EU noted, ‘there are occasions when even if there are supposedly 
safeguards in place in theory, those safeguards are not being effectively implemented 
and for the individuals concerned, regardless of membership of the club, they are 
being persecuted in their country and they are not being protected and that is what 
the courts here [UK], and indeed the authorities in other countries, have found in 
over 7,000 cases’.20 
Even if in practice the limitation were to have little effect on refugee recognition 
statistics, it is undesirable that EU States set an example of limiting the application of 
the Convention definition in this way and undermining international law through a 
tailored regional agreement. It would set ‘a most undesirable precedent in the wider 
international/global context.’21  
Member States cannot simply abrogate their responsibilities under international 
treaties by entering into regional agreements. Accordingly, even though EC law22 now 
contains a harmonized approach to determination of refugee status for non-EU na-
tionals, EU citizens who are refugees must still be able to have their claims assessed 
on the basis of international law. How this will operate, and whether it will in sub-
stance differ from the EC law approach, remains to be seen. The defining-out of 
such persons from the EC Qualification Directive is a political statement, but does 
not ‘undo’ States’ international legal obligations.  
The Directive is the first instrument to attempt a detailed elaboration of acts con-
stituting ‘persecution’ in the specific context of article 1A(2) of Convention.23 It re-
flects very strongly Hathaway’s human rights approach to ‘persecution’,24 requiring 
persecutory acts either to 
a)  be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe viola-
tion of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot 
                                                        
20  House of Lords (n. 18) [50] (Mr Hardwick, Refugee Council). 
21  House of Lords (n. 18) [54]. See also comments of UNHCR at [52]. Although the Convention 
and human rights treaties would still apply to EU citizens, their resultant legal status would be 
uncertain. Additionally, the argument that EU citizens may in any case move freely within the 
EU does not justify the breach of international law in the Directive, nor does such freedom of 
movement necessarily guarantee an equivalent level of rights as provided for in the Directive, 
especially for citizens of the 10 new Member States. 
22  ‘EC law’ denotes law adopted as an instrument of the European Community. 
23  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains a definition of ‘persecution’ in 
the context of crimes against humanity: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art. 7(2)(g). For further 
discussion of the refugee definition in the Qualification Directive, see A. Klug, Harmonization 
of Asylum in the European Union – Emergence of an EU Refugee System?’, (2004) 47 German 
Yearbook of Intl L, p. 594. 
24  J.C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths Canada 1991, p. 99–135. 
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be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or  
 b)  be an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights 
which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as men-
tioned in (a).25  
 
The assessment is therefore both quantitative and qualitative. The express link drawn 
between persecution and violations of ‘basic human rights’ seeks to underline the 
intrinsic relationship between the two but implies that if persecution is based on 
human rights violations, then developments in human rights law and jurisprudence 
may impact upon interpretations of the term ‘persecution’ in the context of refugee 
determinations. However, some have critiqued this approach on the grounds that 
‘persecution’ may become a catch-all for all forms of treatment that do not serve ‘the 
general ideals of pluralist democracy under the rule of law’, and that ‘the failure in 
some troubled jurisdictions to accord to their citizens or inhabitants rights and free-
doms which at least approximate to those enjoyed here and in other developed de-
mocracies may itself come to constitute a pressure to admit such persons as refu-
gees.’26 In the view of Lord Justice Laws of the UK Court of Appeal, human rights 
law and refugee law have overlapping but nonetheless distinct mandates, particularly 
in the context of dualist legal systems like the UK’s where human rights law, derived 
from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and implemented by the 
Human Rights Act, forms part of municipal constitutional law and is thus open to 
more creative judicial interpretation, while refugee law, deriving from international 
treaty law, reflects an agreement between various States and the court’s task is a more 
limited one – ‘to secure the State’s obedience to an international contract to which it 
has committed itself’.27 Klug, while appreciating the flexibility of a human rights ap-
proach to persecution, observes that it may obscure other forms of persecutory 
treatment, such as ‘[s]evere discrimination or the cumulative effect of various meas-
ures’. This echoes UNHCR’s concerns that an interpretation of ‘persecution’ that 
relies too heavily on objective factors risks obscuring valid elements of subjective 
fear, because such an approach overlooks the situation where ‘life in the country of 
origin [has become] so insecure from many perspectives for the individual concerned, that 
the only way out of this predicament is to leave the country of origin.’28 Though it is 
important to analyse country conditions and human rights standards in assessing 
whether persecution may exist in a given situation, the additional subjective element 
of the Convention definition captures a need for protection that is outside the realm 
of a pure human rights assessment, and cautions against tying the concept of persecu-
                                                        
25  Qualification Directive, art. 9(1). 
26  Lord Justice Laws, Asylum – A Branch of Human Rights Law?, AIT Conference (June 2006) [13]; 
see also G. Noll, ‘Asylum Claims and the Translation of Culture into Politics’, (2006) 41 Texas 
Intl LJ, p. 491. 
27  Lord Justice Laws (n. 26) [8]. 
28  E. Feller, Statement by Ms Erika Feller, Director, Department of International Protection, UNHCR, 
Brussels: SCIFA 6 November 2002, p. 3 (emphasis added); see also UNHCR, Handbook on Pro-
cedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees UN Doc HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (2nd edn Geneva 1992) [52].  
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tion exclusively to human rights law. As UNHCR’s Director of International Protec-
tion observed:  
 
Persecution cannot and should not be defined solely on the basis of serious human rights 
violations. Severe discrimination or the cumulative effect of various measures not in them-
selves alone amounting to persecution, as well as their combination with other adverse fac-
tors, can give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution, or, otherwise said: make life in the 
country of origin so insecure from many perspectives for the individual concerned, that the 
only way out of this predicament is to leave the country of origin.29 
 
Article 9(2) of the Qualification Directive lists examples of acts which may amount to 
persecution, importantly clarifying that acts of a gender-specific or child-specific 
nature may be persecutory, and recognizing that punishment or prosecution for re-
fusing to perform military service under certain circumstances may amount to perse-
cution.30 UNHCR has welcomed these points of clarification.31 Article 10 deals with 
the reasons for persecution by seeking to elaborate on each of the Convention 
grounds. UNHCR has pointed out that while this is helpful, it must not be regarded 
as exhaustive.32 
The Directive also introduces common ‘harmonized’ concepts for a range of 
refugee law concepts, as outlined in articles 5 to 8. Positive steps include recognizing 
protection needs arising sur place, and that ‘actors of persecution or serious harm’ may 
be non-State agents, finally bringing French and German law into line with the rest of 
the Member States and UNHCR. Controversially, however, there is a provision on 
‘actors of protection’, which states that protection may be provided by the State, or 
by parties of organizations, including international organizations, controlling the State 
or a substantial part of its territory. The most obvious problem with this is that non-
State actors may have a limited ability to enforce the rule of law,33 and are not bound 
by international human rights treaties.  
                                                        
29  Feller (n. 28), p. 3; see also UNHCR’s Handbook (n. 28) [55]. This element is underestimated in 
Hathaway’s analysis of the well-founded fear standard: Hathaway (n. 24), p. 69. It is reminiscent 
of remarks made during the drafting of the 1951 Convention, when the Israeli delegate ex-
plained that applying objective criteria in certain cases would result in injustice, such as where 
persons’ ‘horrifying memories … made it impossible for them to consider returning’: Ad Hoc 
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, ‘Summary Record of the 18th Meeting’ (31 
January 1950) UN Doc E/AC.32/SR.18 (8 February 1950) [13] (Israel). More recently, Hatha-
way and Hicks have suggested that the ‘objective’ approach to establishing well-founded fear 
does not exclude a particularized inquiry into individual risk: J.C. Hathaway and W.S. Hicks, ‘Is 
There a Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention’s Requirement of “Well-Founded 
Fear”?’ (2005) 26 Michigan J of Int’l L, p. 505, 543–60. 
30  The provision relating to conscientious objection has been significantly curtailed since the 
original proposal.  
31  UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals 
or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection 
and the Content of the Protection Granted (OJ L 304/12 of 30.9.2004’ (January 2005), p. 20–
21. 
32  Ibid., p. 22. 
33  Ibid., p. 18. 
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While there is not the space here to examine each of these concepts in detail, it is 
important to observe that they necessarily impact upon the scope of subsidiary pro-
tection by defining the boundaries of refugee protection. However, they have been 
criticized as an attempt to replace the international refugee law regime with a regional 
one, rather than simply clarifying or complementing international law.34  
2.2 Exclusion Clauses – de jure and de facto 
Article 14 on ‘revocation of, ending of or refusal to renew refugee status’ seems to 
conflate and confuse exclusion, cessation, cancellation and revocation.35 First, article 
14(3)(b) permits States to revoke refugee status if it is discovered that an individual’s 
misrepresentation or omission of facts were decisive for the granting of that status, 
although as UNHCR has observed, this should only be the case if those statements 
were objectively false and if there was an intention to mislead the decision-maker. In 
this connection, UNHCR has noted that the mere use of false documents should not 
render an asylum claim fraudulent. 
Secondly, articles 14(4)–(5), based on article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, ex-
pressly allow Member States to ‘revoke, end or refuse to renew’ refugee status where 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as a danger to the security of the 
Member State, or where he or she constitutes a danger to the community of that 
Member State, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime. Paragraph 5 states that in such circumstances, ‘Member States may decide not 
to grant status to a refugee, where such a decision has not yet been taken.’ This pro-
vision acts as quasi-exclusion clause, in that it permits refugee status to be denied for 
reasons beyond those in the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clauses.  
During the drafting of the Directive, a number of Member States had lobbied for 
a merger of Convention articles 1F and 33(2), and such a formulation appeared in 
early drafts of the instrument.36 The UK government thought that it was important to 
exclude persons who had committed serious crimes from obtaining a protected 
status, but thought that using the grounds of article 33(2) to enforce this ‘would not 
be legally sustainable [or of] practical benefit’.37 UNHCR criticized the incorporation 
of article 33(2) criteria into the Directive’s exclusion clauses because article 1F deals 
with those excluded from refugee status, whereas article 33(2) is concerned with the 
treatment of people who have been found to be refugees, but who nonetheless may 
be removed38 (within the Convention’s scope, although perhaps not under the 
                                                        
34  See H. Storey, The New EU Directive – An Evaluation, paper presented at International Associa-
tion of Refugee Law Judges European Chapter Conference, Dublin May 2002, p. 7; see also G. 
Borchardt (Director, Directorate-General Justice & Home Affairs, European Commission), Re-
port from the Seminar ‘International Protection within One Single Asylum Procedure’ (Migrationsverket 
Nörrkoping 23–24 April 2001), p. 7.  
35  UNHCR’s Annotated Comments (n. 31), p. 28. 
36  12620/02 ASILE 54 (23 October 2002). 
37  House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Fourth Report of Session 2002–03 
(The Stationery Office London 6 January 2003) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
cm200203/cmselect/cmeuleg/63-iv/63.pdf> [6.22]. 
38  Feller (n. 28) 5; Presidency Note to Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
on 5–6 November 2002, 13623/02 ASILE 59 (30 October 2002) 3. 
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broader principle of non-refoulement in human rights law). Indeed, the provisions serve 
different functions: article 1F is motivated by the seriousness of crimes that an indi-
vidual has committed, rendering him or her undeserving of refugee status, whereas 
article 33(2) is directed at protecting the safety of the host State, and turns on an 
assessment that the refugee poses a present or future threat. The ‘merger’ formulation 
was ultimately removed from the Qualification Directive because Member States on 
the whole recognized that an ‘additional exclusion clause would not be compatible’ 
with their obligations under the Refugee Convention.’39 
The exclusion–refoulement distinction has important consequences for the individu-
als concerned. A person who is excluded from refugee status is denied all the rights 
provided for by the Convention (and the Qualification Directive). By contrast, a 
refugee issued with an expulsion order in accordance with article 33(2) remains enti-
tled to at least those rights that are not linked to lawful stay. Even though he or she 
may in practice not be able to benefit from them, thus rendering the difference insig-
nificant in real terms,40 it is important not to entrench article 33(2) as a formal exclu-
sion provision. Article 14(6) of the Qualification Directive recognizes that denial of 
the benefit of the principle of non-refoulement does not equate to a loss of refugee 
status.41 Accordingly, it provides that refugees to whom article 14(4) or 14(5) applies 
remain entitled to (some of) the Convention rights that apply to all refugees, irrespec-
tive of the legality of their presence. ‘Dangerous’ refugees remain entitled to the 
benefits contained in articles 3 (non-discrimination), 4 (religion), 16 (access to courts), 
22 (public education), 31 (refugees unlawfully in the country), 32 (expulsion), and – 
curiously – 33 (non-refoulement).42 By contrast, article 19 of the Qualification Directive, 
on the revocation of subsidiary protection, is silent on the question of resultant 
rights. 
Although the Qualification Directive’s refugee exclusion clauses otherwise appear 
to be the same as those of the Convention, there is an important distinction. Article 
12(2)(b) of the Qualification Directive, based on article 1F(b) of the Convention, 
seeks to restrict the types of acts that constitute political crimes (and hence not ex-
clude a person from refugee status). Although it begins by replicating article 1F(b):  
 
he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to 
his or her admission as a refugee; 
 
                                                        
39  12620/02 ASILE 54 (23 October 2002) 19 fn. 2. See also the view of the UK government in 
House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny (n 37) [6.22].  
40  Presidency Note (n. 38), p. 3–4. 
41  On this point, see the decision of the French Conseil d’Etat SSR in Pham, Dec. No. 148997 (21 
May 1997), where the court stated that although article 33(2) of the Convention permits refoule-
ment in certain circumstances, it does not mean that the benefit of refugee status can be with-
drawn. Lambert takes the same view, arguing that the provision ‘does not provide that such a 
person may not benefit from the provisions of the Refugee Convention at large. Article 33(2) is 
not an exclusion clause’: Lambert (n. 5), p. 178.  
42  It is curious that it is phrased in this way, since even though a refugee to whom article 33(2) 
applies might remain protected by the wider principle of non-refoulement under human rights law, 
article 33(2) expressly deprives a refugee of the benefit of non-refoulement contained in article 
33(1).  
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it then continues: 
 
… particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be 
classified as serious non-political crimes.43 
 
Sweden was opposed to this clause. Spain wanted it to apply explicitly to both par-
ticipants in a crime and to instigators of it, as in the Council Joint Position on the 
Harmonized Application of the Term ‘Refugee’.44 Neither the Directive nor the Joint 
Position give any guidance as to how it should be interpreted. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the scope of refugee status has been narrowed under EC law by providing that 
political crimes involving particularly cruel actions will result in exclusion. The House 
of Lords has noted that article 12(2) ‘plainly affords a narrower ground for claiming 
asylum’.45  
Finally, persons who instigate or otherwise finance, plan or incite terrorist acts are 
excluded from international protection under the Directive, since recital 22 regards 
such acts as constituting acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, 
which are grounds for exclusion under article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention (and 
article 12(2)(c) of the Directive). This is particularly problematic since ‘terrorism’ is 
not defined in international law.46 A person excluded on this basis will necessarily 
also be denied subsidiary protection, because article 17(1)(b) of the Directive excludes 
any person who has committed a ‘serious crime’. 
3. Subsidiary Protection 
3.1 Inclusion Clauses 
The definition of a ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ is set out in article 2(e): 
 
a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in re-
spect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person con-
cerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his 
or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm 
as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not apply, and is unable, or, 
owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.47  
 
                                                        
43  Directive art. 12(2)(b), introduced by 12199/02 ASILE 45 (25 September 2002). 
44  12199/02 ASILE 45 (25 September 2002) 17, referring to Council Joint Position on the Har-
monized Application of the Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’ in Article 1 of the Geneva Con-
vention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees (4 March 1996) OJ L63/2 (13 March 
1996).  
45  Sepet (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2003] UKHL 15 [16] (Lord Bingham) (referring to 
previous numbering as art. 14(2)). 
46  On this issue, see B. Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford: OUP 2006. 
47  7944/04 ASILE 21 (31 March 2004) art. 2(e). It was originally art. 5, but was moved to the 
definitions section in art. 2 by 11356/02 ASILE 40 (6 September 2002). 
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It raises four points of interest. The first concerns its application to ‘third country 
nationals or stateless persons’ only, discussed above in the refugee context. Of 
course, because the Directive is the first instrument to define subsidiary protection at 
an inter-governmental level, this restriction does not breach international law in the 
same way that the limitation on refugee eligibility contravenes the Refugee Conven-
tion,48 but it still constricts the scope of subsidiary protection status. In any case, 
Member States’ human rights law obligations may prevent them from removing indi-
viduals who fall outside the strict terms of the definition.49  
Secondly, a person is only eligible for subsidiary protection where he or she ‘does 
not qualify as a refugee’. This is premised on the idea that the Refugee Convention 
should be given a full and inclusive interpretation, and is particularly pertinent in the 
context of the Qualification Directive regime where refugee status affords a higher 
quality of protection than subsidiary protection status. The result of wrongly charac-
terizing a claim therefore has serious consequences in terms of rights.  
Thirdly, the standard of proof for subsidiary protection is ‘substantial grounds … 
for believing’. This is an objective test, by contrast to article 1A(2) of the Convention 
which contains both objective and subjective elements, requiring an applicant to 
demonstrate a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution. The ‘belief’ in the present definition 
does not relate to the applicant’s belief (unlike the applicant’s well-founded fear), but 
rather to the decision-maker’s judgment that substantial grounds (based on objective 
circumstances) exist for believing that the applicant would face harm.  
The reference to ‘substantial grounds’ stems from the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights on article 3 of the ECHR and the Torture Committee on 
article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and was deliberately selected in order to avoid 
divergence between international and Member States’ practice.50 The Torture Com-
mittee has consistently held that ‘substantial grounds’ involve a ‘foreseeable, real and 
personal risk’ of torture.51 They are to be assessed on grounds that go ‘beyond mere 
                                                        
48  This contravenes article 42 of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits States from limiting the 
personal scope of article 1 (the refugee definition) and making reservations to article 3 (non-dis-
crimination). 
49  E.g. ECHR art. 3, CAT art. 3, ICCPR art. 7. 
50  Council of the European Union Presidency Note to Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum on 25 September 2002 Doc 12148/02 ASILE 43 (20 September 2002) 5. 
The Netherlands supported Sweden’s argument that wording from decisions of the Torture 
Committee should be taken into account to avoid different rulings from different courts of 
bodies concerning similar situations: 12199/02 ASILE 45 (25 September 2002) 3 fn 3. 
51  See e.g. EA v Switzerland (Comm No 28/1995) UN Doc CAT/C/19/D/28/1995 (10 Novem-
ber 1997) [11.5]; X, Y and Z v Sweden (Comm No 61/1996) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/61/1996 
(6 May 1998) [11.5]; IAO v Sweden (Comm No 65/1997) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/65/1997 (6 
May 1998) [14.5]; KN v Switzerland (Comm No 94/1997) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/94/1997 (19 
May 1998) [10.5]; ALN v Switzerland (Comm No 90/1997) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/90/1997 
(19 May 1998) [8.7]; JUA v Switzerland (Comm No 100/1997) UN Doc CAT/C/21/D/100/ 
1997 (10 November 1998) [6.6]; SMR and MMR v Sweden (Comm No 103/1998) UN Doc 
CAT/C/22/D/103/1998 (5 May 1999) [9.7]; MBB v Sweden (Comm No 104/1998) UN Doc 
CAT/C/22/D/104/1998 (5 May 1999) [6.8]; KT v Switzerland (Comm No 118/1998) UN Doc 
CAT/C/23/D/118/1998 (19 November 1999) [6.5]; NM v Switzerland (Comm No 116/1998) 
UN Doc CAT/C/24/D/116/1998 (9 May 2000) [6.7]; SC v Denmark (Comm No 143/1999) 
→ 
JANE MCADAM 
18 
theory or suspicion’ or ‘a mere possibility of torture’,52 but the threat of torture does 
not have to be ‘highly probable’53 or ‘highly likely to occur’.54  
As can be seen from this explanation of ‘substantial grounds’, the Directive effec-
tively incorporates a circular, if not a double, threshold. Whereas the Torture Com-
mittee considers ‘substantial grounds’ to be met by a ‘foreseeable, real and personal 
risk’, the Directive requires that there are (a) substantial grounds for believing that (b) 
there is a real risk to the applicant. Accordingly, the Directive requires a foreseeable, 
real and personal risk of a real risk. It may in fact be easier to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution, and precisely this has occurred in Canada, where the 
courts have determined that a lower standard of proof applies to Convention refugee 
claims than to complementary protection cases. Under section 96 of the Canadian 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the test for a refugee’s well-founded fear of 
persecution is a ‘reasonable chance’ or ‘serious possibility’ of persecution,55 whereas 
individuals fearing removal on the grounds of a personal risk to life or cruel and un-
usual treatment or punishment under section 97 must demonstrate that the risk of ill-
harm on removal is ‘more likely than not’.56  
The fourth notable element of the definition relates to the nature of suffering (‘se-
rious harm’) that may result in subsidiary protection being granted, set out in article 
15. ‘Serious harm’ is defined there as: 
a)  death penalty or execution; or 
b)  torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the 
country of origin; or 
c)  serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscrimi-
nate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
 
These types of harm reveal a strong presumption for Convention status.57 Article 15 
should therefore only apply where the standard of harm does not reach the level of 
persecution and/or there is no link to a Convention ground.  
Paragraph (a) was based on Protocol 6 to the ECHR, prohibiting the imposition 
of the death penalty in peace time, which has since been strengthened by Protocol 13, 
                                                        
UN Doc CAT/C/24/D/143/1999 (10 May 2000) [6.6]; HAD v Switzerland (Comm No 
126/1999) UN Doc CAT/C/24/D/126/1999 (10 May 2000) [4.10]; US v Finland (Comm No 
197/2002) UN Doc CAT/C/30/D/197/2002 (1 May 2003) [7.8]. 
52  EA v Switzerland (n. 51) [11.3]. 
53  Report of the Committee against Torture UN GAOR 53rd Session Supp No 44 UN Doc A/53/44 
(1998) Annex IX.  
54  EA v Switzerland (n. 51) [11.3]. 
55  Adjei v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1989] 2 FC 680, 57 DLR (4th) 153 (CA). 
56  Li v Canada (Minister for Citizenship & Immigration) [2005] 3 FCR 239 (FCA) [27]–[29]. This was 
not envisaged by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: ‘The preferred position of 
IRB Legal Services is that all three grounds for protection should be decided using the same 
standard of proof, namely the Adjei test, “reasonable chance or serious possibility”. The test is 
premised on the prospective nature of the risk and that same prospective element is present in 
all three protection grounds’: Immigration and Refugee Board (Legal Services), Consolidated 
Grounds in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: Persons in Need of Protection: Risk to Life or Risk of 
Cruel and Unusual Treatment or Punishment (15 May 2002) Part 7.  
57  UNHCR’s Observations (n. 18) [42]. 
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prohibiting the death penalty in all circumstances.58 Furthermore, all Member States 
except France are parties to the Second Optional Protocol of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which contains a similar requirement. It is 
also consistent with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights59 and 
the Human Rights Committee.60 
Paragraph (b) derives from Member States’ obligations under article 3 ECHR, but 
with a limitation: it expressly requires that such treatment relate to an applicant ‘in the 
country of origin’. This may be intended to obviate a claim by an asylum seeker that 
he or she would face torture in a third country to which return may be contemplated, 
but in such circumstances article 3 ECHR would still prevent removal. Significantly, 
however, protection under article 3 ECHR alone would not guarantee a legal status, 
but would simply classify the person as non-removable.61 Drafting records reveal that 
the main impetus for the ‘country of origin’ caveat, however, was to permit the re-
moval of ill persons to countries in which they could not obtain adequate medical 
treatment: 
 
However, if sub-paragraph (b) was to fully include the jurisprudence of ECtHR relating to 
Article 3 of EHRC, cases based purely on compassionate grounds as was the case in D ver-
sus UK (1997)1, also known as the Stt. Kitt´s case, would have to be included. 
 
In the Stt. Kitts case, although the lack of access to a developed health system as well as 
lack of a social network in itself was not considered as torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the expulsion to this situation, which would have been lifethreatening to the 
concerned person, was 
described as such. 
 
Consequently, to avoid the inclusion of such compassionate grounds cases under a subsidi-
ary protection regime, which was never the intention of this Directive, the Presidency is 
suggesting to limit the scope of sub-paragraph (b) by stating that the real risk of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment must prevail in his or her country of ori-
gin.62 
 
                                                        
58  Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty (adopted 28 April 1983, entered into 
force 1 March 1985) ETS No. 114. This has since been strengthened by Protocol 13, prohibit-
ing the death penalty in all circumstances: Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the Abolition of the Death Pen-
alty in All Circumstances (adopted 3 May 2002, entered into force 1 July 2003) ETS No. 187.  
59  Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 [88]. 
60  Judge v Canada Comm No 829/1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (5 August 2003). 
61  In Bonger v The Netherlands, App No 10154/04 (15 September 2005) 14, the European Court of 
Human Rights stated that ‘neither Article 3 nor any other provision of the Convention and its 
Protocols guarantees, as such, a right to a residence permit’. In the case of Fornah (Sect’y of State 
for the Home Dept v K; Fornah v Sect’y of State for the Home Dept [2006] UKHL 46, the House of 
Lords also noted that leave to enter on the basis of article 3 ECHR gives rise to a limited and 
uncertain status: [35] (Lord Hope); [121] (Lord Brown).  
62  12148/02 ASILE 43 (20 September 2002) 6 (citation omitted). 
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The Directive therefore regulates only ‘classic’ refoulement cases – where an individual 
fears the positive infliction of ill-treatment in the country of origin – but not ‘humani-
tarian’ cases, such as illness, where ill-treatment stems from the country of origin’s 
failure to provide adequate resources or care combined with termination of care in the 
host EU State.63 The assumption is that ill-treatment ‘in the country of origin’ must 
be constituted by a positive act of harm in that country, rather than deriving from 
deprivation of health care in the host State plus generally inadequate care in the coun-
try of origin. Whether or not decision-makers will interpret the ‘country of origin’ 
requirement so as to exclude combination cases remains to be seen, but given recent 
jurisprudence on ‘humanitarian’ claims and the very high threshold imposed on ap-
plicants, grants of subsidiary protection on this basis seem unlikely.64 Since an article 
3 ECHR claim cannot be brought directly to the ECJ, seeking a ruling on this point 
may not be possible.65 Conversely, the European Court of Human Rights cannot 
make a ruling on how the Directive should be interpreted or implemented.66  
Since there is a strong presumption for Convention refugee status where torture is 
involved,67 article 15(b) would only apply to persons at risk of torture who were un-
able to demonstrate a link to a Convention ground (such as cases where perpetrators 
resort to torture based on purely criminal motivations).68 The provision’s scope 
therefore seems to rest primarily in decision-makers’ interpretation of ‘inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’. While the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights is expected to be particularly influential in this regard,69 national 
interpretations may extend the concept in different directions. Early French case law 
on this provision has focused on protecting individuals from non-State actors whose 
                                                        
63  This is Battjes’ classification: H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006, p. 236–37.  
64  N v Sect’y of State for the Home Dept [2005] UKHL 31. 
65  In the field of asylum, only Member States, not individuals, may appeal to the ECJ: TEC (n. 12) 
arts 68, 234.  
66  In this context, note also the fact that in the international arena, there is no hierarchy of judicial 
institutions with a final body to resolve conflicts: International Law Commission, ‘Report of the 
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law’ UN Doc A/CN.4/L.628 (1 August 2002) 
[15]. For discussion of the relationship between the ECJ and the European Court of Human 
Rights, see H. Battjes, Human Rights Protection in the EU’s Legal Framework: The Relationship between 
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (IARLJ/ILPA Seminar on the 
Refugee Qualification Directive, London 26 June 2006). In areas where EC law leaves Member 
States some discretion (which is the case with all the asylum Directives stipulating ‘minimum 
standards’), Member States retain full responsibility under the ECHR: Bosphorus v Ireland App 
No 45036/98 (30 June 2005) [157]. Accordingly, individual appeal rights to the European Court 
of Human Rights remain unaffected. 
67  UNHCR’s Observations (n 18) [42]. 
68  UNHCR, ‘Some Additional Observations and Recommendations on the European Commis-
sion ‘‘Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status 
of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise 
Need International Protection’’ COM (2001) 510 final, 2001/0207 (CNS) of 12 Sept. 2001’ 
(Geneva, July 2002), p. 7. 
69  It should be noted that ill-treatment due to underlying social or political chaos, or a lack of 
resources, will only satisfy the requisite level of severity in exceptional circumstances: e.g. HLR 
v France (1997) 26 EHRR 29 [42]; D v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423; Henao v The Netherlands App No 
13669/03 (24 June 2003); BB v France App No 30930/96 (9 March 1998). 
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conduct the authorities cannot (or will not) proscribe, granting subsidiary protection 
in cases including domestic violence,70 threats by an employer,71 and risks arising 
from testifying against persons involved in criminal activities.72  
Paragraph (c) reflects the existence of consistent, albeit varied, State practice of 
granting some form of complementary protection to persons fleeing the indiscrimi-
nate effects of armed conflict or generalized violence without a specific link to Con-
vention grounds.73 However, its scope is significantly restricted by a requirement that 
the claimant face an individual threat. The vast majority of Member States supported 
the ‘individual’ requirement to avoid ‘an undesired opening of the scope of this sub-
paragraph’.74 It is strengthened by recital 26:  
 
Risks to which a population of a country or a section of the population is generally exposed 
do normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify as serious 
harm.75 
 
The combined effect of article 15(c) and recital 26 suggest that a person in an area of 
indiscriminate violence will need to at least show that he or she is personally at risk, 
rather than simply being able to claim subsidiary protection status by virtue of geo-
graphical location. This is problematic, since indiscriminate violence by definition is 
random and haphazard.76 If interpreted even more strictly, it might require individu-
als to be singled out, which would establish a higher threshold than is required for 
either Convention-based protection or temporary protection. Indeed, the Temporary 
Protection Directive protects persons  
                                                        
70  Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (7 October 2005) App No 535458 (Mme D). 
71  Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (21 April 2005) App No 494377 (M K). 
72  Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (8 February 2005) App No 493983 (Mlle Z) (a Chinese 
unaccompanied minor feared retribution for testifying against a ‘mafia gang’ involved running a 
clandestine emigration network); Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (21 December 2004) 
App No 483691 (an individual in Moldova denounced the participation of his superior in traf-
ficking cigarettes).  
73  See ECRE, European Asylum Systems: Legal and Social Conditions for Asylum Seekers and Refugees in 
Western Europe (2003) (13 June 2004); ELENA, Complementary/Subsidiary Forms of Protection in the 
EU States – An Overview (April 1999). UNHCR’s mandate extends to such persons: see e.g. 
UNGA Res 1671 (XVI) of 18 December 1961; UNGA Res 1673 (XVI) of 18 December 1961; 
UNGA Res 3143 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973. The UK will also include ‘unlawful killing’ in 
its definition of ‘humanitarian protection’ (its name for ‘subsidiary protection’): The Refugee or 
Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 reg 2, read in con-
junction with UK Immigration Rules rule 339C; Home Office, ‘Implementation of Council Di-
rective 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status 
of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise 
Need International Protection and the Content of Protection Granted: A Public Consultation’ 
(June 2006) [7.4].  
74  12382/02 ASILE 47 (30 September 2002) [4]. 
75  Qualification Directive, recital 26. 
76  E.g. UK Secretary of State’s refusal of asylum on the basis of such violence, as recorded in the 
case of Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248 [13]: ‘But it is noted that the incidents you have 
related were random and part of the army’s general activities directed at discovering and dealing 
with Tamil extremists and that they do not constitute evidence of persecution’; see also [25], 
[40], [52], [62]. 
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who have had to leave their country or region of origin, or have been evacuated … and are 
unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that 
country, who may fall within the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention or other 
international or national instruments giving international protection, in particular: 
(i)  persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence; 
(ii)  persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised 
violations of their human rights.77 
 
States seem fearful of according the same protection when individual status determi-
nation procedures are involved, and accordingly demand a higher threshold of indi-
vidual harm, even though those individuals would be automatically entitled to protec-
tion if they were part of a mass influx from the same area. There seems to be a deep-
seated fear that whole populations will flee on the basis of generalized violence if 
subsidiary protection status does not require individual harm to be demonstrated.78 
This is counterintuitive both to State practice and the EU’s temporary protection 
regime, and some States have in fact refused to transpose the individual element of 
article 15(c) into their national law.79 For the current provision to have any meaning-
ful effect, it would seem that decision-makers will have to be relatively generous in 
determining the ‘individual’ aspect of the risk.80  
For legal and logical consistency, subsidiary protection ought to protect persons 
fleeing individually or in small groups from situations which, in a mass influx, would 
result in protection. The rationale behind the Temporary Protection Directive is that 
the size of the influx makes it inefficient or impossible to process claims in the nor-
mal way,81 not that the nature of the threat is unique to mass influxes. Therefore to 
limit subsidiary protection in this way seems both illogical and inconsistent, premised 
on political fear of numbers rather than any legal basis. 
When the Directive was first proposed in 2001, the definition of ‘serious harm’ 
contained an additional paragraph, which provided that it could consist of a ‘violation 
of a human right, sufficiently severe to engage the Member State’s international obli-
gations’. The potentially wide-ranging scope of this provision was in fact its downfall, 
since the considerable flexibility it would have provided for assessing protection 
                                                        
77  Temporary Protection Directive (n. 2) art. 2(c). 
78  12199/02 ASILE 45 (25 September 2002). 
79  E.g. Belgium’s Loi modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et 
l’éloignement des étrangers (15 September 2006) art 26, which inserted a new art 48/4(2)(c) into the 
Aliens Act 1980: ‘les menaces graves contre la vie ou la personne d’un civil en raison d’une vio-
lence aveugle en cas de de conflit armé interne ou international’; Lithuania’s Law on the Legal 
Status of Aliens (29 April 2004) No IX-2206 (Official Gazette No 73-2539, 3 April 2004) art 87. 
80  See e.g. French jurisprudence on this provision: Commission des Recours des Réfugiés SR (17 
February 2006) App No 419162 (Mlle K) (applicant received subsidiary protection on the basis 
of article 15(c) due to a situation of generalized violence and internal armed conflict in Iraq, and 
the fact she was a single Assyro-Chaldean Christian woman with supposed financial means); 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés SR (17 February 2006) App No 497089 (M A) (applicant 
received subsidiary protection on the basis of article 15(c) due to a situation of generalized vio-
lence and internal armed conflict in Iraq, and the fact that he had been an official in the former 
regime and was a member of a particular political party). 
81  See Temporary Protection Directive (n. 2) art. 2(a). 
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needs was considered as too open and uncertain. The present wording of article 15 
offers relatively little room for expansive interpretation, and for this reason it is likely 
that the phrase ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ will become the 
focal point for seeking to broaden the Directive’s scope, functioning in a similar fash-
ion to the Convention’s ‘membership of a particular social group’ category.  
It seems absurd to exclude known protection categories from the ambit of the Di-
rective. Doing so does not obliterate the existence of such categories, but simply 
recasts the class of non-removable people with an ill-defined legal status. As Vedsted-
Hansen has noted, ‘they are likely to end up in a kind of tolerated situation in the actual 
Member State that may be prohibited from deporting them.’82 At the domestic level, 
it might be possible to argue that such persons ought to receive subsidiary protection 
status because their situation is analogous to that of currently delineated beneficiaries, 
(paralleling the extension of protection offered to ‘de facto refugees’ in the past). How-
ever, given the lack of latitude in the Directive to protect additional groups,83 the 
outcome may be a hardening of the law on the defined subsidiary protection catego-
ries, and a reluctance to grant similar protection to persons outside those categories 
who, ironically, may have had a better claim to protection prior to the introduction of 
the Directive. While this is not a reason to abandon the harmonization attempt, it 
highlights the problems with narrowing down the scope of subsidiary protection too 
far.  
3.2 Exclusion Clauses 
The subsidiary protection exclusion clauses are broader than the refugee ones (both 
under the Qualification Directive and the Convention). In addition to the refugee 
exclusion grounds, a person is excluded from subsidiary protection if he or she ‘con-
stitutes a danger to the community or to the security of the country in which he or 
she is’ (art. 17(1)(d)). This effectively constitutes the merger of article 33(2) and article 
1F of the Refugee Convention which was considered untenable, as a matter of inter-
national law, for refugees under the Directive.84 However, the lack of an international 
instrument on subsidiary protection meant that no analogous legal argument could be 
satisfied with respect to its beneficiaries, although of course States may be precluded 
from removing them from their territories due to their non-refoulement obligation under 
human rights law.  
Additionally, article 17(3) of the Qualification Directive allows Member States to 
exclude an individual from subsidiary protection status 
                                                        
82  J. Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Assessment of the Proposal for an EC Directive on the Notion of Refugee 
and Subsidiary Protection from the Perspective of International Law’, in Bouteillet-Paquet (ed.), 
(n. 11), p. 76. 
83  On this point, see M-T. Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection under EC Law: The EC 
Qualifications Directive and the Right to Be Granted Asylum, revised paper from ‘How Much Free-
dom, Security and Justice?’ ILPA, Justice and the British Institute for Comparative and Interna-
tional Law Conference, London May 2005, p. 4–6, 18–21, querying whether a decision by a 
Member State to grant subsidiary protection to additional categories of persons in accordance 
with international law could be interpreted as a breach of EC law.  
84  See section 2.2 above. 
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if he or she prior to his or her admission to the Member State has committed one or more 
crimes, outside the scope of paragraph 1, which would be punishable by imprisonment, had 
they been committed in the Member State concerned, and if he or she left his or her coun-
try of origin solely in order to avoid sanctions resulting from these crimes. 
 
This provision has no parallel in the Refugee Convention. 
Finally, as discussed above in the context of exclusion from refugee status, per-
sons who instigate or otherwise finance, plan or incite terrorist acts are excluded from 
protection.85  
4. Status 
The Qualification Directive entrenches a hierarchy of rights at a number of levels. 
First, and of primary relevance to the discussion below, is the superiority of refugee 
status over subsidiary protection status. The political compromises needed to secure 
all Member States’ agreement on the final text of the Directive resulted in a more 
greatly differentiated and diluted set of substantive rights for beneficiaries of subsidi-
ary protection than had been originally proposed – a proposal that had itself been 
criticized for failing to provide a single, equal status.86 Secondly, the entitlements of 
refugees’ family members are more extensive than those accorded to family members 
of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.87 Finally, in some cases, subsidiary protec-
tion status may provide more extensive rights than those received by refugees’ family 
members.88  
In May 2003, Germany still had 12 reservations in place on social rights and inte-
gration provisions. It wanted to establish subsidiary protection at the level of the 
former Duldung (tolerance), described as ‘a non-status on the level of immigration 
rights’.89 By September 2003, all the other Member States had agreed on the text of 
                                                        
85  Qualification Directive, recital 22. 
86  As Lambert notes, this is exacerbated by the fact that neither the Reception Conditions Direc-
tive nor the Family Reunification Directive apply to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection: 
Lambert (n. 5) 176. Klug suggests that the original proposal for the Directive created a single 
rights regime for refugees and beneficiaries of complementary protection: Klug (n. 23) 618. 
This is incorrect. Although the Explanatory Memorandum (n. 8) stated that ‘the rules laid down 
[with respect to status] apply to both categories of persons’, it added that this was so ‘unless oth-
erwise indicated’: 28 (emphasis added). A number of distinctions were already present in the 
original proposal. 
87  Article 23(2) of the Qualification Directive provides that although family members of refugees 
and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection ‘are entitled to claim the benefits referred to in Arti-
cles 24 to 34’, that paragraph goes on to state: ‘In so far as the family members of beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection status are concerned, Member States may define the conditions appli-
cable to such benefits.’ Only family members of refugees are entitled to a residence permit un-
der article 24. 
88  Art. 23(4) provides that: ‘Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 [relating to the conferral of 
benefits on family members], Member States may refuse, reduce or withdraw the benefits re-
ferred therein for reasons of national security or public order.’ 
89  Pro Asyl, ‘Council for Justice and Home Affairs in Brussels: Common EU Asylum System in 
Danger of Falling through because of Germany: Appeal to Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign 
→ 
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the Directive, but Germany refused to agree and postponed further negotiations.90 It 
was feared – rightly so – that Member States might submit to German demands sim-
ply to have the text agreed by the deadline of April 2004.91 Three meetings in March 
2004 ultimately secured agreement on a text which accepted many of the German 
demands, finalized on 31 March 2004.  
The areas of difference between refugee status and subsidiary protection status 
are summarized in the table below.92 
Legally, there is no reason why the source of protection should lead to differentiation 
in the rights and status accorded to a beneficiary. UNHCR has stated that rights and 
benefits should be based on need rather than the grounds on which a person has 
been granted protection, and that there is accordingly no valid reason to treat benefi-
ciaries of subsidiary protection differently from Convention refugees.93 Numerous 
other advocates have stressed the importance of treating refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection equally.94  
                                                        
Minister Fischer to Withdraw the German Reservations’ (8 May 2003) <www.proasyl.de/ 
presse03/mai08.htm> (accessed 6 September 2003). For the law on Duldung, see Aufenthaltsgesetz 
§60a, which replaced Ausländergesetz §53 from 1 January 2005. On Germany’s insistence: Third 
UNHCR Working Group on EU Asylum and Migration Harmonization, ‘Summary of the Most 
Important Points of the Proposal for Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualifi-
cation of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Oth-
erwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted’ (21 May 
2003) <www.unhcr.bg/events_records/2003/3unhcr_wg.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2004). 
90  Refugee Council (UK), Refugee Council Briefing on the Common European Asylum System (March 
2004) <www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/downloads/briefings/intl/common_euro.pdf> (accessed 
13 April 2003) 13. 
91  Refugee Council (UK), International Protection Project Update (September 2003), p. 2. 
92  For an extensive discussion on the points of difference, see McAdam (n. 1), p. 497–514. 
93  UNHCR’s Observations (n. 18) [46]; UNHCR, Note on Key Issues of Concern to UNHCR on the 
Draft Qualification Directive (March 2004), p. 2; UNHCR, ‘Towards a Common European Asylum 
System’, in C.D.U. de Sousa and P. de Bruycker (eds), The Emergence of a European Asylum Policy 
(Brussels: Bruylant 2004) 249–50. The rights granted under the Directive to refugees are not 
identical to those contained in the Refugee Convention, although art. 20(1) states that the for-
mer are ‘without prejudice’ to the latter. Accordingly, nothing in the Directive should be under-
stood as displacing additional or more expansive Convention rights. For discussion of the rela-
tionship between the two instruments on this point, see Klug (n. 23) 619–20. Further, UNHCR 
has commented that ‘[I]t is unthinkable that the Member States of the European Union would 
deny refugees the exercise of these Convention rights simply by reason of their express non-
incorporation into Community rule. Still, there is a drafting problem that needs to be remedied’: 
UNHCR, Towards a Common European Asylum System (n. 94), p. 246.  
94  E.g. Amnesty International Irish Section, ‘The Case for Complementary Protection’ (January 
2003) <www.amnesty.ie/act/refug/protection.shtml> (accessed 6 September 2003); Refugee 
Council (UK), ‘Refugee Council’s Response to the Home Office Consultation on Changes to 
the Policy of Issuing of Certificates of Identity’ (February 2003) <www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/ 
downloads/policy_briefings/cid_traveldocs.pdf> (accessed 12 April 2004). 
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 Refugee status Subsidiary protection status 
Family unity 
and rights of 
family mem-
bers 
(art. 23) 
Family members95 entitled to same 
substantive rights 
Same entitlements, but States can 
define applicable conditions to such 
benefits, provided they guarantee ‘an 
adequate standard of living’. 
Residence 
permits  
(art. 24) 
 
• As soon as possible  
• At least 3 years and renewable  
•  Family members: less than 3 years 
and renewable 
•  As soon as possible 
•  At least 1 year and renewable 
 
Travel do-
cument  
(art. 25) 
 
•  Convention travel document  
 
• Travel docs at least for serious hu-
manitarian reasons 
• Only to those who cannot obtain a 
national passport 
Access to 
employment  
(art. 26) 
 
May engage in employed or self-
employed activities immediately after 
status granted 
May engage in employed or self-
employed activities immediately after 
status granted,  
but ‘the situation of the labour market 
in the Member States may be taken 
into account, including for possible 
prioritisation of access to employment 
for a limited period of time to be 
determined in accordance with natio-
nal law.’ 
Social welfare  
(art. 28) 
 
Entitled to necessary social assistance 
on same terms as nationals 
 
Entitled to necessary social assistance 
on same terms as nationals, 
but Member States may limit social 
assistance granted to beneficiaries of 
SP to core benefits.  
Health care  
(art. 29) 
 
Access to health care under the same 
conditions as nationals  
 
Access to health care under the same 
conditions as nationals,  
but Member States may limit health 
care granted to beneficiaries of SP to 
core benefits  
Access to 
integration 
facilities  
(art. 33) 
Provision for integration programmes 
considered to be appropriate to help 
integration into society 
Where Member States consider it 
appropriate, access shall also be gran-
ted to integration programmes 
                                                        
95 ‘Family members’ are defined in art. 2(h)) as: 
- spouse or unmarried partner in stable relationship (where the national aliens law/practice 
treats them in the same way); 
- minor unmarried and dependent children.  
Art. 23(5) permits Member States to grant rights to ‘other close relatives’ who:  
- lived with the family in the country of origin; and  
- were wholly or mainly dependent on the beneficiary of refugee/SP status. 
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Indeed, during the drafting process the UK government had initially seemed to rec-
ognize this, stating that ‘[a]n individual’s needs are the same regardless of the status 
granted; it would help limit the number of appeals by those refused refugee status but 
granted subsidiary protection’.96 (It later shifted its position, however.97) The House 
of Lords Select Committee noted further that: 
 
We urge the Government to push for the extension of the same rights to everybody entitled 
to international protection. Not only would this remove an apparently unjustified discrimi-
nation between Geneva Convention refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, it 
would also, as the Government itself recognises, have practical advantages. It would help 
limit the number of appeals by those refused refugee status but granted subsidiary protec-
tion.98 
 
The European Parliament, in its Explanatory Statement to its amendments to the 
Commission proposal, noted that differences between the rights accorded to refugees 
vis-à-vis beneficiaries of subsidiary protection were arbitrary, particularly as the 
statuses were supposed to be ‘complementary rather than hierarchical.’99  
Equivalent treatment would not only reduce fragmentation of the international 
protection regime but might also minimize the number of appeals against refusal of 
Convention status by persons seeking to obtain the full set of rights which that en-
compasses.100 Indeed, the extra litigation that may result from this issue itself pro-
vides an incentive for the State to grant identical rights.  
Article 3, strengthened by recital 8, does provide that: 
 
Member States may introduce or retain more favourable standards for determining who 
qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection, and for determining 
the content of international protection, in so far as those standards are compatible with this 
Directive, 
 
However, it does not prevent Member States currently providing a higher level of 
protection to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from lowering their standards.101 
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This is a deliberate interpretative choice by Member States, since it does not follow 
from the terms of article 63(1)(c) TEC that minimum standards necessitate the lower-
ing of pre-existing higher standards. Indeed, the European Parliament suggested an 
amendment to prevent States from using the provision to reduce their present stan-
dards,102 however this was not adopted by the Member States. Nevertheless, the UK 
has indicated that it will maintain higher standards in certain areas, such as broaden-
ing the scope of serious harm to include unlawful killing,103 and applying the Direc-
tive to all asylum applicants, including from within the EU.104 
Lambert, however, considers the wording of article 3 to be problematic because 
standards that are ‘compatible’ with the Directive could be interpreted to mean ‘con-
sisten[t] with the provisions contained in the Directive’.105 Accordingly, Member 
States with less restrictive provisions in force would have to adopt more restrictive 
ones to bring them into line with the Directive.  
5. Conclusion 
The Qualification Directive ought help to clarify the Member States’ previously di-
verse practices relating to refugees and other people in need of international protec-
tion, and in this way stabilize the pace of reform. Together, these may be viewed as 
positive outcomes. However, the decision to restrict the Directive to simply harmo-
nizing existing concepts and methods of subsidiary protection in the EU means that 
it does not create a new system of protection per se,106 but distils State practice by 
(supposedly) drawing on the ‘best’ elements of the former 15 Member States’ national 
systems.107 Indeed, Geoff Gilbert has described the process as one of ‘equalizing 
down’ at the refugee’s expense,108 arguing that harmonization has been driven by an 
immigration control mentality, rather than one focused on the protection needs of 
individuals, and the international protection obligations of States. Although the 1999 
Tampere Conclusions called upon Member States to respect the ‘the full and inclu-
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sive application of the Geneva Convention’ and the right to seek asylum (further 
supported in the 2001 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention),109 the 
rhetorical flourishes that kickstarted the process of harmonization have not necessar-
ily been translated into the provisions of the various Directives. 
The result is a political compromise that, while based on international and re-
gional human rights standards, remains conservative in its scope. It is not an innova-
tive blueprint applying human rights law to the protection context, since it extracts 
the least contestable human rights-based protections which already formed part of 
most Member States’ protection policies. The ‘new’ element of subsidiary protection 
in the Qualification Directive is the provision of a definitive status for its beneficiar-
ies, although the status ultimately agreed upon reflects the hierarchical structure of 
the Directive which equates the ‘full and inclusive’ application of the Convention 
with a superior status for refugees. 
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The Role of the European Court of Justice 
 
 
Jean-Yves Carlier* 
Introduction 
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, one of the main criticisms concerning the intergov-
ernmental immigration policy within the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs was 
that no competence was delivered to the ECJ. This was the case, for instance, for the 
Joint Position on the harmonized application of the definition of the term refugee in 
the Geneva Convention (1996, OJ, L. 63). Thus, it is interesting today to specify the 
role and the competence of the ECJ with regard to the Qualification Directive. 
It is known that, generally speaking, there are two kinds of appeals to the Court of 
Justice in EC law. First, a direct appeal, mainly through the review of legality of acts. 
Second, an indirect appeal through the preliminary question by a domestic court. 
These two complementary remedies, the common one and the domestic one, are 
usually presented as, and I quote the Court: “a complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted 
by the [European] institutions” (UPA, § 40). This is not totally correct. As in cases 
Union de Pequeños Agricultores, C-50/00 (2002) and Jego-Quéré, C-263/02 (2004), the 
Court did reaffirm, contrary to the views of the Court of First Instance (Jégo-Quéré, 
2002) and to the Opinion of General Attorney Jacobs, that for a natural person to 
institute proceedings against an act is not “of direct and individual concern” if he is 
not singled out, even when there is no possibility of individual appeal to the domestic 
courts. This is not really important in the context of the Qualification Directive, as it 
is clear that a natural person could not be considered as having a “direct and individ-
ual concern” following Article 230 EC. The only means of common EC protection 
will, of course, be the preliminary question. However, before we turn to this, let me 
just make two more short remarks on the direct appeal by review of legality. 
The first remark is on the possibility for a European Institution, such as the Par-
liament or the Commission, to institute proceedings against a directive. This was not 
done against the Qualification directive, but was done, for instance, by the Parliament 
against the Family reunification directive. The arrest in the Family reunification case 
(2006) is usually presented as negative because the Court refused the request for an-
nulment of some articles on the basis of the protection of family life. My comment 
would not be so severe. Even if the Court did relinquish a large margin of apprecia-
tion to the Council, it was after an examination of the proportionality of the measure 
and with reference, for the first time in an arrest, to the Charter of fundamental 
rights. This is important, in my view, since in Article 18 the Charter states that “The 
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right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951”. 
The second remark would be for the future, if the Constitution should enter into 
force. Instituting proceedings against an act would be a bit more open for persons, 
but only for regulatory acts that do not entail implementing measures, which would 
still not be the case for a directive or framework law (Const. Art. III-365, § 4). 
Let us turn now to the preliminary question with regard to a directive in general, 
and to the Qualification Directive in particular.  
There are two questions.  
First, the question of when. When is there a possibility or an obligation of pre-
liminary question (I)? It is a question of procedure. 
Second, the question of what. What shall be the question? It is also the question 
of the direct effect of a directive (II). It is a question of content. 
I. The Possibility of Preliminary Question (When?) 
When can domestic courts refer a question to the ECJ? The general rule of Article 
234 EC is well known: “any” court or tribunal “may” refer questions to the Court “if 
it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment” 
and “courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law” 
must refer such questions. 
It is also known that there is a specific rule in Title IV of the Treaty (which con-
cerns not only visa, asylum and immigration, but also other policies linked to free 
movement of persons, such as in International private law: Regulation Brussels I and 
IIbis). This specific rule of Article 68 EC introduces two limitations to preliminary 
questions. One is formal: only courts whose decisions are not subject to review have 
competence to refer a question in this matter (Art. 68, § 1 EC). One is substantial, 
and probably less important for the Qualification Directive. It is the exclusion of 
questions about “maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of national 
security” linked to internal borders control (Art. 68, § 2, EC). 
Let us turn to the general rule of article 234 EC (A) before taking a look at the 
specific rule of Article 68 EC (B). 
A. General Rule (234 EC) 
A first instance court “may” refer a question to the ECJ and a “court whose decisions 
are not subject to review”, which usually means a supreme court (House of Lords, 
Constitutional Court, Cour de Cassation, Conseil d’Etat, Raad van State, …), must 
refer a question. But both “first” and “last” instance courts refer the question “if it 
considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment”. 
Thus, even courts whose decisions are not subject to review have a kind of margin of 
appreciation. They enjoy a power of appraisal to ascertain whether a question is nec-
essary (Cilfit, 1982). It is clear that when Article 234, § 3, uses the word “such” a 
question, it refers to a “necessary” question, as in § 2. However, this power of “ap-
praisal” does not simply lead to a possibility to refer the question. In fact, the respon-
sibility of the State may be involved if a court, and especially a Supreme Court due to 
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its duty to refer the question, did not refer a proposed question and made a “manifest 
infringements of [Community] law” (Köbler, 2003, §§ 53-55). After having said that 
in the Köbler case, the Court confirmed it and condemned the Italian legislation that 
excluded in general the responsibility of a Supreme Court when not correctly apply-
ing community law (Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA, 2006). 
The problem, for a natural person, and particularly for a refugee refused admit-
tance, would be of course to introduce a new procedure in responsibility against the 
State afterwards. This means that, in practice, in most of the cases, courts whose 
decisions are not subject to review would benefit from a large power of appraisal. 
B. Special Rule (68 EC) 
If we consider now the special rule of Article 68 EC, we know that only courts whose 
decisions are not subject to review shall refer a preliminary question. Three points are 
of interest: (1) What is a court whose decisions are not subject to review?, (2) What is 
the role of first instance courts?, (3) Is there, for courts whose decisions are not sub-
ject to review, an obligation to refer questions? 
1) What is a court whose decisions are not subject to review? 
A court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is, in 
principle, a Supreme Court. However, a more concrete view may argue that it is, in 
concreto, in the case pending that the decision will not be subject to review. This could 
be important in an asylum procedures as, in practice, the last instance could be differ-
ent in different procedures, for instance for a manifestly unfounded application. Case 
law seems to go in this direction (Costa, 1964; Georgescu, 2004 about the visa regula-
tion for Rumanians, 539/2000, where the Court says that “the decision in principal will 
be subject to review”, § 32). There was a similar limitation for the preliminary ques-
tion on the Brussels Convention (1968, protocol of 1971, OJ 1990, L 189/2 for a 
consolidated version, before the Regulation Brussels I) that was limited to appeal 
courts (which is, paradoxically, less limited than in Regulation Brussels I now in-
cluded in Title IV EC; the Roma Convention on Conflict of Laws in contract matters 
was also limited to supreme courts and with just a “faculty”, OJ 1989, L 48/1, art. 2). 
In the case Torline (2004) the Court did accept a question of a first instance tribunal 
that was not subject to review. 
2) What is the role of first instance courts? 
We should bear in mind that even if a first instance court is not able to refer a pre-
liminary question to the Court, it has to apply and interpret Community law. What if 
this tribunal has some doubt on the conformity of domestic law with Community law 
or of Community law with International law? It is a question of content and of con-
flict of laws, depending also on the “effet direct” of the directive (infra, II), but let us 
just say here that the domestic tribunal has to apply domestic law in conformity with 
Community law, but may not, in principle, judge the conformity of Community law 
with International law. The question here is just what could the tribunal do? In his 
book on European Asylum Law and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), re-
quested reading in this matter, Hemme Battjes suggests several solutions (pp. 573-
975). The most realistic is to declare the Qualification Directive incompatible with the 
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Geneva Convention, to refuse to apply the directive on the basis of Article 307 EC. 
This will force the State authority to introduce an appeal with, probably, at the end, a 
preliminary question. 
3) Is there an obligation to refer questions? 
We are speaking here only of Courts whose decisions are not subject to review. Arti-
cle 68 EC is, on this point, not exactly the same as Article 234 EC. It says that this 
Court “shall … request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon” and not that it 
“must” refer a question. This difference does not lead to a different interpretation. As 
we have seen, through the “necessity” of the question, there is always a possibility of 
appraisal. 
II. The Content of the Preliminary Question, Linked to the Direct Effect 
(What?) 
One could imagine two kinds of questions. First, the conformity of national law with 
the Qualification Directive (A). Second, the conformity of the Qualification Directive 
with International law (B). 
A. Conformity of Domestic Law with the Qualification Directive 
As the Qualification Directive provides for minimum standards with, as often in a 
directive, the possibility for Member States to “introduce or retain more favourable 
standards”, there is no need for a preliminary question if the domestic law is more 
favourable than the directive. For instance on the definition of subsidiary protection, 
in his transposition of the Qualification Directive, the Belgian law did decide to sup-
press the terms “and individual” in Article 15, c, which means that serious harm con-
sists of “serious […] threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”. It is a broader defi-
nition. 
On the contrary, it could happen that domestic law is less protective than the di-
rective, for instance if there is no subsidiary protection provided. As we are after the 
date of transposition, I will not address the question of the effect of a directive before 
the date of transposition and the obligation for States to refrain from taking any 
measures liable to seriously compromise the result prescribed by the directive (Interen-
vironnement Wallonie, 1997). I would just draw your attention to the Mangold (2005) 
case, that could be of interest before but also after the date of transposition for a 
directive linked to fundamental rights. The fundamental right in question in this case 
was the right to equal treatment regarding age. As the date for the transposition of 
the non-discrimination directive (Dir. 2000/78) was not yet past, and as Article 13 
EC on non-discrimination is not of direct effect, Germany said that its domestic law, 
allowing fixed-term employment contracts for older workers was not contrary to 
Community law. The Court said that it was in contradiction with Community law 
because “the source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition of those forms 
of discrimination [is] found […] in various international instruments and in the con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States” (§ 74) so that “The principle of 
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non-discrimination on grounds of age must thus be regarded as a general principle of 
Community law” (§ 75). This could be of importance, for two reasons, also in asylum 
law and for the interpretation of the Qualification Directive, even after the date of 
transposition. First, it is difficult to know today how far the Court could go on the 
principle of non-discrimination for the different criteria (race, ethnicity, religion, 
conviction, sexual orientation, …) as a general principle of Community law. Second, 
it is interesting to note that when a directive confirms a principle of International law, 
this could reach the level of general principle of Community law. 
The central question now is, what is the effect of the directive after the date of 
transposition if a Member State did not implement the directive or did it incorrectly. 
Of course, the directive has a sort of indirect effect in a way that domestic courts 
must read domestic law in accordance with Community law. This is the theory of the 
conciliatory interpretation of domestic and Community law. But what happens if it is 
impossible and if there are doubts so that a Supreme Court should ask a preliminary 
question? Then, of course, the central question is that of the direct effect of a direc-
tive, and particularly the vertical direct effect between a person and the State (I will 
not address here the horizontal direct effect, as the Qualification Directive does not 
impose obligations between individuals, but this debate, which in my view is not 
closed, could be of importance for the “reception” directive). 
If the Treaty provided that a regulation is “directly applicable” (Art. 249 EC), it 
did not for a directive. However, case law came to the conclusion that it is not be-
cause a directive is not directly applicable that some provision of the directive could 
not have direct effect. The best proof that a directive has, at least, some effect, even 
without transposition, is in the possibility for the Commission to “bring the matter 
before the Court of justice” after the date of transposition. A provision of Commu-
nity law, including a directive, has direct effect when it is clear, precise and uncondi-
tional. The wording of each provision is the most important test. 
If one tries the exercise to look at the wording of all articles in the Qualification 
Directive, the result will not be easy, and I will not do it here. I will just call your 
attention to two elements. First, some articles do use the wording “may be” (Art. 5, 
8). In this case, direct effect seems unlikely, but most of those articles concern the 
possibility for Member States to do more than the minimum standard. The second 
point is, in my view, the most important: the obligation to grant (I would prefer to 
recognize) refugee status (Art. 13) or subsidiary protection (Art. 18) if the applicant 
for international protection fulfils the criteria of the definition. And the wording of 
the important elements of interpretation of the definition is clear and precise: “Actors 
of persecution or serious harm include” (Art. 6). This provision is quite important for 
the definition of non-State actors that “are unable or unwilling to provide protection 
against persecution”. This definition is broader than the one found in the Joint Posi-
tion in 1996, and applied by domestic case law in some Member States like France; 
“acts of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention 
must” (Art. 9); “serious harm consists of” (Art. 15). All those provisions are clearly of 
direct effect. If, for instance, a domestic law doesn’t have any status of subsidiary 
protection, this would be in contradiction with the statement of Article 18 “Member 
States shall grant subsidiary protection status…”, even if, according to the procedure 
directive, Member States may have separate procedures for subsidiary protection 
(Art. 3, §§ 3 and 4, Procedure directive). 
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In conclusion, one may say that most of the provisions of the Qualification Direc-
tive are of direct effect. 
B. Conformity of the Qualification Directive with International Law 
One could see two possibilities. First, the national legislator decides that on one point 
or another the Qualification Directive is not in conformity with international law. If 
domestic law then adapts the transposition of the directive to international law, there 
is no problem. It does not matter that the criticism against the directive be correct or 
not. If we assume that the result would be a more favourable standard of protection, 
this would be in conformity with the directive (Art. 3) and would not require a pre-
liminary rule.  
The second possibility is that a domestic court thinks that one point or another of 
the directive is in contradiction with International and domestic law does not correct 
this. Even if there is no law of transposition, or if domestic law does not cover this 
point, it would be difficult to sustain that there is no obligation to apply the directive 
because this specific provision would not be of direct effect. The indirect effect 
would impose the conciliatory interpretation: domestic law, and even the silence of 
domestic law, must be interpreted in conformity with the directive. However, at least 
for the Qualification Directive, all rules appear to set minimum standards and it is not 
Community law as such that would be in contradiction with International law, but the 
domestic law that can protect more, according to the directive, and must do it, ac-
cording to International law. Then, in conformity with its Constitutional law, the 
domestic court could refuse to apply the domestic law in contradiction to Interna-
tional law. If there is a doubt on the interpretation of the conformity between Com-
munity law, as transposed by national law, and International law, at the end of the 
domestic procedure, it would be the responsibility of the Court whose decision will 
not be subject to review, to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ. 
In conclusion, it could be said that, in theory, a solution could be found for every 
difficulty of interpretation of the Qualification Directive, if necessary by a preliminary 
rule in Luxembourg. I’m afraid that it will not be so easy in practice. Let me conclude 
by an example. 
There is an asylum seeker coming from Afghanistan. His application for refugee 
status is refused on exclusion rule because he committed “particularly cruel actions 
that even committed with an allegedly political objective is classified as serious non-
political crime”, to use the wording of Article 12, § 2, b Qualification Directive. His 
lawyer believes that this is contrary to the Geneva Convention. Shall he obtain from a 
first instance domestic court a decision that refuses to apply domestic law, arguing 
that if it is in conformity with Community law, it is not in conformity with Interna-
tional law? If yes, after appeal, shall he obtain from the Supreme Court a preliminary 
question to the Court, proving that this is necessary to give judgment? If yes, and if 
the State did take the precaution of adding that this decision and the order to leave 
the country was a decision relating to “the safeguarding of internal security”, the State 
would say then that, according to Article 68, § 2 EC, “The Court of Justice shall not 
have jurisdiction to rule on any measure or decision … relating to the maintenance of 
law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. The lawyer could say that 
this does not apply to the Qualification Directive because Article 68, § 2 EC concerns 
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a “decision taken pursuant to Article 62 (1), which is the absence of control at inter-
nal borders”. The State could contest that this was an error and should call on Article 
62 (2) concerning external borders and that, anyway, internal security remains rele-
vant for internal borders with other Member States. The lawyer could argue that, in 
any case, it is up to the Luxembourg court to decide if this is a question of internal 
security or not, like in the visa case (Com. v. Council, C-170/56, 1988, see also CFI, 
Segi, T-2004). Will the Court follow the lawyer and give a preliminary rule? If not, 
could he take the train to Strasbourg and contest the effectivity of the Community 
protection system for fundamental rights? He will then have to face the Bosphorus case 
(E Court HR, Bosphorus, 2005) considering that the Community legal order provides 
for protection that is “equivalent” to that provided under the Human Rights Conven-
tion. 
I leave this open for the practice. 
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
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Convention and the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC of 
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At the Tampere European Council in October 1999, the Member States undertook to 
establish a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) based on the full and inclu-
sive application of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as 
supplemented by the 1967 New York Protocol, seeking to affirm the principle of 
non-refoulement and to ensure that no one in need of international protection is sent 
back to persecution. The creation of such a system entails, in the short term, closer 
alignment of the rules on the recognition and content of refugee status. 
The main objective of the Qualification Directive is, on the one hand, to ensure 
that Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely 
in need of international protection, and, on the other hand, to guarantee that a mini-
mum level of benefits is available for such persons in all Member States. The Direc-
tive will apply to all applications made at the border or in the territory of a Member 
State. In addition, Member States are free to introduce or retain more favourable 
standards. 
The Directive’s Preamble refers to other documents, in particular to the 1951 
Refugee Convention as the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the pro-
tection of refugees (preambular paragraph 3). 
Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Preamble read:  
  
“This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in 
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, this 
Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity and the right to asylum of appli-
cants for asylum and their accompanying family members.  
With respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this Directive, Mem-
bers States are bound by obligations under instruments of international law to which they 
are party and which prohibit discrimination.” 
  
This makes clear that the Directive seeks to incorporate Member States’ obligations 
both under the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the 1950 European Human 
Rights Convention (ECHR). 
As an aside, it is worth recalling that all EU Member States are parties to the 
ECHR, given that they are all members of the Council of Europe, whereas not all 
                                                        
*  Judge of the European Court of Human Rights. The views expressed are those of the author. 
JÁN ŠIKUTA 
42 
Council of Europe Member States are members of the EU, and consequently are not 
bound by the Directive or other binding EC legislation. 
A. The 1951 Refugee Convention as a Tool for Specifying Acts of 
Persecution 
The relationship between the Refugee Convention and the ECHR is also highlighted 
by Article 9(1) of the Directive, which deals with an individual’s qualification as a 
refugee:  
  
“Acts of persecution within the meaning of Article 1 A of the Geneva Convention must: 
(a) be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of 
basic human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under 
Article 15 (2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms; or  
(b) be accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which is suf-
ficiently severe as to the affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a)”.  
  
Therefore, while the definition of “refugee” is formulated in Article 2(c) of the Direc-
tive as meaning a third country national or a stateless person, who, owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opin-
ion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality 
or former habitual residence, and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return and to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country”, substantially 
reflecting Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, Article 9 of the Directive uses the 
ECHR to help enumerate and identify acts that may constitute persecution, for the 
purposes of the Directive’s definition. 
Article 15(2) of the ECHR provides that: “no derogation from Article 2 [right to 
life], except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3 
[prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment], 4 (para-
graph 1) [prohibition of slavery and servitude] and 7 [no punishment without law] 
shall be made under this provision.” 
It can be therefore concluded that according to Article 9(1) of the Directive, vio-
lations of certain ECHR rights and freedoms may be considered as acts of persecu-
tion for the purposes of Directive’s refugee definition, and thereby qualify asylum 
applicants for recognition as refugees (provided that the other elements of the refu-
gee definition are met). 
B. Directive, National Law and the ECHR 
The Directive came into force on 20 October 2004 and Member States had to trans-
pose it into domestic law by 10 October 2006. It is thus clear that the Directive im-
pacts on national law, which in turn has an effect on the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg and its jurisprudence. 
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There is already well-established case law of the Strasbourg Court dealing with 
refugees and rejected asylum seekers, in particular relating to Article 3 of the ECHR 
(expulsion cases relating to feared torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment), Article 5 (the right to liberty and security), Article 8 (the right to respect for 
private and family life) and Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy). 
Content of International Protection 
B.1 Protection from Refoulement 
As has already been noted, cases of refoulement, expulsion or deportation of a third 
country national or stateless person may violate Article 3 of the ECHR where such 
expulsion may be considered as (or result in) torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 
The Qualification Directive deals with protection from refoulement in Article 21, 
which provides that:  
  
“1. Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their 
international obligations.  
2. Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Member 
States may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when  
 (a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to the security of 
the Member State in which he or she is present; or  
 (b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State.” 
  
A similar provision is contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Articles 32 and 33 
deal with expulsion and prohibition of expulsion or return, according to which “no 
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”. The benefit of that provision may not, however, “be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security 
of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of 
a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” 
It is thus clear that the exception to the non-refoulement principle applies only to 
persons whom there are reasonable grounds for considering a danger to national 
security, or who have been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious 
crime and are a danger to the security of the country or community of the country. 
By contrast, Article 3 of the ECHR contains an absolute protection from removal 
to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, regardless of whether the 
individual concerned constitutes a danger to the security or community of the coun-
try. In the Court’s opinion, “Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the fun-
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damental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”.1 This 
absolute protection was demonstrated also in several Court judgements, such as Soer-
ing v. United Kingdom, and Ireland v. United Kingdom, where it was said: “it follows that 
the prohibition under Article 3 of the Convention is an absolute one and that there 
can never be under the Convention, or under international law, a justification for acts 
in breach of that provision.”  
B.2  Maintaining Family Unity 
Expulsion of a third country national or stateless person can also be viewed also from 
the perspective of maintaining the family unity. Article 23 of the Directive requires 
Member States to ensure that family unity can be maintained. 
While the 1951 Refugee Convention does not refer to the principle of family unity 
as such, Article 8 of the ECHR provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. Section 2 of that provi-
sion reads: “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or mor-
als, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
That means that a State may only interfere with family life if: (a) the interference is 
in accordance with law; (b) is for a specified reason (national security, public safety, 
etc) and (c) is necessary in a democratic society. The first of these is particularly im-
portant in light of ECHR jurisprudence, since the Qualification Directive (like any 
other EU binding legislation) establishes certain conditions, criteria and standards 
which Member States are obliged to respect, and which must be implemented in 
national law. It is according to such law that any interference must be assessed.  
As regards the Strasbourg Court’s case law, for cases of expulsion of family mem-
bers the Court has developed the so-called Boultif criteria, which a should be taken 
into consideration when assessing whether expulsion amounts to a violation of Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR: 
- the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant (if any); 
- the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which s/he is to be expelled; 
- the time elapsed since any offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct 
during that period; 
- the nationalities of the various persons concerned;2 
- the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of marriage, and other factors 
expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life; 
- whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered 
into a family relationship; 
- whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; 
- the best interests and well-being of the children; 
                                                        
1  Ahmed v Austria, Application No. 25964/94. 
2  Boultif v Switzerland, Application No. 54273/00. 
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- the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to 
encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; 
- the strength, solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and 
with the country of destination; 
- the seriousness of difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the coun-
try to which the applicant is to be expelled. 
  
These criteria were recently reaffirmed and further developed by the Grand Chamber 
in Uner v. The Netherlands.3 
B.3 Freedom of Movement within the Member State 
Issues relating to the expulsion of a third country national are very closely connected 
to those concerning the admission of foreigners to EU territory, and the regulation of 
their right to liberty and freedom of movement. It is understandable that, prior to the 
expulsion of a third country national, as assessment must be made of whether his/her 
deportation would constitute a breach of the basic human right contained in Article 3 
of the ECHR – the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  
According to Article 32 of the Directive, Member States must accord freedom of 
movement within their territory to beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection 
status, under the same conditions and restrictions as those provided for other third 
country nationals legally resident in their territories. 
Similarly, according to Article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, each Contract-
ing State must accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their 
place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations 
applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR also provides that: “Everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following 
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. Paragraph (f) includes as 
such a case: “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unau-
thorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation or extradition”. 
While there is no dispute that Member States must allow a third country national 
or stateless person to submit a request for international or subsidiary protection (see, 
for example, Articles 2(g), which defines “application for international protection”) 
and Article 4(5)(d), which provides that “the applicant [must have] applied for inter-
national protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate 
good reason for not having done so”), there are different opinions regarding the 
lawfulness of States’ restrictions on (or deprivation of) the freedom of movement of 
those seeking international protection, namely asylum-seekers. Whether such persons 
may be detained, and if so, for how long and on what grounds, are questions which 
States have not formally resolved. 
                                                        
3  Application No. 46410/99. 
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Article 5 of the ECHR does not prohibit detention as such, but it contains an ex-
haustive list of situations in which detention may be resorted to, as well as procedural 
guarantees. Article 5 does not differentiate between nationals, third country nationals 
or stateless persons, instead using the term “everyone”. Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, 
from its context, can be interpreted as relating only to non-nationals, foreigners and 
aliens, given that only those categories of individuals can be deported or extradited, 
or can be prevented from entering an EU Member State. However, this provision 
does not make any distinction between ordinary migrants, foreigners, and aliens, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, asylum-seekers, refugees or other third country na-
tionals seeking international protection or subsidiary protection, as covered by the 
Qualification Directive. 
In other words, while Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR does not distinguish between 
different categories of non-nationals, the Qualification Directive does. 
UNHCR argues that the detention of asylum-seekers is inherently undesirable un-
der normal circumstances.4 The Strasbourg Court’s position has typically been that 
States “have the undeniable sovereign right to control aliens’ entry into and residence 
in their territory”.5 
However, this is constrained by Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, which only permits 
an alien’s detention under the following circumstances: 
- in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law; 
- to prevent his/her effecting an entry into the country;  
- an entry into the country must be unauthorised; or,  
- with a view to deportation or extradition.  
 
A few months ago, the Court dealt with a case6 in which, inter alia, provision of Arti-
cle 5(1)(f) of the ECHR was revoked, detention of an asylum-seeker in view of pre-
vention his effecting unauthorised entry into the country. 
In the instant case, the applicant had arrived at London Heathrow Airport on 30 
December 2000 and applied for asylum upon his arrival at the immigration desk, in 
line with the national law. He followed all the instructions given to him by the immi-
gration authorities and reported to them on a regular basis. He did not misuse the 
asylum procedure and did not hide. On the contrary, he co-operated with the immi-
gration officers. He was granted legally recognized admission. The grant of temporary 
admission was subsequently extended twice, on two consecutive days. When he re-
ported himself to the immigration authorities for the fourth time, following their 
instructions, he was detained.  
It was open to the United Kingdom authorities, when the applicant arrived in the 
UK, to deprive him of his liberty (that is, to detain him) under Article 5(1)(f) to pre-
vent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. On the basis of the facts in 
this case, the purpose of the applicant’s detention was not, however, to prevent the 
                                                        
4  See UNHCR Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, 
3 February 1999. 
5  Amuur v France, Application No. 19776/92, judgment of 25 June 1996. 
6  Saadi v United Kingdom, Application No. 13229/03, recently pending before the Grand Chamber 
of ECtHR. 
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applicant’s entry at all. If the competent authorities had been of the opinion that 
there existed grounds for detaining him in order to prevent him from effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the territory, they could have exercised that “right to control 
entry” at that moment for the purpose set out in Article 5(1)(f). However, the immi-
gration authorities, on the contrary, granted him “temporary admission” and he was 
permitted to stay at a hotel of his choice inside the country. The grant of temporary 
admission was subsequently extended twice, on two consecutive days. Therefore, it 
seems apparent that the pre-condition for the applicant’s detention, namely that it be 
for the purpose of preventing him from affecting an unauthorised entry into the 
country, was not met, for the simple reason that the immigration authorities had 
already admitted him. 
From a legal point of view, from the moment of lodging the asylum application, 
the asylum procedure started. The asylum procedure is legally recognized and pre-
scribed by national law. It is a procedure which can last for anything from a few days 
to several years. The possibility of detaining an asylum seeker at any time during the 
asylum procedure on the ground that it was to “prevent his affecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country” would represent great legal uncertainty for the person con-
cerned. States which are parties to international instruments dealing with the legal 
status of asylum seekers and refugees (such as the 1951 Refugee Convention) are 
obliged to grant an asylum seeker admission to the territory (but not a residence per-
mit) until the final decision in the asylum procedure is taken. This also happened in 
the instant case, where the respondent Government admitted the applicant to the 
territory. The applicant, ironically, was detained for seven days, and was then released 
from detention after his asylum claim had been refused. 
Under international law, a State has the right, by virtue of its sovereignty, to con-
trol the entry and stay of foreigners on its territory. It is, however, equally well estab-
lished that a State party to the ECHR must be deemed to agree to restrict the free 
exercise of its rights under general international law to the extent and within the lim-
its of the obligations which it has accepted under that instrument.  
Several important questions can be asked in order to determine whether the asy-
lum-seeker was detained in accordance with Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR: 
1.  in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law – Was the detention procedure for an 
alien or economic migrant the same as the procedure for detention of an asylum-
seeker? If so, was it in line with international standards or EU binding legislation? 
Should there be any difference in such detention procedures for asylum-seekers? 
Could the asylum-seeker be detained after he complied with all relevant legal re-
quirements when asking for international protection? 
2.  to prevent his/her effecting an entry into the country – Was the purpose for detention met, 
when, in the instant case, the applicant was detained only after he was admitted to 
the territory of the UK? Can be an asylum-seeker prevented from entering the 
country when seeking international protection or subsidiary protection, according 
to EU legislation? 
3.  an entry into the country must be unauthorised – Is the entry into the country considered 
as unauthorised in cases where an asylum-seeker applies for asylum or other pro-
tection and complies with all relevant international standards and legislation in 
force? What is the legal character of stay of an asylum-seeker pending his asylum 
procedure? Is such stay unauthorised? Is this in line with EU legislation? 
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4. with a view to deportation or extradition – What was the real purpose and aim of appli-
cant’s detention? Would it more fit to the instant case, if the asylum-seeker was 
detained with a view to deportation? 
 
This example suggests the extent to which EU law, through its national transposition, 
may influence the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the ECHR. Since the Qualifi-
cation Directive distinguishes between different categories of non-nationals and ac-
cords certain categories (e.g. asylum-seekers and refugees) higher standards than 
other foreigners, this will consequently have an impact on the application of the Arti-
cle 5(1)(f) of the ECHR for those categories. 
The influence of EU instruments, such as the Qualification Directive, on Stras-
bourg jurisprudence is most likely to be felt in areas where the ECHR requires acts to 
be in “accordance with national law”, due to the transposition requirements of the 
asylum Directives. In this context, therefore, new binding EU legislation may help 
the Court to further develop its jurisprudence. 
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Subsidiary Protection and Reduced Rights 
 
 
Hemme Battjes* 
1.  European Asylum 
The entry into force of the Qualification Directive is, I think, a truly constitutional 
moment in the history of asylum law. For it is the first international – or for the or-
thodox European lawyers amongst us: supranational – instrument that states a right 
to asylum. It gives a right to asylum in the sense of a legally enforceable claim to a 
residence permit adorned with several residential rights. This is really something new. 
Even the Refugee Convention does not confer an enforceable claim to residence 
permit. For persons who cannot be expelled under Article 3 ECHR, the change is 
even more tremendous: from mere prohibition on expulsion, subsidiary protection is 
changed into asylum.1   
Having said that, we should proceed and look inside this asylum in order to sort 
out which it bestows on its beneficiaries (or as the heading of Chapter VII of the 
Qualification Directive calls it, the “content of international protection”). It turns out 
that for Convention refugees, the Directive reproduces or reinforces the rights they 
have under the Refugee Convention.2 Subsidiary protection beneficiaries do partly 
have the same rights as refugees (for example, as regards access to accommodation 
and freedom of movement).3  But other rights are reduced as compared to those for 
refugees. For example, refugees are entitled to a residence permit valid for three 
years, subsidiary protection beneficiaries to a permit valid only one year.4 Member 
states may impose obstacles to their entry on the labour market, which they cannot 
impose on refugees.5 And if we take the broader picture into account, a most striking 
difference concerns claims for family reunification in the Family Reunification Direc-
tive. This instrument does apply to claims by refugees, even establishes a regime for 
them that is more favourable than the one applying to other third country nationals, 
                                                        
*  Dr. Hemme Battjes teaches constitutional and administrative law at the Vrije Universiteit Am-
sterdam. 
1  More precisely, the right to asylum in that sense follows from a reading of Articles 13 and 18 of 
the Qualification Directive in conjunction with Articles 23(1) and 29(1) of the Asylum Proce-
dures Directive (Directive 2001/55) and Article 3(1) of the Dublin Regulation (Regulation 
343/2003; cf. H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2006, p. 364. 
2  Battjes o.c., p. 474ff. 
3  Articles 31 and 32; the same holds true for Articles 21(1), 22, 27, 30 and 34 QD.  
4  Article 24 QD. 
5  Article 26 QD.  
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whereas subsidiary protection beneficiaries are explicitly excluded form the benefits 
of this Directive.6 
So the European asylum for subsidiary protection beneficiaries is in important re-
spects reduced as compared to the European asylum for refugees. At first sight, there 
is nothing wrong with that from a legal perspective. In the Bonger case, the Strasbourg 
Court clearly stated that Article 3 ECHR does not imply a claim for a residence per-
mit.7 I think it would be even harder to successfully claim full access to the labour 
market or integration facilities under Article 3 or another Convention provision. To 
put it bluntly, subsidiary protection beneficiaries have no claim to asylum – to resi-
dential rights - under international law, and should therefore be glad with what any-
thing they got under the Directive.  
Nevertheless, the difference in treatment with refugees is nagging. In my contri-
bution, I will first discuss whether this difference is justified from a legal perspective.  
Subsequently, I will say a few words about the questions whether it is wise to differ-
entiate (the political perspective). Finally, I will briefly address the secondary rights of 
family members of refugee or subsidiary protection status holders.  
2. Differential Treatment 
2.1 The Right to Asylum 
The Qualification Directive respects, according to its Preamble (10th recital), the 
rights laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Since 
the judgement by the European Court of Justice on the Family Reunification Direc-
tive, we now that such a reference to the Charter render its provisions indeed legally 
relevant for assessing the content of the instrument.8 In particular, so the Preamble 
states, the Directive “seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity and the right to 
asylum of applicants and their accompanying family members”, i.e. for Articles 1 and 
18 Charter. So I would argue that the rules in the Qualification Directive on residen-
tial rights for both refugees as well as subsidiary protection beneficiaries serve to 
comply with Article 18 Charter. 
What do these claims to respect for one’s human dignity and “right to asylum” 
entail? The text of the Charter does not state in clear terms which obligations these 
provisions imply – respect for human dignity and asylum are rather broad and rela-
tively undefined concepts. But as another Charter provision, Article 19, addresses 
refoulement separately, I would say that the right to asylum laid down in Article 18 
encompasses more than just protection from refoulement. The provision further-
more indicates where we have to look for defining the content of asylum – it refers to 
the Refugee Convention. So does the Preamble recital (16) to the Qualification Direc-
tive that addresses secondary rights of refugees. Furthermore, the provisions on the 
                                                        
6  Directive 2003/86; cf. Preamble recital (8) and Articles 9 –12 on refugees, and Article 3(2)(c) on 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries.  
7  ECtHR 15 September 2005 (dec.), Bonger v The Netherlands, appl. no. 10154/04.  
8  ECJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03, European Parliament v the Council. 
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content of international protection are framed in much the same way as those in the 
Refugee Convention.9 Where subsidiary protection beneficiaries are entitled to lesser 
rights, their claim is presented as a deviation from the main rule. See for example 
Article 29 of the Qualification Directive, on health care:  
 
“1. Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status 
have access to health care under the same eligibility conditions as nationals of the Member 
State that has granted such statuses.  
2. By exception to the general rule laid down in paragraph 1, Member States may limit 
health care granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to core benefits which will then 
be provided at the same levels and under the same eligibility conditions as nationals.” 
2.2 Balancing Refugee Rights  
Thus, the Refugee Convention benefits served as the basis for defining the content of 
asylum in the Directive, and differential treatment of subsidiary protection beneficiar-
ies is presented as deviation from the main rules. Before addressing possible justifica-
tions for these deviations, I want to address the content of the Refugee Convention 
first. Why are refugees entitled to the claims the Convention grants them? 
The Refugee Convention benefits are the result of a balance of interests.10 At the 
one hand, the interests of the refugee. The Preamble to the Convention points at the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the basis for refugee rights. This instru-
ments lists political as well as social, economic and cultural rights. The primary source 
of protection as regards these rights is one’ state of nationality. People who have well-
founded fear of being persecuted by the authorities of that state therefore must turn 
to some other state to have their human rights protected. As de facto stateless peo-
ple, refugees should get protection from their host states; the preamble speaks of the 
“widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms”. For the refugee, 
the best outcome would be treatment by the host state as nationals in all respects – 
access to housing, labour market, welfare and so on. But the Refugee Convention 
does not grant hem that, as it takes into account also the interests of the host state. 
As the Preamble puts it, “the grant of asylum may place an unduly heavy burden on 
certain states”. The resulting system of refugee benefits is carefully balanced. Some 
benefits may be claimed by all refugees immediately – such as access to education for 
minors. Other benefits apply only to refugees who have been legally resident for a 
number of years.11 Furthermore, in some respects, refugees must be treated as na-
tionals – for example, as regards access to education. But in other issues, host states 
may grant them less beneficial treatment. Refugees have the same claims to wage-
earning employment as most favoured aliens (hence not as nationals) for example.12  
                                                        
9  See Battjes o.c., p. 475-477. 
10  See J.C. Hathaway, ‘What’s in a label?’, in: European Journal of Migration and Law vol. 5 (2003), p. 1 
ff and Battjes o.c., p. 448-469. 
11  Cf. Articles 23, 24, 28 RC. 
12  Articles 22 and 17 RC.  
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So in sum, Refugee Convention benefits are the result of a balancing of, at one hand, 
the interests of the refugee as a person who is de facto stateless person as a result of 
his being persecuted, and at the other hand, the legitimate interest of the host state to 
limit the burden of asylum.  
2.3 Balancing Subsidiary Protection Beneficiary Rights 
All member states accepted the result of this balancing act performed in the Refugee 
Convention, when they became party to Refugee Convention. The Community legis-
lator accepted it as well, for it reproduced most of the Refugee Convention benefits 
for refugees in the Directive. I think that when defining the content of asylum for 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries, the same interests are at stake. Like the refugee, 
the subsidiary protection beneficiary is a de facto stateless person, in need of protec-
tion from the host states – securing “the widest possible exercise of their rights and 
freedoms”. Why, then, does the balancing act yield other results as regards subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries? I can think of two explanations (or differentiations).  
First, the numbers of subsidiary protection beneficiaries are expected to be so 
huge that the burden for host states would become too heavy. This would be an 
acceptable ground for reducing their rights, if we take the Refugee Convention sys-
tem. Indeed, I think it is perfectly acceptable that Temporary Protection, which is 
designed to apply to great numbers (“mass influxes”), entails lesser residential rights 
than refugee status.13 But there is very little in the Qualification Directive that war-
rants the expectation that subsidiary protection will apply to numbers which come 
anywhere near “mass influxes”. It is modelled to the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights on Article 3 ECHR, and this case-law has hitherto not been over-
inclusive, due to the quite strict real risk criterion.14 I would say that subsidiary pro-
tection would encompass great numbers only if it would apply to general threats, like 
temporary protection does. In the Qualification Directive, there is only one provision 
that might be taken to suggest so: Article 15(c) QD. According to this provision, one 
qualifies for subsidiary protection in case of an “individual threat” due to “indis-
criminate violence” in a situation of war or civil war.  The provision is open to vari-
ous readings, and I will not go into all that.15 But we should note that it is possible to 
read it in such a way, that subsidiary protection is due in case people fled situations of 
indiscriminate violence. If member states read Article 15(c) of the Directive that way, 
and hence apply subsidiary protection to great numbers of people, they may pose that 
as justification for the lesser rights of subsidiary protection beneficiaries. But if they 
rather adhere to a restrictive reading of eligibility for subsidiary protection, differen-
tial treatment of subsidiary protection beneficiary cannot be justified by the “over-
burdening” argument.  
                                                        
13  Directive 2001/55; cf.  Battjes o.c., p. 507-512. 
14  Battjes 2006, o.c., p. 224 ff. 
15  See for a thorough discussion Battjes o.c., p. 237-241, and J.-Y. Carlier, ‘Réfugiés: Identification 
et statut des personnes à protéger. La directive “qualification”’, in: F. Julien-Laferrière, H. La-
bayle and Ö. Edström (eds.), The European Integration and Asylum Policy: Critical assessment after Five 
Years after the Amsterdam Treaty, Brussels: Bruylant 2005, p. 289-323. 
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The second explanation or justification for differential treatment would be the in-
herently shorter duration of subsidiary protection. We saw that the Refugee Conven-
tion itself conveys far more benefits on refugees who stay for a longer period. The 
Qualification Directive bestows those long term claims to all refugees immediately, it 
seems, because refugees are expected to be in need for protection for a longer period. 
The three years duration of the refugees residence permit bears witness to this expec-
tation. By contrast, subsidiary protection beneficiaries get a permit for only one year. 
And interestingly, states need not give them access to integration facilities.16 So I 
would say that the Qualification Directive suggests that the need for subsidiary pro-
tection may duly be expected to last shorter than the need for refugee protection. Is 
there any ground to expect so? In itself, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that 
a well founded fear of being persecuted will last longer than real risk of serious harm. 
Again, the only provision of the Qualification Directive that could possibly justify the 
assumption that the need for subsidiary protection will be less durable, might be 
Article15(c).  
That leads me to the following conclusion. A balance of interests of the refugee 
and the host state resulted in the set of refugee status benefits in the Refugee Con-
vention and (with slight alterations) in the Qualification Directive. Exactly the same 
interests are at stake when defining the benefits for subsidiary protection beneficiar-
ies. The reduced rights of subsidiary protection beneficiary are justified if there is 
reason to assume that subsidiary protection will apply to huge numbers, or when 
there is reason to assume that the need for subsidiary protection will be far shorter 
than the need for refugee protection. Only Article 15(c) QD, if read and applied in a 
liberal way, could indeed justify these assumptions.  
2.4 Doubts 
It appears that it is hard to justify the differential of treatment of subsidiary protec-
tion beneficiaries as compared to the entitlements of refugees on the basis of the 
principles that underlie the delimitation of benefits for refugees in the Refugee Con-
vention. But I am not sure whether a law suit against differential treatment of sub-
sidiary protection beneficiaries would be successful. One might argue that the Refu-
gee Convention applies only to refugees, and there is no ground in international law 
for imposing those norms on other groups of people. I suggested the right to asylum 
in Article 18 Charter as a link between refugee protection and international protec-
tion for subsidiary protection beneficiary, but one might argue that this link is too 
weak. This provision does not confer a clearly determined right, but states that “[t]he 
right of asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for [the Refugee Convention”. 
To whom this right applies, and what it entails is a matter of interpretation.17 And in 
general, aliens law in Europe provides for a lot of different statuses, hence a lot of 
differential treatments. It seems that in issues like social benefits states (as opposed to 
non-refoulement issues) states enjoy a rather wide margin of appreciation. 
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3. One Status System 
But even if international or European law does not impose an enforceable claim to 
equal treatment, it is the question whether it would be wise to do so. If a person is 
granted subsidiary protection, he is under the current European asylum system 
tempted to challenge that decision and go for the main prize: refugee status. Such 
challenges may seriously burden asylum systems in an unnecessary way. The Nether-
lands has therefore introduced in 2001 the single status for all persons who are al-
lowed to remain on asylum related grounds – amongst others, both refugees and 
people to whom Article 3 ECHR applies. If I am correctly informed, Sweden and 
Norway have a similar system.18 It has been suggested that such a system may “di-
minish the special role of the Geneva Convention and the concept of particular rights 
of Convention refugees”.19 But I must say that I do not see the problem if the bene-
ficiaries receive the same benefits in all respects.  
4.  Family Members 
A connected issue are the reduced rights for family members of international protec-
tion beneficiaries. The Qualification Directive requires that family members of refu-
gees enjoy the same benefits as refugees do (see Article 22-1). The Preamble (recital 
27) explains why:  
 
“Family members, merely due to their relation to the refugee, will normally be vulnerable to 
acts of persecution in such a manner that could be the basis for refugee status”.  
 
I would say that the same reasoning applies to subsidiary protection beneficiaries. But 
oddly, the Preamble states that benefits provided to family members of subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries do not have “necessarily” to be the same as those for the 
qualifying member. Accordingly, member states may “define the conditions applica-
ble” to benefits of such family members. I would say that just like family members of 
refugees should be treated as refugees, family members of subsidiary protection bene-
ficiaries should so too.  
But maybe there is no reason to address this issue, as it has been taken care of by 
the Strasbourg Court. In Bader, it ruled that expulsion of mr. Bader to Syria would be 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR, as he feared execution of the death penalty. Further-
more, his family members would all face “intolerable uncertainty” about when where 
and how the execution would be carried out, and on that ground, their expulsion 
would also be contrary to Article 3 ECHR.20 It confirmed this ruling in  D contre la 
                                                        
18  K. Hailbronner, Study on the single asylum procedure ‘one-stop shop’ against the background of the common 
European asylum system and the goal of a common asylum procedure, European Communities 2003, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/studies/docs/study_one_stop_shop_e
n.pdf, p. 86. 
19  Ibid., p. 22.  
20  ECtHR 8 November 2005, Bader v Sweden, appl. no. 13284/04, pars. 47 and 48.  
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Turqie.21 It seems that Article 3 ECHR prohibits expulsion of family members of a 
person who runs a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, at least when 
inhuman or degrading punishment is concerned (as in both cases mentioned). In such 
cases, I would say, that  the category of “family members of a person qualifying for 
subsidiary protection” ceases to exist, on the authority of the European Court of 
Human Rights. For those family members can now invoke Article 3 ECHR them-
selves and would qualify for subsidiary protection on their own account.  
5. Final Remarks 
The analysis of differential treatment of subsidiary protection beneficiaries and their 
family members above allow for two conclusions on the Qualification Directive. 
First, reduced rights for subsidiary protection beneficiaries may be justified if subsidi-
ary protection applies to mass influxes, or if it may duly be expected to last for a 
short period of time. Only Article 15(c) of the Directive gives reasons to supposes 
that either of both characteristics applies to subsidiary protection. Thus, the delimita-
tion of secondary rights for subsidiary protection beneficiaries unexpectedly empha-
sises the central importance of this provision. Second, even if the content of the 
subsidiary protection status may be open to criticism, the importance of the grant of 
asylum to this category remains very great. The recent case-law of the Strasbourg 
Court according to which real risk of harm after expulsion of a person prohibits also 
expulsion of his family members illustrates why. This case-law extends or, if the fam-
ily members would be protected from expulsion by Article 8 ECHR, strengthens 
protection from refoulement. The Directive translates the protection for these family 
members to a claim to asylum for subsidiary protection beneficiaries. 
 
                                                        
21  ECtHR 22 June 2006, appl. no. 24245/03, par. 56.  
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1. The Qualification Directive and the Common European Asylum System 
After nearly three years of negotiations, the European Council in April 2004 agreed 
on a Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise 
Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted1 (the 
‘Qualification Directive’), one of the key legal measures on asylum required under 
Article 63 of the Amsterdam Treaty. The Directive’s adoption represented a critical 
point in a process initiated five years earlier, when the European Council summit in 
Tampere had called for measures to establish a ‘common European asylum system, 
based on the full and inclusive application of the [1951] Geneva Convention, thus 
ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-
refoulement.’2  
According to the Council in Tampere, one of the fundamental elements in that 
system would be a legal instrument for ‘the approximation of rules on the recognition 
and content of refugee status.. completed with measures on subsidiary forms of pro-
tection offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such protection’.3 The 
Qualification Directive defined the minimum standards for criteria to be applied 
across the European Union in determining eligibility for refugee status or other forms 
of protection, and appeared to represent a major step forward towards harmonization 
of Member States’ laws and practice in granting protection to those seeking asylum 
within the EU.  
The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR or the Office) fol-
lowed closely the process of preparation and negotiation of the Qualification Direc-
tive. UNHCR saw this as a key instrument that would influence the ways in which 
                                                        
*  The author is Senior EU Affairs Officer at UNHCR’s Regional Representation in Brussels. The 
views expressed herein are her own and do not represent the position of UNHCR or the 
United Nations. 
1  Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 2004 OJ L 304/12, 30.9.04. 
2  Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, SN 200/99, 
16.10.99, para. 13. 
3  Ibid., para. 14. 
MADELINE GARLICK 
60 
Member States would interpret the 1951 Convention criteria for refugee status, and 
other international and regional standards for the grant of other forms of protection 
(referred to in the Directive as ‘subsidiary protection’). Member States and EU insti-
tutions consulted periodically with UNHCR during the negotiations, in accordance 
with Declaration 17 to the Amsterdam Treaty, which requires consultations with the 
Office on matters relating to asylum policy. UNHCR submitted formal comments 
and recommendations to Member States and institutions throughout the course of 
the negotiations,4 and provided input directly to successive Council Presidencies and 
Member States, including on questions of international refugee law as relevant to the 
draft Directive’s text. The Office sought through its interventions to ensure that the 
Directive would conform to the standards of the 1951 Convention and other relevant 
international instruments, in line with the Council’s obligations under Amsterdam 
and the Tampere objectives.  
Upon its adoption, UNHCR welcomed a number of features of the Directive 
which were seen as welcome steps in the direction of aligning Community law with 
international refugee protection standards. In its definition of a ‘refugee’, the Direc-
tive incorporated the 1951 Convention definition as a binding standard under Com-
munity law.5 It also established an explicit obligation for all Member States to provide 
subsidiary protection to people at risk of serious harm, defined as including, amongst 
other things, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.6 The Direc-
tive also referred to gender- and child-specific forms of persecution, along with per-
secution or serious harm at the hands of non-state agents, both of which have at-
tained widespread acceptance as ground for protection in the practice of numerous 
States. However, several unclear areas and other weaknesses were also identified, 
which could create the potential for protection gaps and risks that some people in 
need of international protection may not be recognized under the EC’s minimum 
criteria.  
UNHCR’s reservations about the Directive, as expressed at the time of the Direc-
tive’s adoption, include some which remain current, based on limited observation of 
Member States’ subsequent national legislation and practice. This article aims to 
summarize several of these key concerns regarding the Qualification Directive, both 
at the level of the EC minimum standards, and in national laws and practice. It has 
not been possible to review the state of transposition or implementation in a com-
                                                        
4  See, among others, UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country 
Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International 
Protection (Brussels, 12 September 2001, COM(2001) 510 final, 2001/0207 (CNS)), 1 Novem-
ber 2001; Some Additional Observations and Recommendations on the European Commission 
‘Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of 
Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need 
International Protection’ (COM(2001) 510 final, 2001/0207(CNS) of 12 September 2001), 1 
July 2002. 
5  Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Article 2(c). 
6  Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Article 15. The wording in Article 15(b) refers directly to 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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plete or conclusive manner,7 but some provisional assessments can be made based on 
reports on law and practice from UNHCR, NGOs, lawyers and Member States’ rep-
resentatives in public fora. It is hoped that these concerns, along with others voiced 
by UNHCR in its official commentary on the Directive,8 will be scrutinized closely in 
the process of evaluation of first-phase asylum instruments that the European Com-
mission is obliged to conduct by the end of 2007 under the Hague Programme.9 This 
evaluation process should in turn provide a basis for ‘second phase instruments and 
measures’ which the Commission is required to submit to the Council and Parliament 
‘with a view to their adoption by the end of 2010’.10 
2.  Harmonisation of EU Laws and Practice 
Some observers have queried whether effective harmonization has been achieved 
through the Qualification Directive and the other key instruments adopted under the 
Amsterdam Treaty programme. It has been argued that the minimum standards 
adopted in a number of important provisions11 provide wide-ranging exceptions, and 
leave extensive room for Member States’ discretion, so that harmonization is unlikely 
to result in practice.  
While harmonization was not a key objective in itself for UNHCR, the Office 
supported the process as a means to seek to establish and entrench high standards of 
protection, and set EU norms at the level of those States offering good practice and 
more flexible approaches to recognition and entitlements for refugees. The process 
was seen as a means to work towards reducing or eliminating some of the discrepan-
cies in the ways in which protection criteria have been interpreted and applied to 
similar asylum seeker groups in different EU Member States. Striking variations 
emerge from UNHCR’s public statistics, which indicate that in 2005, asylum seekers 
from the Russian Federation, for example, were recognized in approximately 10% of 
cases in one Member State; close to 70% in another Member State; but faced a 0% 
recognition rate in a third, neighbouring State.12 While harmonization at the level of 
                                                        
7  The limited period of time elapsed since the Directive’s transposition deadline means that it 
would be difficult to assess progress on transposition or implementation in a conclusive way, 
especially given that several key States have yet to adopt or amend the necessary provisions. 
Decision-making authorities and courts have also not had the opportunity to build up practice 
or jurisprudence.  
8  UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on 
Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless 
Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Con-
tent of the Protection granted (OJ L 304/12 of 30.9.2004), 28 January 2005. 
9  The Hague Programme, OJ C 53/3, para. 1.3. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Criticism has focused particularly on the Asylum Procedures Directive, adopted in 2005, which 
provides significant scope for Member States’ discretion and preservation of divergent national 
practices.  
12  See figures for positive decisions (claims ‘recognised’) for applicants from the Russian Federa-
tion in the Netherlands, Austria and Slovakia respectively. UNHCR, ‘2005 Global Refugee 
Trends: a Statistical Overview of Populations of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Dis-
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the lowest rate or standard of protection would be undesirable, a more consistent and 
legally sound application of protection criteria across the EU should ideally emerge 
from a fair and accurate application of EC common standards. 
In addition to the legislative negotiations, UNHCR has been involved in the proc-
ess of transposition of the EC Directives into Member States’ national law. This 
input has been provided under its mandate under Article 35 of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, which defines UNHCR’s supervisory responsibility for the 1951 Con-
vention, and has provided the basis for a long-established practice of providing rec-
ommendations and advice to guide the development of national legislation on asylum 
in general.  
Bearing in mind that the Directive enshrines only minimum standards, permitting 
Member States freely ‘to introduce or retain more favourable standards for determin-
ing who qualifies as a refugee or … person eligible for subsidiary protection’,13 
UNHCR has sought to promote transposition standards going beyond the minima in 
the Directive. This need has arisen particularly for those areas where there is scope 
for divergence between the Directive and the 1951 Convention or other related in-
ternational provisions. 
3.  Key Areas of Interest in the Qualification Directive 
3.1 Subsidiary Protection 
In its definitions, the Qualification Directive defines ‘person eligible for subsidiary 
protection’ as ‘a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a 
refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing 
that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case 
of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a 
real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15…’.14 Article 15 in turn 
defines ‘serious harm’ as ‘(a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s 
life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations or international or 
internal armed conflict’. 
UNHCR welcomed the inclusion in the Directive of an obligation for Member 
States to grant subsidiary protection, particularly given that the concept had not pre-
viously featured explicitly in the law of some Member States.15 Divergent views are 
apparent on the application of Article 15(c) in particular, and on how to interpret 
threats resulting from ‘indiscriminate violence’. At the insistence of some States in the 
negotiations, paragraph 26 was inserted in the Preamble to the Directive, providing 
                                                        
placed Persons, Stateless and other Persons of Concern’, 9 June 2006: Table 9, ‘Asylum applica-
tions and refugee status determinations by origin and country/territory of asylum’.  
13  Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Article 3. 
14  Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Article 2(e). 
15  Those without explicit concepts for subsidiary protection status in national law prior to the 
Directive included Germany and Belgium.  
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that ‘risks to which a population of a country or a section of the population is gener-
ally exposed do normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would 
qualify as serious harm’. This Preambular explanation, while not strictly binding, 
clearly indicated the view of some States that the notion of ‘indiscriminate violence’ 
should be applied narrowly.  
UNHCR by contrast has encouraged Member States to apply Article 15(c) in a 
broad manner, without excessive reliance on limitations relating to individual threat. 
The Office has argued that Article 15(c) should be interpreted as requiring a serious 
and immediate, rather than remote, risk for the applicant, which derives from the 
situation of generalized violence. It does not, however, imply that applicants are 
obliged to show that they are personally being targeted by the perpetrators of the 
generalized violence. It would appear that differences in interpretation persist among 
Member State authorities, based on what is seen by some as the ambiguous, if not 
internally contradictory, wording of the Directive.  
A further, potentially challenging aspect of Article 15(c) relates to the definition of 
an ‘international or internal armed conflict’. Different views could be taken on what 
the threshold test for such a conflict might be, and what body is qualified to deter-
mine when it is crossed and entitlements arise to subsidiary protection in EU States. 
Member State authorities will presumably be confronted with this question, and 
obliged to consider concepts from international law in reaching their determina-
tions.16  
Questions also arise about the precise intended scope of Article 15(b), which re-
flects the wording of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, pro-
viding for protection from the threat of ‘torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ in the applicant’s country of origin. Views may differ, for example, on 
whether this criterion in the EC context extends to cover protection from return to a 
country where medical treatment would not be available to treat a particularly serious 
illness from which an applicant suffers.  
UNHCR has signaled its concern17 that the codification of subsidiary protection 
in EC law in the Directive could potentially lead to undermining of grants of refugee 
status under the 1951 Convention. This reservation focuses on the possibility that 
State authorities might not feel obliged to test an applicant’s claim against the criteria 
for 1951 Convention status, if they can find that the requirements for subsidiary pro-
                                                        
16  A question has been raised as to whether the International Committee of the Red Cross, with 
its authoritative role under international humanitarian law, might be appropriately asked to ex-
press a view on when a situation reaches the level of an ‘international or internal armed conflict’ 
for the Directive’s purposes. However, limits on the ICRC’s role and mandate, and the absence 
of a direct association with Community law, could make this course impractical. Informal ac-
counts suggested that by early 2007, some EU Member States were taking a restrictive view of 
the cases amounting to indiscriminate violence in international or internal armed conflict.  
17  UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on 
Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless 
Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Con-
tent of the Protection granted (OJ L 304/12 of 30.9.2004), 28 January 2005: Comment on Arti-
cle 15. Some observers have also cited an impression in some States that refugee status grants 
are declining, while subsidiary protection is awarded in cases that would previously have been 
recognized under the 1951 Convention. 
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tection are satisfied more easily. In order to preserve the underlying analysis and spe-
cial legal character of the 1951 Convention concept, UNHCR has maintained that 
‘subsidiary protection should apply only if there is no link between the risk or threat 
of harm and any of the five Convention grounds’ (i.e. threats linked to the claimant’s 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion). In this 
way, subsidiary protection could strengthen, rather than weaken, the established pre-
cepts of international refugee law, and scope is left to enable the refugee definition to 
evolve and meet the changing needs and circumstances of applicants for protection.  
States must also address some practical questions around the introduction of sub-
sidiary protection to ensure respect for the rights of people newly entitled to this 
status. Training will be important to raise awareness and understanding of subsidiary 
protection concepts in those States which are introducing the notion, potentially 
extending at least to advocates, decision makers and judges. Transitional provisions 
are notably absent from the Directive. This has left several States and applicants un-
certain about whether and how subsidiary protection grounds might be considered, 
for example, for people whose claims for refugee status had been rejected at first 
instance before the Directive was adopted; but who are still awaiting outcomes on 
appeals when new national laws have come into force. 
3.2  Non-state Agents 
Another new concept in the law of some Member States is the requirement under the 
Directive to accord protection to victims of persecution or serious harm by non-State 
agents.18 
Article 6 provides that ‘actors of persecution or serious harm include: (a) the 
State; (b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the 
territory of the State; (c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors 
mentioned in (a) and (b), including international organisations, are unable or unwill-
ing to provide protection against persecution or serious harm as defined in Article 7’. 
Under Article 7, ‘protection can be provided by: (a) the State; or (b) parties or organi-
sations, including international organisations, controlling the State or a substantial 
part of the territory of the State’.  
For UNHCR, acts committed by non-State agents qualify as persecution and con-
stitute grounds for the grant of refugee status, in cases where the State is unwilling or 
unable to offer effective protection against the perpetrator (and where the persecu-
tion is linked to race, religion, membership of a social group or political opinion). 
Threats arising in situations of ‘failed States’ come into this category, where there is 
no State actor which can be held accountable for failing to protect its citizens, as 
could be the case, for example, in situations of (civil) war. Another example could 
include people threatened by domestic violence, where State authorities are unwilling 
or unable to protect the victim, and where the other 1951 Convention requirements 
are satisfied. In order to achieve a harmonized approach to this complex and sensi-
tive notion, further evolution will be needed in the approaches of Member States to 
such cases.  
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The question of whether an applicant can claim State protection is always an ele-
ment in the assessment of eligibility for refugee status, according to the wording of 
Article 1A of the 1951 Convention. The EC Directive purports to take the test one 
step further, by providing in Article 7 for the possibility of ‘non-State actors of pro-
tection’. It remains to be seen how widely this notion might be applied in EU asylum 
decision-making. UNHCR’s concern with the provision centres on the suggestion 
that international organizations could be seen to have legal and practical powers 
comparable to those of a State, in situations where they are seen to be ‘controlling the 
State or a substantial part of the territory of the State’.  
UNHCR has noted that ‘under international law, international organisations do 
not have the attributes of a State’ and ‘their ability to enforce the rule of law generally 
is limited. Furthermore, they are not party to human rights treaties.’ Concern has 
been expressed about the political context behind this provision, which suggests that 
EU Member States wished to use it to reject claims from asylum seekers from Kos-
ovo, overseen for several years by a UN administration (‘UNMIK’) and peacekeeping 
force. It was noteworthy that around the time when the Directive was finally agreed, 
violence broke out in Kosovo on a significant scale, which demonstrated unequivo-
cally that the UN administration and international force was not in a position to pro-
tect all of the population. UNHCR’s concern is that while international organizations 
continue to provide the best level of support and protection that they can, limited 
resources and legal authority may systematically handicap their efforts. This renders 
unrealistic the suggestion that international organizations can ‘control’ territory and 
‘protect’ people in the same way that a State can.  
3.3  Internal Relocation Alternative  
Under Article 8(1) of the Directive, ‘Member States may determine that an applicant 
is not in need of international protection if in a part of the country of origin there is 
no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm 
and the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.’ 
Article 8(2) provides that ‘Paragraph 1 may apply notwithstanding technical obstacles 
to return to the country of origin.’ 
The juxtaposition of these two paragraphs creates problems of legal interpretation 
and practice. Firstly, for interpretation, it appears difficult to argue that it is ‘reason-
able’ to expect a person to stay in a particular part of a country, where ‘technical ob-
stacles’ effectively preclude his or her return to that country. However, some Member 
States have used Article 8 as a grounds for rejecting claims even where return cannot 
take place, apparently considering that the two provisions are compatible. The impli-
cation is that it can be seen as ‘reasonable’, on a theoretical plane, to expect a person 
to stay in a place to which she or he cannot go in reality. 
A second concrete problem is that of the situation of those people who are re-
fused status on the basis Article 8, but who cannot be removed due to ‘technical 
obstacles’ such as lack of travel documentation; absence of civilian transport into the 
country in question; personal circumstances such as illness, or otherwise. These kinds 
of technical barriers may in some cases persist for years, and the applicant meanwhile 
has no entitlement to predefined basic rights or status under Community law. The 
resultant limbo situation seems problematic for applicants and host States alike. 
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In early 2007, however, an interesting case touching on this issue has been de-
cided by the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in Strasbourg. This case, 
Salah Sheekh v Netherlands,19 addressed, among other things, the question of the inter-
nal flight alternative. There, the Court concluded that States may rely on the existence 
of an internal flight alternative in assessing a risk of serious harm. However, it noted 
that a State, in proposing to return a person to a country where she or he purportedly 
has an internal relocation alternative, is obliged to ensure that the person is not, as a 
result of its acts, exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary 
to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This judgment 
may influence future interpretation of the internal flight alternative under the law of 
EU States, particularly in cases where a risk of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR 
arises.  
3.4  Exclusion 
The Directive provides for applicants to be excluded both from refugee status and 
subsidiary protection, on grounds which are defined in Articles 12 and 17 respec-
tively. UNHCR has criticized Article 12 in particular because of its inconsistency with 
the exclusion principles enshrined in Article 1F of the 1951 Convention.  
The exclusion grounds in Article 1F are exhaustive, and while they may be subject 
to different interpretations, UNHCR maintains that it is not open to a signatory or 
group of signatory States to expand them unilaterally.  
In case of a person who has committed ‘serious non-political crimes outside the 
country of refuge prior to his/her admission as a refugee’, Article 12(2)(b) of the 
Directive purports to define ‘prior to his/her admission’ as the ‘time of issuing a 
residence permit’. This means that the timeframe during which an applicant could 
potentially commit a ‘excludable’ crime is significantly lengthened. In some States, it 
could be years before a decision is made and residence permit issued. Moreover, the 
concept of ‘serious non-political crimes’ is also broadened to include ‘particularly 
cruel acts, even if committed with an allegedly political motive’. These references to 
the undefined and unclear notions of ‘particularly cruel acts’ and ‘alleged’ motives 
appear to create great scope for subjective and arbitrary application of the exclusion 
concept.  
In addition, the Directive moves beyond the 1951 Convention again in Article 
12(3), which permits exclusion of persons who ‘instigate or otherwise participate’ in 
committing crimes as defined in Article 12(2). Apart from objections in principle to 
such a widening of the exclusion clauses, this provision also raises significant ques-
tions about the potential difficulties of establishing criminal proof of responsibility on 
the part of a third person.  
The application of the Directive’s exclusion clauses in practice will warrant close 
monitoring by UNHCR and other interested observers. Although the numbers of 
people excluded from protection in EU Member States appears to be relatively small, 
the concept is politically very sensitive, notably given its potential link to ‘terrorism’ 
and other perceived threats to Member States’ security. Moreover, discussions in EU 
                                                        
19  Application No. 1948/04, 11 January 2007. 
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Member States’ fora suggest that the issue is of great interest to many States, whose 
representatives are interested in exchanging information and practice on how to apply 
it. 
4.  Practical Challenges 
Apart from the legal and interpretative questions arising above, there are issues 
around the practical application of the Qualification Directive which also give 
grounds for concern. Among these is the question of the Directive’s interrelation 
with other EC instruments on asylum; and the scope for authoritative court decisions 
clarifying its provisions in the future.  
A first example of potentially problematic assumptions and outcomes relates to 
the Dublin II Regulation.20 This Regulation is founded on the theory or objective that 
an asylum applicant should have the same prospect of securing protection in all States 
of the EU. Dublin II provides a mechanism for identifying the State which is respon-
sible for determining a claim, based on criteria unconnected to the merits or nature of 
the application, but which consider rather the person’s family situation, his or her 
prior transit through or entry to another State, and others. Member States routinely 
transfer asylum applicants under the Dublin II system to other States which ‘take 
back’ or ‘take charge’ of the person for the purpose of determining their claims. 
However, the limited experience of applying the Qualification Directive, and 
longer evidence emerging from past application of related concepts, suggest that 
there remain significant differences in the ways in which States interpret and apply 
protection criteria. This means that a person who might be recognized in State A, but 
who is sent back to State B under Dublin II, is not necessarily assured of protection if 
State B adopts a more restrictive approach to the internal flight alternative, indis-
criminate violence, or other notions described above.  
Given the varying prospects of recognition between EU Member States, the im-
perative for such people to undertake secondary movements in the first place is ap-
parent, along with the consequences of their return under Dublin II. This speaks in 
favour of greater consistency and quality in decision-making, based on the Qualifica-
tion Directive, in the interests of the effective functioning of the common European 
asylum system as a whole. 
Some ambiguities and discrepancies described here also highlight the need for ju-
dicial interpretation to clarify and ensure the correct application of the Directive. Yet 
practical factors in many cases may place daunting obstacles in the way of applicants 
with potentially strong cases to argue in court. 
One problem relates to the low level of State support to pay for legal assistance. 
Although free legal assistance is obligatory at least at second instance under the Asy-
                                                        
20  Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Mem-
ber States by a third-country national, OJ L 50/1, 25.2.2003 (the ‘Dublin II Regulation’). 
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lum Procedures Directive,21 the amount made available can render this ineffective in 
many cases. In one EU Member State, legal assistance for asylum cases is remuner-
ated at 50% of the normal legal aid rate for other administrative or criminal cases. 
This is despite the fact that asylum claims often involve complex arguments poten-
tially extending to international legal concepts (which, outside the asylum sphere, 
would usually attract a premium assistance rate of 200%.) The result in practice is said 
to be that only one or two practitioners are prepared to take asylum casework on in 
the courts in that country.  
Another problem relates to fear on the part of applicants. The experience of the 
asylum system for some people is such that they are reluctant to challenge any aspect 
of the process or of their treatment, out of concern that it will prejudice their condi-
tions or status. This appears to be a problem in some States for people with subsidi-
ary protection, who are unwilling to appeal a decision, despite their strong grounds 
for refugee status. Their reluctance is based on the anxiety that an appeal could 
prejudice even the status they have. 
Moreover, in cases where appeals are non-suspensive, the realistic prospects of 
launching and pursuing a successful legal challenge may be limited. Many people 
whose claims are rejected through misinterpretation or misapplication of the Direc-
tive may never have the opportunity to pursue it, because they will already have been 
removed from the EU before the necessary steps are taken and preparations made.22 
At best, this can it complicate, and at worst, may render impossible applicants’ efforts 
to redress the errors in some individual cases, or to secure an authoritative and clear 
judgment on the interpretation of protection criteria.  
5.  Conclusion 
The Qualification Directive provoked concerns on the part of UNHCR and other 
observers at the time of its adoption, relating particularly to provisions seen as poten-
tially incompatible with international norms. It remains difficult to assess the full 
impact of the Directive, and its success or otherwise in delivering protection to enti-
tled applicants, with relatively few States having transposed it and little comprehen-
sive data regarding its application.23 However, concerns in some key areas persist, and 
                                                        
21  Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ L 326/13, 13.12.2005 (the ‘Asylum Procedures Di-
rective’). 
22  Note: the Asylum Procedures Directive provides that applicants should be entitled to an ‘effec-
tive remedy’, but does not define further what that entails; and explicitly permits EU States to 
use non-suspensive effect.  
23  When the deadline for transposition of the Directive into national law arrived in October 2006, 
six Member States had notified the Commission of measures to bring their national legislation 
into conformity with its provisions: European Commission Press Release, 10 October 2006, 
‘Entry into force of key asylum law creating a “level playing field” in asylum policies throughout 
Europe hampered by failure of timely transposition by most Member States’, IP/06/1345. By 
February 2007, fourteen Member States had formally notified the Commission of their transpo-
sition measures; but among those, it remained unclear whether all had transposed the EC legis-
lation correctly or completely. 
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clarifications have not been achieved to date through Member States discussions, 
guidance from the Commission, through jurisprudence or otherwise. An instrument 
of the complexity and scale of the Qualification Directive warrants thorough and 
careful analysis across the EU, as part of the evaluation of first-phase legal instru-
ments foreseen by the Hague Programme, to help decisively identify and develop 
solutions to the problems.  
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The Qualification Directive: A Milestone in Belgian 
Asylum Law 
 
 
Dirk Vanheule* 
1.  Introduction 
The implementation of the Qualification Directive 2004/831 is a milestone in Belgian 
asylum law.2 It has resulted in the introduction of new grounds to obtain asylum 
status in Belgium. Up till then only recognition of refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol entitled asylum claimants to obtain residence in Belgium.3 
Unlike other countries, Belgian immigration legislation did not know an alternative B- 
or C-status for persons not meeting the refugee definition but who could not be 
returned, for compelling humanitarian reasons or reasons related to the situation in 
their country of origin. Although the Belgian legislator was aware that under interna-
tional law certain asylum claimants could not be removed, even though they could 
not qualify as refugees under the Convention, an alternative status was not included 
in the legislation.4  
This incompatibility of the legislative framework with contemporary reality of 
immigration authorities being confronted with persons who could not be removed, 
has lead in the past to some creative solutions, but none giving these asylum claim-
ants equal rights or status like recognized refugees. The solutions were either a form 
of toleration of presence on the Belgian territory (often in the form of a prolongation 
of the period given to leave Belgium in an expulsion order), ad hoc schemes of tempo-
rary protection (e.g. during the crises in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) or individual 
regularisations through a leave of stay granted by the minister of the interior, possibly 
on an injunction ordered by the courts. 
At the same time the asylum authorities in Belgium have been struggling with a 
serious backlog created by the increase of asylum applications up till 2001.  
  
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, University of Antwerp; advocate at the Bar of Ghent. 
1  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who other-
wise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 304/12, 30 
September 2004. 
2  On this subject see: M.C. Foblets, D. Vanheule and S. Bouckaert, “De nieuwe asielwetgeving: 
het Belgische asielrecht kleurt Europeser”, Rechtskundig Weekblad 2006-07, p. 942-957. 
3  Art. 49 Aliens Act of 15 December 1980. 
4  For instance, when an asylum application is declared inadmissible for being manifestly un-
founded or on formal-procedural grounds, the Commissioner general for refugees and stateless 
persons must give an advice whether the applicant can be returned to the country where he 
claims to fear for his life or freedom, thus taking into consideration international obligations of 
non-refoulement. 
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Table 1. Number of asylum applications in Belgium 
 
1981 2.449 1998 21.967
1985 5.387 1999 35.778
1991 15.444 2000 42.720
1992 17.657 2001 24.549
1993 26.421 2002 18.805
1994 14.568 2003 16.940
1995 11.655 2004 15.357
1996 12.401 2005 15.957
1997 11.602 2006 11.587
 
This increase had, at the turn of the millennium, already led to discussions about a 
possible reform of the rather complex Belgian refugee recognition procedure. This 
procedure is characterised by a two-tier track of examinations. The first step, after the 
determination of Belgium’s responsibility under the Dublin criteria, is an examination 
of the admissibility (on formal and substantial grounds, notably when a claim is mani-
festly unfounded) in an administrative process by the Immigration Service and the 
Commissioner-general for Refugee and Stateless Persons5 and with a possibility of 
judicial review by the Council of State, the supreme administrative court. Admissible 
claims are then heard on their merits by the Commissioner-general, with a right of 
appeal to the Permanent Refugee Appeals Commission6 and the Council of State.  
The implementation of the Qualification Directive has created the necessary mo-
mentum to amend the Belgian asylum legislation both on the substance as with re-
gard to the procedure. On the substance, the subsidiary protection status was intro-
duced. The procedural reform consists of a simplification of the recognition proce-
dure. 
2. The Implementation Process as regards Refugee Status and Subsidiary 
Protection Status 
The Qualification Directive was transposed into Belgian law by two laws of 15 Sep-
tember 2006, amending the existing Aliens Act7 and becoming effective as of 10 
October 2006. The Belgian government succeeded in meeting the transposition dead-
line, for this directive at least. With the same act, also the Family Reunification Direc-
tive 2003/86/EC and Directive 2004/81/EC on victims of trafficking in human 
beings were implemented. 
                                                        
5  The Commissioner-general heads an independent agency for the determination of refugee 
status. 
6  The commission is an independent administrative tribunal. 
7  Act of 15 September 2006 amending the Aliens Act of 15 December 1980, Moniteur belge 6 
October 2006; Act of 15 September 2006 reforming the Council of State and creating a Council 
of Aliens Litigation, Moniteur belge 6 October 2006. 
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As a result, the Belgian Aliens Act still, as before, states in its Article 48 that a per-
son “fulfilling the requirements set thereto by international agreements binding Bel-
gium” can be recognized as refugee. This principle affirms that international law, and 
more in particular the 1951 Refugee Convention, is still binding. 
The new Articles 48/2, 48/3 and 48/4 contain the definitional criteria to be met 
in order to obtain refugee status (Article 48/3) and subsidiary protection status (Arti-
cle 48/4). No distinction is made here between EU citizens and third country nation-
als. Indeed, in its declaration to the Amsterdam Protocol on asylum for nationals of 
Member States of the European Union, Belgium stated that it would still carry out an 
individual examination of any asylum request made by a national of another Member 
State, be it on the basis of the presumption that such a request is manifestly un-
founded.8  
Most of the provisions of the Directive dealing with the definitions were copied 
literally into the Belgian legislation.9 
Since the Belgian interpretation of the refugee definition has already been very 
broad, the introduction of the definitional provisions of the Directive, will probably 
not change existing practices very much.10 Some of the more restrictive provisions in 
the directive have, in fact, been left out. This has been the case with article 8, para-
graph 3 QD that allows for the application of the internal protection alternative to 
refuse recognition notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of 
origin. Also the possible limitation of gender related fear for persecution that could 
be read in article 10, paragraph 1, (d) in fine QD11 has been left out of the Belgian 
Aliens Act. 
On the other hand it is quite startling to see that some of the most basic and in 
Belgian asylum practice undisputed rules on the assessment of facts and circum-
stances in Article 4 QD have not been entered into the Aliens Act: the assessment at 
the time of taking a decision, the effect of past persecution, the benefit of the doubt. 
The same goes for the possibility of the need for international protection arising sur 
place in Article 5 QD, even though the notion of réfugié sur place has been used in Bel-
gian asylum practice along the lines of Article 5. 
 
As for the introduction of subsidiary protection status, the Belgian implementation is 
characterised by two facts.  
                                                        
8  Declaration by Belgium on the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, OJ C. 340, 10 November 1997. Under the new asylum procedure these applica-
tions will not be taken into consideration when the declaration does not offer sufficient ele-
ments for a well-founded fear of persecution or serious reasons for a real risk of harm. Only a 
limited right of judicial review remains open to the claimant then. See Article 57/6, par. 1, 2° 
new Aliens Act. 
9  This has been the case for the Articles 6 to 10 and 15 to 17 QD. 
10  Although it remains to be seen if the possibility of granting subsidiary protection status, will not 
shift some of the persons in situations currently recognized as leading up to refugee status into 
that new subsidiary protection status. 
11  ‘Gender related aspects might be considered, without by themselves alone creating a presump-
tion for the applicability of this Article.’ 
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First, not all possible violations of article 3 ECHR will lead to the granting of sub-
sidiary protection status in the asylum procedure. In the event of threat to a person’s 
life due to (the absence or insufficiency of) medical conditions in the country of ori-
gin, a person is eligible to obtain a stay on medical grounds, but not the subsidiary 
protection status (see further). 
Second, the discussion on Article 15, (c) QD, namely whether the notion of “in-
dividual threat” can be compatible with the notion of harm as result of “indiscrimi-
nate violence” in situations of armed conflict, has been solved by omitting the term 
“individual”. A serious threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict is serious harm, lead-
ing up to subsidiary protection status.12  
Finally, some discrepancies should be noted here between the Dutch and the 
French version of the Aliens Act and the corresponding versions of the Directive. 
Both versions have official status in Belgium. In the Dutch version of the Aliens Act, 
the concept of religion comprises “inter alia”  the holding of theistic, non theistic and 
atheistic beliefs (Article 48/3, § 4, b) whereas the Directive indicates that the concept 
shall include “in particular” (“met name”) these beliefs (Article 10, 1, (b) QD). As for 
the social group notion, the Dutch version of the text sticks to the Dutch version of 
the directive, stating that it refers to members sharing “a common background that 
cannot be changed” (“gemeenschappelijke achtergrond”, “histoire commune” in Article 10, 1, 
(d) QD). The French version of the Belgian act uses the terms “racines communes” 
which seem to require stronger common roots, rather than a shared background or 
history (Article 48/3, § 4, d Aliens Act). 
A similar remark can be made with regard to the grounds for exclusion of subsidi-
ary protection status. A person is excluded where there are serious reasons for con-
sidering that he has committed a serious crime (article 17, 1, (c) QD). Unlike the 
exclusion ground for refugees in article 1, F, b of the Refugee Convention and Article 
12, 2, b QD, where explicit reference is made to serious non-political crimes, exclu-
sion of subsidiary protection is also possible in the event of political crimes. At least, 
according to the Dutch and English versions of the directive, using the term “crime” 
or “misdrijf”. The French version of the directive, however, refers to a non-political 
crime: “un crime grave de droit commun”. Nevertheless, the French version of the Belgian 
Act, like the Dutch version of the act and the QD allows for exclusion for any seri-
ous crime (“crime grave”).  
3. The New Asylum Procedure 
With the implementation of the Directive and the introduction of subsidiary protec-
tion status, the Belgian legislator has also changed the asylum procedure. 
This procedure is to be a (quasi-) “one stop shop”-procedure: all applications for 
asylum will be examined in a single procedure on, first, the conditions for refugee 
status and, second, the conditions for subsidiary protection status. This examination 
                                                        
12  Along with the harm consisting of death penalty or execution, torture or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the country of origin. 
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will be done by the Commissioner-general for Refugees and Stateless Persons. The 
jurisdiction of the Immigration Service, that could decide on the admissibility of asy-
lum claims in the existing procedure on both substantial and formal grounds, will be 
limited to the application of the Dublin criteria, the filtering of double applications 
and the removal of failed asylum claimants. 
Against the decision of the Commissioner- General an appeal is open to the 
Council for Aliens Litigation (Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, Conseil du Contentieux 
des Etrangers), a newly to establish administrative tribunal. Appeals for cassation 
against the Council’s decision will be open to the Council of State (Raad van State, 
Conseil d’Etat). The new procedure is expected to become effective as of 1 April 2007. 
Although this reform of the procedure is not to be seen as the formal implemen-
tation of the Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC, the Belgian government seems con-
fident that the new procedure will meet all the requirements therein. 
One important exception to the single procedure remains. Persons fearing a re-
turn to their country of origin for medical reasons can obtain a residence status only 
through an administrative procedure before the Immigration Service. The new Article 
9ter of the Aliens Act states that a person in Belgium holding an identity document 
and suffering from a disease in such a manner that this disease constitutes a serious 
risk for his life or physical integrity or a serious risk for an inhuman or degrading 
treatment when no adequate treatment exists in his country of origin, can apply for a 
leave of stay to the Immigration Service. Upon a medical examination by a state ap-
pointed doctor, a determination on the delivery of a residence title for medical rea-
sons will be made.  
This specific procedure was introduced because the asylum authorities were be-
lieved to have insufficient knowledge in medical matters to decide on this type of 
residence claims. 
4. The Status 
The legislative amendments of 15 September 2006 only relate to the residence issues 
of refugee and subsidiary protection status. 
Persons whose refugee status has been recognized are allowed in Belgium for an 
unlimited stay.13 During the first 10 years of their stay, their status can be revoked, 
possibly on demand of the Immigration Service, by the Commissioner-general on the 
basis of fraud committed in the refugee status determination procedure (omission of 
facts, false declarations, false or forged documents) or when the personal behaviour 
indicates that the person does not fear persecution.14 In that case the person can be 
ordered to leave Belgium. 
In the event of the granting of subsidiary protection status, the asylum applicant is 
allowed to stay in Belgium for a limited period. The person is given a renewable resi-
dence title of 1 year. After 5 years he is allowed to a stay for an unlimited period.15  
                                                        
13  Art. 49, § 1 Aliens Act. 
14  Art. 57/6, 7° Aliens Act. 
15  Art. 49/2 Aliens Act. 
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During the stay for a limited period, the status can, on demand of the Immigra-
tion Service, be revoked by the Commissioner general in the event of cessation due 
to a substantial change of the circumstances that have led to the subsidiary protection 
status or in the event of exclusion for suspicion of crimes against peace, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity, serious crimes and acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the UN. Moreover, during a period of 10 years the status can be re-
voked for reason of fraud committed in the determination procedure. In each of 
these cases the person can be ordered to leave Belgium. 
One may say that subsidiary protection status is still seen as a type of temporary 
protection rather than full protection. 
The transposition of other provisions in the Qualification Directive granting 
rights to refugees and persons in need of subsidiary protection may need additional 
legislative amendments of federal and, within the Belgian federal context, regional 
legislation (travel documents, access to employment and education, social welfare, 
health care, accommodation, integration, …). 
5. Transition 
As the subsidiary protection status is a new status in Belgium, a number of transitory 
measures has been taken to ensure the benefit of the rights that asylum claimants may 
have under the Qualification Directive. 
All asylum applications still pending on the date of entry of the new asylum act 
(10 October 2006) and all new applications introduced as of that day will be deter-
mined under the provisions of both the refugee and the subsidiary protection status. 
For asylum applications already determined prior to the enactment of the new 
provisions, the possibility of yet obtaining subsidiary protection status was envisaged. 
A first case is that of asylum claimants who have been refused Convention refugee 
status but who got issued a so-called “non-refoulement clause”, i.e. an advice by the 
Commissioner-general to the Immigration Service that the person cannot be returned 
to the country of origin for reason of a danger for his life, physical integrity or free-
dom (under Article 3 ECHR). Provided that they can prove their identity, these per-
sons can obtain a residence title as person in need of subsidiary protection, on the 
triple condition that they have stayed in Belgium, that the danger still exists and that 
they constitutes no danger to public order or national security.16  
Other asylum claimants who also filed for refugee status unsuccessfully but who 
were not given a “non-refoulement clause”, may introduce a new asylum application, 
even on the same facts that will be examined under the subsidiary protection rules.17  
                                                        
16  This permit is given by a request sent to the mayor of the place of residence. Art. 77, § 3 Act of 
15 September 2006 amending the Aliens Act of 15 December 2006. 
17  Article 77, § 2 Act of 15 September 2006 amending the Aliens Act of 15 December 2006. 
Normally, a consecutive asylum claim based on elements that have already been invoked in a 
prior application, are not taken into consideration. Article 52/4 Aliens Act, renumbered 52bis. 
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6. Conclusions 
The transposition of the Qualification Directive is a milestone in Belgian asylum law. 
Finally the existing protection under refugee status is reinforced by the introduction 
of subsidiary protection. The existing practice of non-refoulement of persons in fear 
of the type of harm as meant by Article 15 Qualification Directive, either through ad 
hoc executive orders or court measures, with a less certain residence status, is replaced 
by a full status. Whether this will have an impact on the existing recognition rate of 
refugee status – somewhere around 10 % of the applications – is to be seen. The 
Belgian legislator has, in any case, confirmed the broad and open interpretation of the 
refugee definition and of the harm to be feared under the subsidiary protection 
status. Surprisingly though, some of the basics in status determination as mentioned 
in Article 4 of the Directive have been omitted from the Belgian legislation. Surpris-
ingly as well, the Belgian legislator has considered subsidiary protection to be the 
‘lesser’ form of protection: the status only becomes final after five years. The Belgian 
legislator confuses subsidiary protection, which calls for full protection as long as the 
facts and circumstances responsible for the risk of serious harm persist,18 with tem-
porary protection, which is basically an instrument to lighten the burden of massive 
influxes of asylum claimants on the asylum procedure.  
 
                                                        
18  Like with situations leading to refugee status this protection can be needed for a longer or for a 
shorter period. 
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The Qualification Directive and its Transposition into 
Swedish Law 
 
 
Gregor Noll* 
1.  Introduction 
What is the impact of the Qualification Directive1 on the Swedish legal system? At 
the time of writing, a conclusive answer cannot be provided, while the contours of 
legislative changes have become apparent.  
A governmental inquiry (hereinafter “the Inquiry”) had been assigned to draw up 
a comprehensive report on legislative changes necessary to transpose the Directive, 
and delivered a 494-page report on 19 January 2006, including detailed legislative 
proposals.2 According to standard procedure, this report will eventually result in a 
governmental proposal to parliament, on the basis of which the Swedish parliament 
will adopt the necessary changes. By summer 2006, ministerial civil servants had ad-
vanced quite far in their work on the government proposal. Further progress was 
hampered by the upcoming general election on 17 September 2006. A new govern-
ment was elected, and a new migration minister took office. 
When the transposition period elapsed on 9 October 2006, Sweden had failed to 
notify the European Commission of its transposition measures on, thereby joining 
the majority of Member States.3 The incoming government decided to handle the 
transposition of the Qualification Directive and the Draft Directive on Asylum Pro-
cedures4 in one and the same process, which provided for further delay. There are 
                                                        
*  Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, Lund University, Sweden. My thanks are due to 
Ms Kimiko Kondo for research assistance. 
1  Council Directive 2004/83/EC (29 April 2004) on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted, OJ L204/24, 30 September 2005 [hereinafter “Qualification 
Directive”, abbreviated QD]. 
2  Skyddsgrundsdirektivet och svensk rätt. Betänkande av Skyddsgrundsutredningen. Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar 2006:6, 19 January 2006. Available at http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/ 
56440 (accessed on 20 January 2007) [hereinafter “the Inquiry Report”]. Please note that the re-
port contains an eight-page English summary. The Inquiry was created by governmental decree 
of 16 September 2004 (Government Ordinance 2004:114) and chaired by Judge Erik Lempert.  
3  Only six Member States had done so when the deadline of 9 October 2006 had elapsed. Euro-
pean Commission, Entry into force of key asylum law creating a “level playing field” in asylum policies 
throughout Europe hampered by failure of timely transposition by most Member States, Press Release of 10 
October 2006. 
4  Council of the European Union, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, ASILE 64, Annex I, 9 Novem-
ber 2004. 
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reasons to assume that a governmental proposal will be finalised in spring 2007 and 
new legislation might enter into force later that year.5 
Against this backdrop, the report of 19 January 2006 delivered by the governmen-
tal Inquiry must be seen as the only document available offering indications on what 
course the Swedish transposition process might take. It should be emphasised from 
the outset that the present author was a member of the Inquiry. Therefore, all that 
can be done in the framework of the current text is to present the main proposals in 
the Inquiry Report without purporting to offer a detached critique.6  
Unsurprisingly, the Inquiry’s work was largely inspired by a minimalist approach 
towards transposition. It had to relate to a major revision of the Swedish Aliens Act, 
which was bound to enter into force on 31 March 2006, and featured inter alia a shift 
from an authority-based appeal system to a court-based appeal system.7 The content 
of the Qualification Directive had been well known at the preparatory stage of the 
2006 Aliens Act, which might limit the need for comprehensive transposition meas-
ures in the future.  
2. Defining Refugees 
The Directive offers an opportunity to rectify known problems with the refugee 
definition of the Swedish Aliens Act. The most important correction related to the 
question of gender and persecution, and it engaged the Inquiry as well as a parallelly 
ongoing legislative reform process. In 1997, a special provision for aliens having a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of gender or sexual orientation had been 
introduced in the Aliens Act8 This lex specialis had relegated its beneficiaries to sub-
sidiary protection and therewith effectively precluded such persons to be recognised 
as refugees. This, in turn, denied them the benefits associated with refugee status (as a 
travel document, more favourable family reunification rules under the Dublin Con-
vention and Regulation, and earlier access to naturalization). In its bill “Refugee 
status and persecution on grounds of sex or sexual orientation” (Government’s Bill 
2005/06:6), the Government has proposed that persons who feel a well-founded fear 
of persecution on grounds of gender or sexual orientation should instead receive 
protection as refugees. The Inquiry saw strong reasons for supporting this alteration 
in articles 9.2.f and 10.1.d QD.9  
                                                        
5  Telephone interview with Mr. Niklas Kebbon, Swedish Ministry of Justice, 9 January 2007. 
6  Nonetheless, the positions expressed in this text are that of the author. Please note that all 
translations from Swedish to English are by this author and have no official standing whatso-
ever. 
7  Aliens Act (2005:716). 
8  See K. Folkelius and G. Noll: “Affirmative Exclusion? Sex, Gender, Persecution and the Re-
formed Swedish Aliens Act”, 10 International Journal of Refugee Law (1998), p. 607-636. 
9  See in particular p. 111-112 of the Inquiry Report, pointing out that the understanding of a 
particular social group according to the refugee definition in existing Swedish law normally does 
not encompass groups constituted by gender or sexual orientation. 
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As of 31 March 2006, a new provision in line with the Government’s Bill and the 
position of the Inquiry has been adopted. In a literal translation, Chapter 4 Section 1 
of the Aliens Act now defines a refugee as  
 
“an alien being outside the country in which that alien is a citizen, because he or she feels a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religious or political opin-
ion or for reasons of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social 
group.”10 
 
Another proposal put forward in the Inquiry Report concerns the forward-looking 
character of the refugee definition. Article 4.4 QD implies that refugee status deter-
mination ultimately assesses future risks. Presently, a key phrase on persecution by 
non-state agents in Chapter 4 Section 1 of the Swedish Aliens Act relates to a refugee 
as an alien having been exposed to persecution. The Inquiry proposes this wording to be 
altered to define a refugee as an alien risking to be exposed to persecution.11  
Otherwise, the Inquiry Report states that Swedish law is well in line with the pre-
scriptions of the Qualification Directive in a number of areas (actors of persecution, 
actors of protection, cessation). On the issue on protection needs created by the 
applicant sur place in Article 5.3 QD, the Inquiry Report highlights a lack of clarity in 
article 5.3 QD, which states that an applicant “shall normally not be granted refugee 
status, if the risk of persecution is based on circumstances which the applicant has 
created by his own decision since leaving the country of origin.” The Inquiry empha-
sised the need to assess all sur place cases under the 1951 Convention. It suggested 
that this particular provision “shall not entail any legislative changes” .12  
The Inquiry believes that Swedish procedures for cessation of refugee status 
comply with the requirements of the Qualification Directive. The Inquiry Report puts 
forward the proposal to As domestic norms reflecting Article 1D, E and F of the 
1951 Convention are merely limiting the right to obtain a residence permit under 
current law, the Inquiry report suggests that they should also bar an applicant from 
access to refugee status.13 The Inquiry proposes that a provision be introduced in the 
Aliens Act that a residence permit for a refugee must be permanent or be valid for at 
least three years and renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or 
public order otherwise require.14  
                                                        
10  “[E]n utlänning som befinner sig utanför det land som utlänningen är medborgare i, 
därför att han eller hon känner välgrundad fruktan för förföljelse på grund av ras, 
nationalitet, religiös eller politisk uppfattning eller på grund av kön, sexuell läggning 
eller annan tillhörighet till en viss samhällsgrupp”.  
11  Inquiry Report, p. 107-108. 
12  Inquiry Report, p. 96. Emphasis by the author. 
13  Inquiry Report, p. 127-139. 
14  Inquiry Report, p. 132-133. 
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3. Subsidiary Protection 
Subsidiary forms of protection were introduced in Swedish law and practice already 
in the 1970s. By comparison to Southern neighbours as Germany, the Swedish vari-
ety was relatively advantageous, and entailed permanent residence permits with a 
stable set-up of rights. During the past decade, the definition was successively 
adapted to international human rights law and thus became less discretionary. Articles 
2.e and 15 QD would reinforce this trend further15, if the Inquiry proposal for reform 
is followed.  
In order to transpose the Directive, it is suggested that Chapter 4, Section 2 of the 
Aliens Act be supplemented by a provision covering serious and individual threat to a 
civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of interna-
tional or internal armed conflict. In defining beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in 
its article 2.e, the Qualification Directive employs objective formulations of risk 
(“substantial grounds for believing” and “real risk of suffering serious harm”). These 
criteria may be considered more favourable for the individual than the criterion “well-
founded fear” presently used when defining subsidiary protection beneficiaries in the 
Aliens Act. The Inquiry Report suggests, therefore, that the language of ‘well-
founded fear” is swapped for language reflecting objective risks (the alien being “in 
danger” or “running the risk” of certain specified forms of harm).16  
The proposed definition has grown into an extraordinarily complex provision. Its 
central elements merit quoting in full:  
 
A person in need of alternative protection according to this law is an alien who, in other 
cases than those covered by Section 1 [i.e. the refugee definition, GN], is outside the coun-
try in which the alien is a citizen, but where there are reasonable grounds to assume that the 
alien upon return 
1.  would be in danger of being exposed to the death penalty or to corporal punishment, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
2.  would as a civilian run a serious and individual risk to life or person by reason of indis-
criminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, 
3.  would otherwise be in need of protection due to international or internal armed con-
flict, or would risk to be exposed to serious violations due to other grave conflicts in 
the alien’s home country, or 
4.  would be in danger of being persecuted on account of his or her gender or homosexu-
ality  
and that alien is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to accord himself or herself of the 
protection of that country.  
                                                        
15  Jane McAdam sketches the emergence of a subsidiary protection regime and explores its codifi-
cation in the Qualification Directive in J. McAdam, “The European Union Qualification Direc-
tive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime”, 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 
(2005) pp. 461-516. See also R. Piotrowicz and C. van Eck, “Subsidiary Protection and Primary 
Rights”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005), p. 107-138. 
16  See the wording of proposed amendments to Chapter 4 Section 2 of the Aliens Act on p. 44-45 
of the Inquiry Report. 
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It is immaterial to application whether the authorities of the home country are responsible 
for exposing the alien to the risk mentioned in the first paragraph, subparagraphs 1-4, or 
whether the authorities are unable to protect the alien from such actions by individuals.17 
 
Notably, the Inquiry committee believed that article 15.1.c QD might be so narrow in 
scope that the pre-existing Swedish protection clause for persons fleeing armed con-
flict should not be swapped for it. Therefore, article 15.1.c QD is replicated in sub-
paragraph 2 above, while the pre-existing clause is to be found in subparagraph 3 to 
provide a catch-all for those cases not falling under subparagraph 2.  
The Inquiry further suggested that the Aliens Act be complemented with a provi-
sion prescribing that a beneficiary of subsidiary protection be declared as having the 
status of subsidiary protection.18 A residence permit for a person with subsidiary 
protection status should be permanent, or valid for a period of at least one year, and 
renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise 
require. The Inquiry also proposed the introduction of a provision on the ending and 
revocation of subsidiary protection status.19  
4.  Assessment of Facts and Circumstances 
In its article 4, the Qualification Directive offers a messy combination of mandatory 
and optional rules on how to assess applications for international protection.20 The 
current Swedish system for assessing applications for international protection is a 
one-stop shop, where applications for asylum are dealt with in the same manner as 
applications for subsidiary protection. It rests on the principle of free evaluation of 
evidence. The Inquiry believed that it currently meets the requirements raised by the 
Directive, obviating active transposition.21 
5. Information Duties on the Content of the Status Granted 
In Swedish practice, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status are 
informed of their rights and obligations. However, there is no written norm under-
pinning that practice. With a view to article 22 QD, the Inquiry proposes that a new 
provision on information concerning the rights and obligations relating to refugee or 
subsidiary protection status be introduced in the Aliens Ordinance (1989:547).22 It 
                                                        
17  Please note that subparagraph 4 has already been deleted in Chapter 4 Section 2 of the Aliens 
Act as currently in force for reasons explained above (see text accompanying note 9). 
18  Inquiry Report, p. 188-189. 
19  Inquiry Report, pp. 191-193. 
20  For an extensive analysis, see G. Noll, “Evidentiary Assessment in Refugee Status Determina-
tion and the EU Qualification Directive”, 12 European Public Law (2006), p. 295-317. 
21  Inquiry Report, p. 218. 
22  Inquiry Report, p. 241-243.  
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states explicitly that, “[t]o the extent possible, such information shall be delivered in a 
language which the alien can understand”.23 
6. Maintaining Family Unity 
In Swedish law, the principle of family unity applies to families of refugees. To a large 
extent, the unity of families of individuals with subsidiary protection status is also 
maintained. In general, family members will be granted the same status as the person 
they wish to join in Sweden. 
In the light of articles 23 and 24, the Inquiry proposes that a provision be intro-
duced in the Aliens Act stating that a spouse, partner or unmarried child of a refugee 
or person with subsidiary protection status is entitled to a residence permit. The resi-
dence permit is to be permanent, or valid for a period of at least one year, and renew-
able unless reasons of national security or public order otherwise require.24 Other-
wise, existing provisions in the Aliens Act on the revocation of residence permits of 
family members are deemed compatible with the Directive. 
Providing family members of beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection 
status with permanent residence permits or temporary residence permits valid for at 
least one year opens their access to residence-based benefits in Chapter VII of the 
Directive. With regard to the level of benefits to be provided to family members of 
beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status, existing Swedish law matches 
the requirements of the Directive.  
7. Travel Documents  
Existing Swedish law provides that refugees are entitled to a travel document in ac-
cordance with the 1951 Convention. Hence, there is no need of active transposition 
of article 25.1 QD. The Inquiry proposes that the Swedish Migration Board should 
be obliged by a provision in the Aliens Ordinance to issue an aliens passport to a 
beneficiary of subsidiary protection status where this is necessary for serious humani-
tarian reasons.25 At present, there is merely a competence for the Migration Board to 
do so, but no obligation. 
8. Unaccompanied Minors 
In its analysis of existing Swedish law, the Inquiry noted that article 30.5 QD would 
need to be transposed. It is suggested that the Swedish Migration Board be given the 
                                                        
23  Inquiry Report, p. 243. 
24  Inquiry Report, p. 260-272. 
25  Inquiry Report, p. 277. 
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task of tracing an unaccompanied child’s family members after a child has been 
granted a residence permit.26  
9. Other Issues  
With regard to  
Access to the labour market; 
- Education; 
- Access to accommodation; 
- Right to free movement within the Member State; 
- Access to integration facilities; 
- Repatriation; 
- Administrative cooperation within the EU, and  
- Staff, 
 
the Inquiry deems Swedish law to be fully in line with the obligations of the Qualifi-
cation Directive. No legislative amendments are proposed in these areas. 
 
                                                        
26  Inquiry Report, p. 333-340. 
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The Implementation of the Qualification Directive in 
France: One Step Forward and Two Steps Backwards 
 
 
Vincent Chetail∗ 
 
 
The position of France regarding the implementation of the European Qualification 
Directive of 29 April 20041 can best be described as unusual. France incorporated the 
Directive five months before its very adoption! A Statute on asylum was specifically 
adopted in December 2003 in order to incorporate in domestic law the main compo-
nents of the proposal of the European Commission, which eventually became – after 
several modifications – the Qualification Directive five months later.2 
At first glance, this sudden enthusiasm coming from a Member State traditionally 
reticent in implementing European Directives may strike as surprising. As the author 
has elaborated on elsewhere,3 this premature incorporation was clearly designed to 
influence the negotiations within the European Union and thereby to reshape the 
content of the future Directive. From a traditional French viewpoint, it made it pos-
sible to argue that the EU Directive implements French law rather than the contrary.  
In spite of its highly political context, the Statute of December 2003 introduced 
three important changes in existing French domestic law and practice: it officially 
recognised subsidiary protection, persecution from non-state actors, and internal 
                                                        
∗  Lecturer in Public International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies; Research 
Director, University Centre for International Humanitarian Law (Geneva). The author wishes 
to thank Fiona Le Diraison for her comments and suggestions. 
1  See on this Directive: J.-Y. Carlier, “Réfugié: identification et statut des personnes à protéger. 
La directive ‘qualification’”, in: F. Julien-Laferrière, H. Labayle and O. Edström (eds.), La 
politique européenne d’immigration et d’asile: Bilan critique cinq ans après le Traité d’Amsterdam / The Euro-
pean Immigration and Asylum Policy: Critical Assessment Five Years after the Amsterdam Treaty, Brussels: 
Bruylant 2005, p. 289-322; H. Lambert, “The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, Its Impact on 
the Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and International Law”, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 2006, p. 161-192; F. Julien-Laferrière, “Le régime européen de l’asile”, in: V. 
Chetail (ed.), Mondialisation, migration et droits de l’homme: le droit international en question / Globaliza-
tion, Migration and Human Rights: International Law under Review, Brussels: Bruylant 2007, p. 523-
568. 
2  Loi sur le droit d’asile du 10 décembre 2003, JO 11 December 2003, p. 21080. For a commentary of 
this important reform of asylum law, see: D. Turpin, “La loi du 10 décembre 2003 relative au 
droit d’asile : d’une « exception française » mal assumée à un alignement européen trop bien as-
suré !”, Recueil Dalloz, 2004, pp. 1034-1041; V. Chetail, “La réforme française de l’asile : prélude 
à la banalisation européenne du droit des réfugiés”, Journal de droit international, 2004, p. 817-865; 
F. Julien-Laferrière, “L’actualité législative du droit d’asile en France : la loi Villepin N° 2033-
1176 du 10 décembre 2003 modifiant la loi du 25 juillet 1952 relative au droit d’asile”, in: J.-Y. 
Carlier and P. De Bruycker (dir.), Immigration and Asylum Law of the EU : Current Debates / Actuali-
té du droit européen de l’immigration et de l’asile, Brussels: Bruylant 2005, p. 559-573. 
3  V. Chetail, “La réforme française de l’asile : prélude à la banalisation européenne du droit des 
réfugiés”, op. cit., p. 817-865.  
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protection. Although not explicitly required by European law,4 the new Statute also 
instituted a single procedure on asylum, including both claims for refugee status and 
subsidiary protection. 
Since the adoption of the Statute, there has been no other substantial legislative or 
administrative measure to implement the Qualification Directive. A new Code on 
aliens’ admission and the right to asylum (Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du 
droit d’asile) entered into force in March 2005. However, the adoption of this Code 
was a purely formal modification of the law, the purpose of which was to gather all 
the existing rules governing migration and asylum into a single document. Similarly, 
the new Statute on immigration and integration (Loi Sarkozy II), enacted in July 2006, 
contains some provisions on technical aspects of the asylum procedure, but these 
provisions do not affect the Qualification Directive.5 The deadline of 10 October 
2006 for implementing the Directive in national legislation therefore lapsed without 
any further change.  
The legislative reform adopted in December 2003 undoubtedly endorsed impor-
tant changes initiated by the European Union. Nonetheless, this premature incorpo-
ration of the Qualification Directive remains selective and partial, thus reducing the 
impact of the harmonization process. More significantly, French law focuses only on 
certain limited aspects of the two major components of the Directive concerning 
respectively, the common criteria for defining who is a refugee or is otherwise enti-
tled to subsidiary protection (Part. I) and the minimum level of rights and benefits 
attached to the protection granted (Part. II).  
1. The Definition of Refugees and of other Persons in Need of 
International Protection 
The main interest of the French legislation lies in the definition of refugees and per-
sons entitled to subsidiary protection and more particularly in the case law that relates 
to it.6 France is indeed in a very peculiar situation, as it is the only Member State that 
it has the opportunity to implement the EU Directive during more than two years 
before the official deadline for its transposition. However, even if the French case 
law is instructive on several aspects of the Qualification Directive, the overall result 
of the implementation process initiated in January 2004 is rather disappointing. 
French Courts did not succeed in providing a systemic and coherent framework for 
the interpretation of the definition of persons in need of protection, particularly con-
cerning the very concept of persecution. 
                                                        
4  The Directive on asylum procedure adopted in December 2005 does not impose a single pro-
cedure, even if this option is clearly encouraged. See: Commission of the European Communi-
ties, A More Efficient Common European Asylum System: The Single Procedure as the Next Step, 
COM(2004) 503 final. 
5  Loi du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration, JO 25 July 2006, p. 11047. 
6  French case law mentioned in the present study is updated until 30 September 2006. It may be 
found in the 2004 and 2005 annual reports and the three first quarterly reports 2006, edited by 
the Commission des recours des réfugiés (Contentieux des réfugiés. Jurisprudence du Conseil d’Etat et de 
la Commission des recours des réfugiés, Centre d’information juridique). 
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1.1 Nature and Grounds of Persecution and Serious Harm 
Persecution is defined in Article 9 of the Qualification Directive as “a severe violation 
of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made 
under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms” or “an accumulation of various measures, including 
violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a 
similar manner”. This general definition of persecution has not been incorporated 
into French domestic law (neither in the legislation of December 2003 nor in any 
other regulations or case law). The absence of any clear-cut definition of the term 
“persecution” contrasts with the more systemic and rather sophisticated approach 
developed by common law countries.7 Defining persecution by reference to human 
rights violations not only ensures that the 1951 Geneva Convention has a continuing 
relevance in accordance with the subsequent evolution of international law, but it also 
allows for a common and coherent framework for interpretation that plainly corre-
sponds to the objectives of the harmonization process initiated by the European 
Union.  
The attitude of the French authorities towards the crucial concept of persecution 
is symptomatic of a selective and partial incorporation of the Qualification Directive. 
As a matter of fact, it therefore depends on the circumstances of each case whether a 
particular action or threat would amount to persecution. Such an empirical and ad-hoc 
assessment weakens the very idea of a predictable and binding meaning of persecu-
tion.8 This typical trend of the French Parliament and the Courts may be explained 
on the following grounds: it illustrates their implicit will to preserve a broad margin 
of appreciation for decision-makers and more decisively, their traditional reluctance 
to define persecution by reference to human rights. In accordance with a sovereign 
and classical conception of asylum, refugee law is commonly considered in France to 
be within the boundaries of domestic administrative law rather than international or 
human rights law.  
This conception did not change even after the incorporation in domestic law of 
the grounds of subsidiary protection deriving from human rights instruments.9 The 
                                                        
7  See for example: Canada v. Ward [1993] 2 RCS 689, p. 733 (J. La Forest); Horvath v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 577 (HL), p. 581 (Lord Hope); RSAA, Refugee 
Appeal N° 74665/03 (7 July 2004), § 41. 
8  This critic was already raised in 1998 by J. Fougerousse and R. Ricci in their article “Le conten-
tieux de la reconnaissance du statut de réfugié devant la Commission des Recours des Réfu-
giés”, Revue de droit public, 1998, p. 197: “On se trouve en présence d’une mosaïque de pa-
ramètres, qui varie considérablement selon les affaires. Autour de certaines constantes (gravité, 
durée), les nuances sont extrêmes et dissolvent véritablement toute idée de persécution ju-
ridiquement définie, de sorte que la sécurité juridique des requérants s’en trouve compromise”. 
9  For a general overview of the interaction between human rights law and refugee law through 
the principle of non-refoulement, see notably: V. Chetail, “Le droit des réfugiés à l’épreuve des 
droits de l’homme: bilan de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur 
l'interdiction du renvoi des étrangers menacés de torture et de traitements inhumains ou 
dégradants”, Revue belge de droit international, 2004, p. 155-210. See also in relation to the Commit-
tee against torture: V. Chetail, “Le Comité des Nations Unies contre la torture et l’expulsion des 
étrangers: dix ans de jurisprudence”, Revue suisse de droit international et européen, 2006, p. 63-104. 
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recognition of this alternative ground for protection is one of the major changes 
inspired by the EU Directive.10 The legislation adopted in December 2003 restates 
the basic criteria for subsidiary protection recognised in article 15 of the Qualification 
Directive. Both French law and European law refer to a “serious harm [which] 
consists of: (a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and 
individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict”.11 
The absence of any legal definition of persecution, in conjunction with the more 
specific criteria of subsidiary protection, makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
two forms of protection. After more than two years of application, the case law of 
the French Refugee Appeals Board (Commission des recours des réfugiés) is simply not 
coherent. One could reasonably wonder whether it aims to distinguish them. The 
Commission tends to use one common criterion for both forms of protection in 
order to differentiate who is outside and who is within the ambit of international 
protection. This vague and factual criterion depends on the gravity of persecution 
and serious harm. Asylum applications are frequently refused on the ground that the 
prejudicial actions are not sufficiently severe to be eligible for refugee status or for 
subsidiary protection.12 The threshold of the gravity test can be relatively high. For 
example, a dismissal motivated by ethnic origin in Georgia does not justify interna-
tional protection.13 The French Commission held in the same vein that a withdrawal 
of nationality as a result of the refusal to perform military service in Turkey is neither 
a persecution nor a serious harm.14 
The main distinctive element between subsidiary protection and refugee definition 
is built on the grounds of persecution and serious harm. Subsidiary protection does 
                                                        
10  See on subsidiary protection: R. Piotrowicz and C. van Eck, “Subsidiary Protection and primary 
rights”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2004, p. 107-134; G. Noll, “International Pro-
tection Obligations and the Definition of Subsidiary Protection in the EU Qualification Direc-
tive”, in: C. Urbano de Sousa and P. De Bruycker (eds.), The Emergence of a European Asylum Policy 
/ L’émergence d’une politique européenne de l’asile, Brussels: Bruylant 2004, p. 183-194; J. McAdam, 
“The European Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime”, Inter-
national Journal of Refugee Law, 2005, p. 461-516. See also on the previous draft of the European 
text: J. Vedsted-Hansen, “Assessment of the Proposal for an EC Directive on the Notion of 
Refugee and Subsidiary Protection from the Perspective of International Law”, in: D. Bouteil-
let-Paquet (ed.), Subsidiary Protection of Refugees in the European Union: Complementing the Geneva Con-
vention?, Brussels: Bruylant 2002, p. 57-78. 
11  We could notice two differences of language between the two texts. The French Act does not 
explicitly mention “execution”, which is supposed to be covered by the generic expression of 
“death penalty” (peine de mort). Moreover, the EU Directive requires that “torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment” relates to an applicant “in the country of origin”, whereas this curious 
condition is fortunately not mentioned in the French legislation.  
12  See for example: CRR, 9 January 2006, 489406, D. (short term detention of 24 hours for iden-
tity control of a transsexual in Ivory Coast); CRR, 1st June 2005, 487178, Veletanlic (expulsion 
from housing of a Muslim in Bosnia according to a non-discriminatory legislation); CRR, 6 De-
cember 2004, 496263, Wang (pressure from private individuals to reimburse a loan and finan-
cial penalty for leaving the Chinese territory without official permission). 
13  CRR, 6 January 2005, 479780, Shaveshean épouse Khatoyan. 
14  CRR, 2 May 2005, 502323, Gunduz.  
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not require a particular ground or motivation, whereas persecution – under the refu-
gee definition – has to be based on one of the grounds enumerated in the Geneva 
Convention (race, religion, nationality, political opinion and particular social groups). 
Article 9(3) of the EU Directive recalls that “there must be a connection between the 
reasons […] and the acts of persecution”. These five reasons of persecution are de-
fined in Article 10 of the Directive. The European definitions of these grounds of 
persecution have not been explicitly incorporated in domestic law. However, they 
correspond in substance to the general understanding of French case law. For exam-
ple, the Conseil d’Etat held in a judgement Beltaifa delivered in 1998 that political opin-
ion may be attributed to the applicant by the actor of persecution, irrespective of the 
reality of such political beliefs.15 Since the consecration of this interpretation by Arti-
cle 10 § 2 of the Directive, the Commission refers more systematically to the percep-
tion of political opinions by persecutors.16 
The ground of persecution based on the “membership to a particular social 
group” provides a more striking example of the parallel between French case law and 
the EU Directive. The controversial notion of a particular social group is defined in 
the Directive as the “members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a 
common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that 
is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to 
renounce it, and that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is 
perceived as being different by the surrounding society”. This definition is considered 
to encompass the two main conceptions of a particular social group, namely the 
“protected characteristic approach” and the “social perception approach”.17 Article 
10 is however criticized by the UNHCR because, although the two approaches fre-
quently converge, this is not always the case and it may therefore create protection 
gaps.18 The UN agency therefore recommends that Member States reconcile the two 
approaches to permit alternative, rather than cumulative, application of the two con-
ceptions. This will certainly not be the case for France, as the definition of a “particu-
lar social group” expressed in Article 10 § 1 d) of the EU Directive is similar to that 
retained by the Conseil d’Etat in a judgement delivered in 1997. According to the 
French Administrative Supreme Court, a particular social group has to be defined on 
the basis of two cumulative conditions: the members of that group have to share a 
                                                        
15  CE, SSR, 27 avril 1998, Beltaifa. 
16  See notably: CRR, SR, 17 December 2004, 487872, Kahoul ép. Louahche; CRR, 22 July 2005, 
508193, Ataev; CRR, 6 April 2005, 436054, Zhivilo; CRR, 15 February 2005, 485234, Bessam; 
CRR, 15 March 2006, 502401, Nouri; CRR, 28 June 2006, 530213, Museka.  
17  See on the different schools of thought on the particular social group: T.A. Aleinikhoff, “Pro-
tected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of ’Membership of a 
Particular Social Group’ ”, in: E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in In-
ternational Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 263-311; Guidelines on Interna-
tional Protection: ‘Membership of a particular social group’ within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, HCR/GIP/02/02, 7 
May 2002. 
18  UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Mini-
mum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees 
or as Persons who otherwise need International Protection and the Content of the Protection granted, January 
2005, p. 23. 
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common characteristic and, because of this characteristic, the group has to be 
perceived as distinct in the surrounding society.19 The Commission confirmed in 
2004 and 2005 a well-established case law,20 recognizing that women who refuse 
genital mutilation constitute a particular social group in Chad,21 Senegal22 and Mali.23 
The Commission also held in an important judgment delivered in July 2005 that 
women refusing forced marriage and considered by the society as transgressing social 
mores constitute a particular social group in Cameroon.24 The Commission explained 
that if one of the two conditions identified by the Conseil d’Etat for the definition of a 
particular social group is not satisfied, notably because their refusal is not considered 
as a transgression of the social order, such women are still eligible for subsidiary 
protection. This case is one of the rare decisions explicitly referring to the differences 
between subsidiary protection and refugee definition. 
In doing so, the Commission highlights the main purpose of subsidiary protec-
tion, namely providing for an alternative protection when persecution is not based on 
one of the five grounds enumerated in the Geneva Convention. This case also exem-
plifies the implicit reasoning of the French Court: the decision-maker has first to 
examine whether the applicant fulfils the conditions of the refugee definition and 
then, if this is not the case, notably because of the absence of a ground of persecu-
tion, the decision-maker has to examine whether the applicant satisfies the conditions 
for subsidiary protection. Following this method, refugee definition under the Ge-
neva Convention remains the rule and subsidiary protection under the European 
Directive the exception. Article L 712-1 of the French Statute (Code des étrangers) ex-
plicitly recalls for the same purpose that subsidiary protection is granted to any per-
son who does not qualify as a refugee. 
Since January 2004, subsidiary protection has been recognised in three main fields: 
family or private issues; threat of serious harm from mafia and other criminal organi-
zations; and situations of armed conflict. The first set of circumstances is the most 
frequent ground for subsidiary protection. It generally includes: family violence in the 
context of forced marriage refusal;25 domestic violence from husband;26 family har-
                                                        
19  The French Supreme Court defined a particular social group as a “groupe dont les membres 
seraient, en raison des caractéristiques communes qui les définissent aux yeux des autorités et de 
la société, susceptibles d’être exposés à des persécutions”: CE, SSR, 23 June 1997, O., Leb. p. 
261 ; D., 1997, IR p. 175 ; JCP, n° 28-29, 9 juillet 1997. 
20  See : CRR, 18 September 1991, Diop, Doc. Réfugiés, suppl. au n° 187, 20/29 juin 1992 ; CRR, SR, 
7 December 2001, Sissoko et Konate épouse Sissoko, Rec. p. 44. 
21  CRR, 30 March 2004, 454281, Ndiguimadji. 
22  CRR, 22 February 2005, 456133, Diakhate épouse Ndiongue. 
23  CRR, 16 June 2005, 492440, Sylla. 
24  CRR, SR, 29 July 2005, 519803, Tabe. The Commission came to the same conclusion for 
women refusing forced marriage in Pakistan (CRR, SR, 15 October 2004, 444000, Nazia), Tur-
key (CRR, SR, 4 March 2005, Tas; CRR, 11 April 2005, 507766, Ozkan) and Guinea (CRR, 
531526, 27 April 2006, Diallo épouse Bah). However, divorced women in Iran do not constitute 
as such a particular social group: CRR, 9 June 2006, 54948, Khoshmou.  
25  CRR, 21 December 2004, 483691, Diagana: Mauritania; CRR, 7 October 2005, 535458, Dolgor: 
Mongolia. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE IN FRANCE  
93 
assment based on perceived sexual orientation;27 forced prostitution by a family 
member;28 and adultery cases.29 The second set of circumstances justifying subsidiary 
protection is related to threat of serious harm by mafia or other criminal organiza-
tions because the applicants denounced their criminal activities or refused bribes and 
racket.30 The third main ground for subsidiary protection derives from a situation of 
armed conflict, as expressly mentioned in Article 15 (c) of the EU Directive. During 
more than two years of application, the Commission recognized subsidiary protection 
in the context of armed conflict only four times. It concerned applicants coming 
from Sudan, Iraq and Colombia. In the first decision delivered in November 2005, 
the French Court described the situation in Darfur as an internal armed conflict un-
der the criteria mentioned in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the protection 
of civilian population.31 The reference to Article 3 was rather unfortunate. Contrary 
to the assumption of the Commission, this provision identifies the minimum stan-
dard applicable in times of internal armed conflict, but it does not define what an 
internal armed conflict is.32 Two other decisions have been delivered in February 
2006 in the context of Iraq, where the situation has been characterized by the Com-
mission as “a conflict between Iraqi security forces, coalition forces and armed 
groups carrying out on certain parts of the territory sustained and concerted military 
                                                        
26  CRR, 21 March 2005, 493515, Gueye ép. Reckoundji: Central African Republic; CRR, 28 Septem-
ber 2005, 458663, Apleni ép. Aguocha: South Africa; CRR, 16 February 2006, 552561, Mame-
dova: Russia; CRR, 19 July 2006, 526541, Maher: Morocco. 
27  CRR, 25 March 2005, 513547, G.: Moldavia. 
28  CRR, 9 March 2006, 548670, Barro: Congo. 
29  CRR, 26 January 2006, 463518, Aigbe and CRR, 521250, 6 March 2006, Sule: Nigeria. 
30  CRR, 8 February 2005, 493983, Z.: China; CRR, 21 April 2005, 494377, Khan: Bangladesh; CRR, 
28 June 2005, 519680, Saint Phart: Haiti. Subsidiary protection was also recognised because ap-
plicants risked being victim of a vendetta in Albania: CRR, 28 September 2005, 432255, Canaj; 
CRR, 17 February 2006, 5442999, Selmani. 
31  CRR, 22 November 2005, 538807, Azzine Ahmed. 
32  Article 3 may however be relevant for identifying the “threat to a civilian’s life or person” men-
tioned in Article 15 (c) of the EU Directive. According to Article 3: “In the case of armed con-
flict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provi-
sions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To 
this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatso-
ever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for (...)”. 
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operations”.33 This definition, implicitly inspired from the wording of Article 1 of the 
1977 Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, is far more relevant than Article 3 common to 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
These few cases demonstrate that the threshold of this last ground of subsidiary 
protection is relatively high. It excludes situations where the intensity of violence falls 
below the threshold required by an “armed conflict”. One could argue that a situation 
of generalized violations of human rights is a degrading treatment under Article 15 
(b) of the Qualification Directive. The French Commission is however traditionally 
reluctant towards situations of indiscriminate violence. Contrary to other States Par-
ties to the Geneva Convention,34 it never recognized the concept of collective perse-
cution under the refugee definition. In fact, subsidiary protection as well as refugee 
status are frequently denied on the ground that the general situation in the country of 
origin cannot justify protection in the absence of a clearly individualized risk of per-
secution or serious harm upon return.35 French case law gives the impression that the 
benefit of subsidiary protection and refugee status is inversely proportionate to the 
number of persons invoking it.  
Case law rulings can be inconsistent in their application of the Directive. The 
Commission held in a decision of June 2006 regarding an applicant from Iran that 
judicial condemnation to 100 lashes for adultery is not a persecution, on the ground 
that it is the result of a non-discriminatory measure of implementation of the criminal 
legislation.36 It concludes nevertheless that this is an inhuman and degrading treat-
ment under Article 15 (b) of the EU Directive. The Commission implicitly admits 
therefore that such a penalty is susceptible to be applied against any other persons in 
the same situation. Such decisions are nevertheless sparse. The recent cases related to 
a situation of armed conflict confirm the premise based on – what Jane McAdam 
called – a “political fear of numbers rather than any legal basis”.37 
The four decisions delivered under the meaning of Article 15 (c) of the Directive 
have been formulated in very cautious terms. The Commission insists on the “indi-
vidual” and “direct” nature of the threat to life or person, holding, for example, that 
such a threat is closely linked either to the financial situation of the Sudanese na-
tional38 or to the former position of the Iraqi applicant in the administration of Sad-
                                                        
33  Translation by the author. CRR, SR, 17 February 2006, 497089, Alawazi; CRR, SR, 416162, 17 
February 2006, Kona. See also in Colombia: CRR, 29 September 2006, 533070, Rincon Perez. 
34  See for example in Belgium: CPRR, Decision n° 92/335/R756 (20 August 1992), in Canada: 
Salibian v. Canada [1990] 3 C.F. 250 (C.A.), p. 258, in the UK: Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment v. Adan [1998] Imm AR 338 (HL), p. 348-349 (Lloyd of Berwick), or in the USA: Kotasz 
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1994). 
35  See notably: CRR, 13 October 2004, 482327, Ziberov: Russia; CRR, 10 November 2005, 543380, 
Alkhor: Palestine. 
36  CRR, 9 June 2006, 550721, Mehrzadeh. The legality of such conclusion is questionable, as Article 
9 (2) (c) of the EU Qualification explicitly states that “prosecution or punishment, which is dis-
proportionate” is an act of persecution under the refugee definition.  
37  J. McAdam, “The European Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection 
Regime”, op. cit., p. 483. 
38  CRR, 22 November 2005, 538807, Azzine Ahmed. 
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dam Hussein.39 It begs the question whether the situation of armed conflict is still 
relevant in such circumstances. Indeed, the refugee status has been recognized in 
similar circumstances to other applicants from Sudan40 and Iraq41 without mention-
ing the situation of armed conflict. 
Overemphasis on a personalized threat neutralized the very concept of indis-
criminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the EU Directive and removed, as a conse-
quence, a substantial part of the raison d’être of subsidiary protection. Such reasoning is 
based on a confusion between the effect and the cause, namely the risk itself 
(fear/threat) and the source of this risk (persecution/serious harm). While the risk is 
by definition personal to the applicant, such a risk may be caused by a collective 
treatment to a whole group of persons. The issue is not whether the claimant is more 
at risk than anyone else in his/her country, but rather whether he/she is personally at 
risk because of his/her membership to a particular group. 
1.2 Actors of Persecution and Actors of Protection 
One of the major changes introduced by the legislative reform initiated in December 
2003 relates to non-state actors. According to a well-known case law, France was 
traditionally in favour of the so-called “accountability approach” requiring a direct 
link between persecution and the State.42 On the contrary, the vast majority of States 
parties to the Refugee Convention apply the “protection approach”, focusing on the 
failure to provide protection.43 This last approach was finally endorsed by Article 6 of 
the EU Directive and France preferred to anticipate this change by incorporating it in 
its domestic law before the adoption of the Directive (Article L 713-2 of the Code des 
étrangers).  
This change imposed by the Parliament created a sort of cultural revolution for 
French judges. Persecution from non-state actors no longer depends on State com-
plicity, as was previously required for Algerian applicants. The Commission acknowl-
edged in a decision of June 2004 that the Algerian authorities were unable to provide 
protection against terrorists between 1995 and 2000 and considered that they are still 
unable to today in the particular region of Chlef.44 It also recognized refugee status to 
nationals from Columbia who have a well-founded fear of being extorted and kid-
napped by the FARC guerrilla group.45 Contrary to its previous case law, the Com-
                                                        
39  CRR, SR, 17 February 2006, 497089, Alawazi. 
40  CRR, 15 May 2006, 560434, Lpen. 
41  CRR, 15 mars 2006, 502401, Nouri. 
42  CE, sect., 27 mai 1983, Dankha, Leb. p. 221. For an overview of the previous French case-law, 
see: F. Tiberghien, “Statut de réfugié et persécution par des agents non publics”, Revue française 
de droit administratif, 1998, p. 244-257; D. Alland and C. Teitgen-Colly, Traité du droit de l’asile, 
PUF, Paris, 2002, p. 447-453. 
43  V. Türk, “Non-State Agents of Persecution”, in: V. Chetail and V. Gowlland-Debbas (eds), 
Switzerland and the International Protection of Refugees/La Suisse et la protection internationale des réfugiés, 
The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2002, p. 95-110. 
44  CRR, SR, 25 June 2004, 446177, Boubrima. See also: CRR, 16 June 2004, 462367, Bouguessa.  
45  CRR, 26 April 2005, 502080, Marmolejo. See however: CRR, 24 March 2004, 446350, Castano; 
CRR, 16 December 2005, 527022, Munoz. 
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mission finally recognised in September 2004 that persecution may also come from 
Somali clans.46 This is another important change, because it traditionally considered 
Somalia as a situation of anarchy without any legal or de facto authorities. The Com-
mission also explained in subsequent decisions on Somalia that the current transi-
tional government does not exercise effective control over the Somali territory and 
thus cannot provide protection against persecution from clans.47 
Despite these remarkable changes, the Commission still seems reluctant to ad-
dress persecution from non-state actors. Such claims are frequently refused on the 
general ground that the risk is not clearly established. Moreover, certain decisions 
relating to Algerian applicants surprisingly continue to apply the former case law.48 
Decisions of this kind are isolated but nevertheless illustrate persisting disagreement 
within the Commission itself on the issue of non-state actors. Another disturbing 
aspect of French case law derives from the fact that the vast majority of subsidiary 
protection cases have been recognized in the context of private and non-state perse-
cution. This curious coincidence could be inferred from an implicit interpretation 
that persecution under the Refugee Convention is supposed to be linked to a legal or 
de facto authority. Such a distinction is clearly in contradiction with the EU Directive 
as the rules governing actors of persecution and protection are expressly applicable 
under the same conditions for the refugee definition and the subsidiary protection. 
With regard to the actors of protection identified in Article 7(1) of the EU Direc-
tive, it is worth mentioning that the legislation adopted in December 2003 only refers 
to “States” and “international or regional organisations”. The other actors of protec-
tion mentioned in the Directive (“parties or organisations […] controlling the State or 
a substantial part of the territory of the State”) have been voluntarily excluded by the 
French Parliament. Such a peculiarity is compatible with the EU Directive, as Article 
3 explicitly permits Member States to “introduce or retain more favourable standards 
for determining who qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary pro-
tection”. 
On the other hand, French legislation fails to incorporate an important clarifica-
tion specified in Article 7(2) of the Directive49 regarding the level of protection pro-
vided by States and international organizations. In the silence of the legislation, case 
law insists on the effectiveness of the protection actually provided by States or inter-
national organisations to prevent persecution.50 The Commission recalled in numer-
ous cases on Congo,51 Kosovo52 and Haiti53 that the mere presence of UN peace-
                                                        
46  CRR, 22 September 2004, 476063, O.; CRR, 22 September 2004, 477184, Hussein ép. Adowe. 
47  CRR, SR, 29 July 2005, 487336, Ali Ahmed; CRR, 30 January 2006, 548925, Hassan Djamé épouse 
Abdillahi. 
48  CRR, 13 March 2006, 561830, Hammounda.  
49  According to Article 7(2) of the Directive, “Protection is generally provided when the actors 
mentioned in paragraph 1 take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of 
serious harm, inter alia, by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and 
punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the applicant has access to 
such protection”. 
50  See in particular: CRR, SR, 29 July 2005, 487336, Ali Ahmed. 
51  CRR, 25 may 2004, 442209, Kibalatatu Moboto. 
52  CRR, 23 September 2004, 469809, Qerimi. 
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keeping forces is not sufficient to prevent persecution, when such forces as well as 
State authorities fail to provide effective protection. The Commission’s assessment 
being focused on the circumstances of each case, it is difficult to be more specific 
than the effective nature of the protection in the country of origin. 
1.3 Internal Protection 
According to Article 8(1) of the Qualification Directive, Member States “may” refuse 
protection to an applicant “if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-
founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the 
applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country”.54 Although 
optional, the French Parliament explicitly incorporated the concept of internal pro-
tection in its domestic legislation (article L. 713-3 of the Code des étrangers). The Com-
mission des recours des réfugiés confirmed in June 2004 that the two conditions above-
mentioned are cumulative: the decision-maker has firstly to examine whether there is 
a risk of persecution or serious harm in a part of the country of origin and secondly, 
it has to examine whether the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in that 
part of the country.55 
Contrary to the European text, the French Code explicitly mentions the author of 
persecution amongst the different factors to take into account in the assessment of 
the availability of internal protection. When the author of persecution is the State, it is 
clearly exceptional that an applicant may find protection in one part of the national 
territory, as State authorities are generally able to act throughout the whole territory. 
In practice, internal protection has been raised only four times as a ground of re-
fusal of refugee status and subsidiary protection.56 In each case, applicants invoked 
non-state actors’ persecutions in one particular area of the national territory. This is 
an important point for the potential impact of internal protection. As a matter of 
principle, internal protection is not bound to be applied to all asylum cases. Geo-
graphically circumscribed risk of persecution is a prerequisite to apply internal protec-
tion. 
Once such a geographically circumscribed risk is established, the Commission 
generally takes into account the living conditions in the relevant part of the country in 
order to assess whether it is reasonable to stay there. It held, for instance, that an 
Algerian applicant could not reasonably be expected to stay in Alger because of the 
impossibility of finding a job as well as being submitted to pressure by the police to 
go back to his region of origin.57 However, the geographical size of a given part of 
                                                        
53  CRR, 28 June 2005, 519680, Saint Phart; CRR, 6 July 2005, 475778, Valeus. 
54  See on this subject: R. Marx, “The Criteria of Applying the ‘Internal Flight Alternative’ Test in 
National Refugee Status Determination”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2002, p. 185; James 
C. Hathaway and M. Foster, “Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of 
Refugee Status Determination”, in: E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection 
in International Law, op. cit., pp. 357-417. 
55  CRR, SR, 25 June 2004, 446177, Boubrima.  
56  CRR, 20 July 2004, 448586, Kasipillai Thalaiyasingam; CRR, 26 October 2004, 475193, Hyrije 
Bejtullahu; CRR, 7 April 2005, Masaquiza Anancolla; CRR, 30 March 2006, 542469, Nacu. 
57  CRR, SR, 25 June 2004, 446177, Boubrima.  
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the country is surprisingly not a relevant factor. The Commission admitted that the 
capital of Moldavia58 or even the village of origin in Kosovo59 could be a reasonable 
place to stay. Such a restrictive interpretation is manifestly open to legitimate criti-
cism. 
2.  The Content of International Protection for Refugees and Beneficiaries 
of Subsidiary Protection  
One of the two major objectives of the Directive is to ensure that a minimum level of 
protection is available in all Member States for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidi-
ary protection (recitals 6). It is intended to reduce disparities between Member States’ 
legislation and, as a consequence, the so called “secondary movements” based on 
differing rights and benefits from a State to another. Differences between Member 
States have been, however, substituted by differences between persons. The final text 
of the Qualification Directive has resulted in differentiation between the rights af-
forded to those with refugee status and those with subsidiary protection by allowing 
Member States to withhold rights, or grant significantly lower levels of rights, to 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.  
For instance, refugees shall be issued with a residence permit valid for at least 
three years, whereas persons entitled to subsidiary protection shall be issued with a 
residence permit valid for at least one year (Article 24). In the same vein, refugees 
shall be granted a travel document in accordance with the Geneva Convention, 
whereas beneficiaries of subsidiary protection shall only be provided with a travel 
document when they “are unable to obtain a national passport” and “serious humani-
tarian reasons […] require their presence in another State” (Article 25). More signifi-
cantly, access to employment (Article 26), social welfare (Article 28), health care (Ar-
ticle 29) and integration facilities (Article 33) is more restricted for persons entitled to 
subsidiary protection. According to Article 28(2), Member States have the option to 
limit the social benefits for persons entitled to subsidiary protection to core benefits 
only (minimum income support, assistance in case of illness, pregnancy and parental 
assistance). On the other hand, refuges and persons entitled to subsidiary protection 
have equal access to education (Article 27) and accommodation (Article 31). Member 
States shall also allow freedom of movement within their territory under the same 
conditions for both refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Article 32). 
The difference of treatment between refugees and persons entitled to subsidiary 
protection is frequently criticized.60 Legally, there is no basis as to why the source of 
protection should require differentiation in the benefits and entitlements accorded to 
the beneficiary. UNHCR has stated that rights should be based on need rather than 
                                                        
58  CRR, 30 March 2006, 542469, Nacu. 
59  CRR, 26 October 2004, 475193, Hyrije Bejtullahu. 
60  See for example: J. McAdam, “The European Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Sub-
sidiary Protection Regime”, op. cit., p. 497-499; F. Julien-Laferrière, “Le statut des personnes 
protégées”, in: C. D. Urban de Sousa and P. De Bruycker (eds), The Emergence of A European Asy-
lum Policy/L’émergence d’une politique européenne d’asile, op. cit., p. 195-219.  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE IN FRANCE  
99 
the grounds on which a person has been granted protection and that there is accord-
ingly no valid reason to treat beneficiaries of subsidiary protection differently from 
Convention refugees.61 The position of French law on this important question is 
again relatively original. The selective and anticipated incorporation of the Qualifica-
tion Directive was mainly focused on the issue of residence permits of refugees and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. On the contrary, other aspects of their legal 
status, such as access to employment and welfare benefits, have been relatively ig-
nored so that the previous legislation has been maintained without significant 
changes. 
2.1 Residence Permit and Family Unity 
The major difference between refugee status and subsidiary protection lies in the 
duration of the residence permit. This differentiation is even more accentuated in 
French law than in the minimum standard provided by the European Directive. Ac-
cording to the Code on aliens’ admission and the right to asylum (Article L 314-11 8), 
a residence permit of ten years is delivered to refugees, whereas the residence permit 
for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection is valid for only one year (Article L. 712-3). 
Such a distinction is based on the false premise that refugee status is taken to be per-
manent, while subsidiary protection is considered temporary in nature. However, the 
risk faced in the country of origin is relatively comparable under both forms of pro-
tection. There is no reason to expect the need for subsidiary protection to be of 
shorter duration than the need for protection under the refugee status.62 
Notwithstanding this basic reality, French law incorporates in substance the rules 
governing cessation and revocation of subsidiary protection enshrined in Articles 16 
and 19 of the Directive. The result is that the latter protection is particularly precari-
ous. According to Article L. 712-3 of the French Code, subsidiary protection may be 
withdrawn at any time if the beneficiary has committed a serious non political crime 
or if its activities in France represent a threat to public order or national security. 
Moreover, renewal of the one year permit may be refused if the circumstances which 
justified the initial grant for subsidiary protection no longer exist. The situation of 
refugees is more stable than those of persons entitled to subsidiary protection. In-
deed, the cessation clauses of the refugee status have no effect on the ten years resi-
dence permits. Residence permits remain valid despite the withdrawal of refugee 
status and they are automatically renewed, with the traditional exceptions of the 
threat to public order and national security.  
With regard to family members, the ten years resident permit is delivered to the 
spouse and minor children of the refugee (Article L 314-11 ali 8). Similarly, the one 
year permit is delivered under the same conditions to the family of the beneficiary of 
subsidiary protection (Article L. 313-13). The Commission des recours des réfugiés con-
firmed in a judgement delivered in May 2005 that the principle of family unity has to 
                                                        
61  UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum 
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as 
Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection, 14109/01 ASILE 54, November 2001. 
62  See: F. Julien-Laferrière, “Le régime européen de l’asile”, op. cit., p. 557-558. 
VINCENT CHETAIL 
100 
be applied under the same conditions for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection.63 This case is an interesting one, as the Commission explained that the 
right to family unity derives not only from French domestic legislation but more 
broadly from the general principles of refugee law. It held that: “The object of the 
directive n° 2004/83/CE of the European Union Council adopted 29 April 2004, as 
well as the Code on the aliens’ admission and the right to asylum, is to institute an 
asylum regime which, while conferring different rights in function of the legal nature 
of the protection conferred to an alien, has to ensure for all persons in need of a real 
protection, whether under the refugee status or the subsidiary protection, the effec-
tive guarantees deriving from the general principles of law applicable to refugees”.64 
Family unity, being such a general principle of law, has to be extended by analogy to 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. As a result, family members have to be granted 
subsidiary protection and benefit from all the rights attached to this protection on an 
equal footing with any other beneficiary of the subsidiary protection.  
The clarification given by the French Court is extremely important because the 
Directive is particularly vague on this albeit crucial issue. On the insistence of Ger-
many, there is no explicit reference in the EU Directive to residence permits for fam-
ily members of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection65. Moreover, while Article 23(2) 
entitles family members of the beneficiary of subsidiary protection to claim the bene-
fits recognized in the Directive, the reminder provision enables Member States to 
restrict its application. It states that Member States “may define the conditions appli-
cable to such benefits” without any other precision on the scope and the content of 
these possible conditions. 
2.2 Employment and Welfare Benefits 
French law is rather indifferent to the EU Directive with regard to employment and 
welfare benefits. The reform on asylum simply left unchanged the content of the 
previous legislation. The practical result is that domestic law goes sometimes beyond 
the minimum standard identified by the Directive. 
Access to employment is recognized by French law under the same conditions for 
refugees (Article L 314-4 of the Code) and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Ar-
ticle L. 313-13). There is, however, a difference between them with regard to trade 
and commercial activities. Contrary to persons entitled to subsidiary protection, refu-
gees are exempted from the possession of the special permit ordinarily required of all 
                                                        
63  CRR, SR, 27 May 2005, 487613, Ananian ép. Arakelian. 
64  Translation from the author (“tant la directive n°2004/83/CE du Conseil de l’Union eu-
ropéenne, en date du 29 avril 2004, que le livre VII du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrang-
ers et du droit d’asile ont pour objet l’institution d’un régime d’asile qui, s’il peut comporter des 
garanties et conférer des droits différents selon la nature juridique de la protection accordée à 
l’étranger, assure en tout état de cause à l’ensemble des personnes qui ont un réel besoin de pro-
tection, qu’elles soient détentrices du statut de réfugié ou de la protection subsidiaire définie par 
l’article L.712-1 du code précité, les garanties effectives qui découlent des principes généraux du 
droit applicables aux réfugiés”). 
65  Only the family members of refugees are mentioned in the final version of Article 24 of the 
Directive. 
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foreigners since 1938 (called “carte de commerçant étranger”). Moreover, it is worth recall-
ing that access to a considerable number of liberal professions is prohibited to aliens 
in general (including both refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection), be-
cause the exercise of these professions is subordinated to the possession of the 
French nationality or the nationality of another EU Member State66.  
With regard to other economic and social rights, access to social welfare, health 
care, education and accommodation is generally accorded to all aliens legally resident 
in France under the same conditions as those provided for French nationals.67 The 
primary legislation does not contain any specific provision on travel document for 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Nevertheless, a Decree of 14 
August 2004 provides that the Director of OFPRA, the administrative office in 
charge of the protection of refugees in France, is competent for identifying the bene-
ficiaries of subsidiary protection for whom a travel document has to be issued (Arti-
cle 9 4°)). Although there is curiously no explicit mention for refugees, they are enti-
tled to the relevant documents required by Article 28 of the Geneva Convention. 
Conclusion 
The incorporation of the Qualification Directive in France was both hasty and in-
complete. This transposition “à la carte” considerably mitigates its impact on French 
law. It highlights more generally the persistence of national peculiarities over the 
objectives of European harmonization. French Parliament explicitly integrates only 7 
of the 34 Articles of the Directive. Probably the most acute problem in France is 
about the definition of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. The neces-
sary recognition of non-state persecution cannot divert attention from the fact that 
the majority of the other changes initiated by the Parliament are much more restric-
tive and other important aspects of the Directive were simply ignored. During the last 
two years, French Courts have unfortunately failed to rectify the situation by promot-
ing a more integrated and balanced interpretation of the refugee definition. The road 
for a European Asylum Regime is still long. 
 
                                                        
66  See on this issue: N. Guimezanes, “Condition des étrangers en France. Droits professionnels”, 
Jurisclasseur droit international, fasc. 525-B-2; F. Julien-Laferrière, Droit des étrangers, Paris: PUF 
2000, p. 187-251. 
67  Ibid., p. 251-273. 
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Olga Sidorenko* 
Introduction 
When the negotiations for the accession to the European Union began, the differ-
ences between the EU acquis and the Slovak legislation were apparent. One of the 
most evident discrepancies was in the area of justice and home affairs, including asy-
lum law. It was a difficult task to harmonise the national legislation with the EU acquis 
not just because of the vast number of legal acts to be adopted, amended or trans-
lated, but in particular due to the fact that the sensitive concepts of asylum and hu-
man rights needed to be brought in line with the views of the EU.1 The alignment 
with the EU acquis was certainly a challenging task for all candidate countries. The 
harmonisation of legislation did not simply mean taking over the texts prepared and 
adopted by the Institutions in Brussels. One has to realise that this process required 
substantial changes in the policy, legislation and both to be reflected in the implemen-
tation process in practice. Essential reforms were also required in the institutional 
framework.                                                                                                         
Evolution of the Slovak Asylum Legislation 
The first legislative act dealing with asylum on the territory of the former Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic (Czechoslovakia), following the political changes at the end 
of the 1980s, was the Refugee Law No. 498 Coll. of 16 November 1990.2 Its adoption was 
of vital importance, as it was necessary to establish this essential institute of the inter-
national and humanitarian law. After the splitting of Czechoslovakia on the 1st Janu-
ary 1993 into two independent states - the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, 
also known as Slovakia, the abovementioned Law was revoked in Slovakia and re-
placed by the Refugee Law No. 283 Coll. of 14 November 1995.3  
                                                        
*  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This contribution has been written 
in the author’s personal capacity. 
1  Based on interviews at the Institute for the Approximation of the Law of the Slovak Govern-
ment on the 31st August 2004 and at the UNHCR BO, Bratislava, on the 2nd September 2004.  
2  It was adopted by the Parliament of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on the 16th No-
vember 1990 and entered into force on the 1st January 1991. Rights and duties of aliens in gen-
eral were at that time still regulated by the Law on the Stay of Aliens on the Territory of the 
Czech and Slovak Socialistic Republic (No. 68 Coll. of 1965), Art. 1(3). 
3  The Slovak Refugee Law 287/1995 Coll. entered into force on the 1st January 1996.  
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Part II of the Slovak Constitution4 lays down the fundamental rights and free-
doms provided for Slovak nationals, and for persons residing in the territory of the 
Slovak Republic. Article 53 of the Constitution stipulates that  
 
“the Slovak Republic shall grant asylum to aliens persecuted for the exercise of political 
rights and freedoms. Such asylum may be denied to those who have acted to violate the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. Details shall be provided by law”.  
 
New provisions to the Slovak Refugee Law were introduced by an amendment to the 
283/1995 Law, No. 309 Coll. of 19 September 2000, which entered into force on the 1st 
November 2000 and the substantial changes introduced by this amendment were: 
- the abolition of the “24-hour-rule” for lodging an asylum claim;5  
- the extension of the grounds for granting refugee status by inserting a new para-
graph on family reunification; and  
- the addition to the list of grounds for starting an accelerated procedure of cases 
where the applicant came from a third safe country or a safe country of origin.  
 
The complete harmonisation of the Slovak asylum law with the Community law had 
to progress in three stages, starting with the adoption of the amending 309/2000 
Law. The next proposed stages have been the adoption of an entirely new Asylum 
Law; and finally the complete implementation of the EU law in the field of asylum 
achieved upon Slovakia’s accession to the European Union.6    
A proposal for a new Asylum Law was submitted to the Slovak Parliament ac-
cording to a negotiation position reflected in the Negotiation Chapter 24 (Co-
operation in the field of justice and home affairs). In June 2002 the Slovak Parliament 
adopted a new Asylum Law, which entered into force on the 1st January 2003. The 
main purpose of the Asylum Law No. 480 Coll. of 20 June 2002 has been to attain stan-
dards comparable to the standards of the EU Member States.7 The 480/2002 Asylum 
Law introduced new terminology, including its title. Instead of ‘Refugee Law’, it is 
now named ‘Asylum Law’, in order to harmonise the corresponding terminology 
used in the national legislation with the Community legislation. 
At the time of joining the EU on the 1st May 2004, Slovakia had adopted the EU 
legislation on asylum in force at that time. It can be therefore said that Slovakia ac-
ceded to the Union on the same footing as the ‘old’ Member States. Since the EU 
asylum system itself has been further developing according to the goals set in the first 
pillar, especially Article 63 TEC, it has been inevitable to respond to these new devel-
                                                        
4  The text of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic of the 3rd September 1992 (including the 
Amendments of the 14th July 1998 and the 14th January 1999) is available at: www.govern-
ment.gov.sk.     
5  Following the abolition of the often criticised “24-hour-rule” – a time-limit for lodging an 
asylum claim, asylum seekers can lodge an application either at the border at the time of entry 
the territory of Slovakia or after crossing the border, at any time at a police department at the 
place of their stay.  
6  Explanatory memorandum of the Slovak Government to the 309/2000 Law. 
7  Explanatory memorandum of the Slovak Government to the 480/2002 Law.  
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opments in the way of further amending the national legislation.8 For example, a new 
Law was adopted in December 2004. The amendment to the 480/2002 Asylum Law, 
No. 1 Coll. of 2 December 2004 entered into force on the 1st February 2005. The main 
purpose of this amendment has been to transpose into the national legislation the 
Reception Directive and the Temporary Protection Directive;9 and thus to make a 
further step to bring the Slovak legislation on asylum in line with the primary (espe-
cially Articles 61 and 63 TEC) and the secondary (the above-mentioned Council 
Directives) Community law. 
Transposition of the Qualification Directive into the Slovak Legislation   
The implementation of European Union law consists of several stages. Some of them 
(e.g. transposition) are also called ‘abstract implementation’, since they refer to the 
implementation of European legislation (primary or secondary) into the national 
legislation of the Member States. Other stages (application, enforcement) represent 
‘concrete implementation’, i.e. application of the already harmonised national legisla-
tion in practice and its enforcement by administrative or judicial authorities.10  
A proposal for a further amendment to the Slovak Asylum Law (further referred 
to as the amendment-proposal) has been introduced in order to comply with the 
obligation to transpose the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 in the 
national legislation. Once the new amendment enters into force, the asylum-
determination procedure carried out by the Migration Office of the Ministry of Inte-
rior of the Slovak Republic will include not only assessment of asylum claims, but 
also a determination whether a third-county national qualifies for a subsidiary form of 
protection.11 Currently, a subsidiary form of protection for the third-country nation-
als is partially covered by the concept of tolerated stay laid down in the Law on the Stay 
of Aliens No. 48/2002 Coll. The tolerated stay does not, however, offer the same 
scope of rights as does the subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Direc-
tive.  
The amendment-proposal introduced a number of substantial changes, for exam-
ple, it: 
- defines the terms: international protection, subsidiary protection, serious harm, 
actors of persecution, country of origin; 
- re-defines the term persecution, and specifies the reasons for persecution; 
- broadens the grounds for rejection of an asylum application as inadmissible; 
- includes new circumstances under which the asylum is not granted or is revoked; 
                                                        
8  So far the 480/2002 Asylum Law has been further amended by the following laws: 606/2003 
Coll., 207/2004 Coll. and 1/2005 Coll.  
9  Annex 5 to the amended 480/2002 Asylum Law.   
10  On the concept of implementation, see Jans, J.H., Lange, R. de, Prechal, S., Widdershoven, 
R.J.G.M., Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht, 2nd ed. (Nijmegen, 2002), p. 32 et seq.; Brink, A. 
van den, Regelgeving in Nederland ter implementatie van EU-recht (Deventer, 2004), p. 8-9.  
11  A single-procedure-approach has been introduced in Article 12(1) (a).    
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- introduces the grounds for granting, for refusal to grant, for ending and revoca-
tion of subsidiary protection; 
- enables to grant subsidiary protection for the purpose of family reunification; 
- introduces the rights and duties of the third country nationals, who have been 
granted a subsidiary form of protection, including the right to be informed about 
these rights and duties; 
- determines the time period for which the asylum status for the purpose of family 
reunification is initially granted.  
 
I will not go into details regarding all provisions in the amendment-proposal. Instead, 
based on a discussion with the representative of the UNHCR in Slovakia, I would 
like to draw your attention to one Article, the new Article 20, paragraphs (2) and (3). 
The proposal under Article 20(2) states that asylum shall be granted for an indefi-
nite period of time, while asylum for the purpose of family reunification shall be 
granted initially for a period of 3 years. Subsequently it may be extended, upon the 
request of the applicant for an indefinite period of time, provided that the require-
ments under Article 10 (i.e. granting asylum for the purpose of family reunification) 
are met. This proposed provision puts the family members of the person granted 
asylum in a disadvantageous position on account of their derivative refugee status. 
This proposed distinction is incompatible with the legal requirement of non-
discrimination contained under various international human rights treaties. It is also 
important to bear in mind that in its Final Act, the UN Conference of Plenipotentiar-
ies, which adopted the 1951 Geneva Convention, unanimously approved Recom-
mendation B on the subject of family unity in the case of refugees emphasizing that 
the  
 
“unity of the family, the natural and fundamental group unit of society, is an essential right 
of the refugee, and that such unit is constantly threatened, and noting with satisfaction that 
according to the official commentary of the ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems (E/1616, p. 40) the rights granted to a refugee are extended to the members of 
his family.”  
 
Further, the fundamental importance of the family and the need to protect it have 
consistently received recognition in international human rights law both at the uni-
versal and regional level and it is clear that these protective provisions apply to refu-
gees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. The following international legal in-
struments form the foundation in support of family reunification: 
- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 16); 
- the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 17, 23); 
- the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 10); 
- the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 18, 22); 
- the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Article 8). 
 
The proposed administrative requirement that this status shall be first granted for 
three years, with the possibility to apply for an indefinite status, appears to be incom-
patible with the body of law and practice outlined above. The Slovak authorities justi-
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fied this provision by referring to Article 24(1) of the Qualification Directive on resi-
dence permits. Moreover, the approach taken in the amendment-proposal suggests a 
refugee status that can be terminated purely on the basis of expiration of time, a ces-
sation provision infringing the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Qualification Di-
rective, as well.   
As regards Article 20(3) of the amendment-proposal, the beneficiaries of subsidi-
ary protection, as well as their family members would need to renew their status an-
nually. Having a status that has to be renewed every year would cause major chal-
lenges for the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Furthermore, the Qualification 
Directive does not recommend that time limitations should be attached to subsidiary 
protection status. On the contrary, according to the Qualification Directive, subsidi-
ary protection status is a durable status that can only be terminated on the grounds 
laid down in Article 19. Therefore, the time limitation proposed in the amendment 
seems to be below the minimum standards established by the Directive. The Slovak 
authorities justify the one-year time limitation of the subsidiary protection status by 
the minimum duration of residence permits issued to the beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection according to Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive. However, from a 
legal point of view there is a qualitative difference between a time limit on the status 
itself and a time limit on a residence permit for the status holder. It is stated in the 
Qualification Directive that as long as the person holds the status, he/she is auto-
matically entitled to the residence permit. Thus, in order to refuse the granting of or 
renewal of the residence permit, the status which provides the entitlement would 
need to be terminated first. In order to avoid confusion, this distinction must be 
clearly reflected in the amendment to the Slovak Asylum Law; otherwise one can 
speak about an incorrect interpretation and consequently an incorrect transposition 
of the EU Qualification Directive.   
Conclusion 
The transposition of the Qualification Directive in the Slovak legislation requires 
amending other legal instruments besides the Asylum Law, for example, the Law on 
the Stay of Aliens, the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Social 
Assistance Law and the Administrative Fees Law. As far as the transposition process 
of the Qualification Directive into the Slovak national legislation is concerned, by 15 
November 2006 the situation was as follows: 
1. On the 5th September 2006, the Legislative Council of the Slovak Government 
discussed the amendment-proposal in order to ensure the transposition of the 
Qualification Directive.  
2. On the 20th September 2006, the Slovak Government approved the proposal. 
3. In order to become a law, the proposal needs to be adopted by the Slovak Parlia-
ment. The adoption of the proposal by the Slovak Parliament is still pending, cur-
rently being in the second reading in the Parliament. The expected entering into 
force of the amendment to the Asylum Law is the 1st January 2007, as stated in 
the final provisions to the amendment-proposal.    
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Slovakia thus did not meet the transposition deadline of the 10th October 2006 as laid 
down in Article 38(1) of the Qualification Directive to bring into force the laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive; never-
theless, its transposition is in process. By transposing the Qualification Directive in 
the national law, the process of harmonisation of the Slovak asylum legislation with 
the EU acquis will not yet be completed. Before 1 December 2007 the Asylum Law 
would need to be amended again in order to transpose the Council Directive on 
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status.  
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Transposition of the Qualification Directive in Germany 
 
 
Roland Bank* 
1.  Introduction 
In the course of negotiations on the Qualification Directive, Germany had managed 
to introduce some of its national concepts into the Directive. For instance, the provi-
sion on subsequent applications and protection needs arising sur place in Article 5 (3) 
Qualification Directive was modelled along the German provision on post-flight 
reasons concerning the rejection of constitutional asylum existing at the time.1 With 
regard to some other aspects, the concepts adopted in the Qualification Directive 
were taken up in the course of legislative reform of German immigration law in 2004. 
This applies in particular to the provision on non-state agents of persecution: Before 
the reform, it was standing practice in Germany to deny refugee protection in cases in 
which persecution emanated from non-state agents. With the Immigration Act 2004, 
a provision explicitly recognising non-state agents as relevant actors of persecution 
was introduced into German law which is worded exactly along the lines of Article 6 
lit. c Qualification Directive. Consequently, a number of aspects do not or no longer 
require any legislative transposition activities. However, the great majority of provi-
sions of the Qualification Directive on the criteria for refugee status and particularly 
subsidiary protection still require transposition legislation. 
Germany is currently seeking to transpose into German law the Qualification Di-
rective together with all other instruments adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty. 
A respective legislative proposal had been drafted already in autumn 2004 but re-
mains under discussion at the end of 2006.2 The new act will not enter into force 
                                                        
*  Legal Officer, UNHCR Regional Representation for Austria, Czech Republic and Germany, 
Berlin. The views presented in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily shared 
by the United Nations or UNHCR. The author wishes to thank Friederike Foltz and Constan-
tin Hruschka for their most valuable comments on a draft of this article. 
1  The German legal situation concerning asylum applications based on post-flight reasons created 
by the own decision of the asylum seeker was – before the legislative reform in 2004 – the fol-
lowing: According to Section 28 Asylum Procedures Act constitutional asylum was rejected but 
Convention refugee status was possible. With the Immigration Act 2004, a new Subsection 2 
was introduced blocking, as a rule, the granting of Convention refugee status if the respective 
reasons are brought forward in a subsequent asylum application. 
2  Due to a number of additional reform issues added to the mere transposition provisions, sig-
nificant political discussions surrounded the adoption process. Since transposition provision in 
contrast were often rather technical in nature, it has proven difficult to raise any significant po-
litical interest for the respective proposals even if they partly will fall short of the requirements 
of the Qualification Directive. Moreover, in the second half of 2006, the adoption process has 
been politically intertwined with negotiations on a long-stayer regulation applying to persons 
without legal residence permit but remaining in Germany based on a toleration permit. This as-
pect has attracted most interest in the public debate surrounding the negotiations. 
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before summer 2007. Since the expiry of the transposition deadline on 10 October 
2006, the Qualification Directive is applicable in Germany with immediate effect 
under the usual conditions. It is this requirement of direct application of the Qualifi-
cation Directive which may prompt a more thorough review of the current German 
practice in the light of the Directive in particular by the courts: judges will have to 
systematically examine the provisions of the Directive taking into account the entire 
Directive as it stands and not only by applying German transposition provisions. 
The application of the Directive before and after its transposition will provide an 
important impulse towards bringing German practice of refugee law better in line 
with the 1951 Convention. More particularly, the following provisions of the Qualifi-
cation Directive will require changes in the practice of German refugee law: the cu-
mulative effect of certain acts may constitute an act of persecution (Art. 9 (1) lit. b 
Qualification Directive); persecution for reasons of religion will no longer be limited 
to the exercise of religious freedom in private but also cover persecution on grounds 
of the exercise of religious freedom in public (Art. 10 (1) b Qualification Directive); 
the German concept of an internal protection alternative will no longer apply and be 
replaced by the criteria of safety from persecution and reasonableness of the protec-
tion alternative in line with the Directive (Article 8 Qualification Directive); the con-
cept of subsidiary protection according to Article 15 Qualification Directive will add 
significant aspects to the concepts applying so far in Germany. Moreover, other pro-
visions of the Directive shall inspire a review of certain criteria as interpreted in 
Germany, without, however, already prescribing definitely different results. For in-
stance, the concept of what constitutes an act of persecution if the rights to life, lib-
erty or freedom are not violated may have to be reconsidered in the light of Art. 9 
Qualification Directive. Or, the question of rejecting subsequent applications may 
have to be revisited against the background of Article 5 (3) Qualification Directive in 
the light of its explicit reference to and the lack of compatibility with the 1951 Con-
vention. 
2. Problems in the Draft Transposition Act 
Two fields of discussion in the process of transposition legislation shall be addressed 
here. Firstly, the technique of transposition: whereas some provisions are transposed 
by amending existing provisions in German law others are transposed by referring in 
a German provision to several specific articles of the Qualification Directive. The 
latter approach will be analysed in some detail below since it concerns the most im-
portant provisions of the Directive. Secondly, the phenomenon of selective or restric-
tive transposition provides for examples in which the immediate effect of the Direc-
tive will remain of crucial importance.3 
                                                        
3  The Transposition Act is still being negotiated among the coalition partners of the present 
Government, and there is no final draft available for the time being. The analysis is based there-
fore on the draft of 13 March 2006 by the Federal Ministry of Interior (“Entwurf eines Geset-
zes zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen Union”; sub-
sequently to be referred to as “Draft Transposition Act”) and on the “Application Guidelines” 
of 13 October 2006 regarding the direct application of the Qualification Directive, also issued 
→ 
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2.1  Technique of Referral 
According to the Draft Transposition Act, the core provisions of the Qualification 
Directive setting out the criteria for refugee status are not woven into existing Ger-
man provisions. Instead of this, a reference to these provisions will be introduced 
into German law. The respective draft provision on criteria for refugee status reads: 
 
“In application of the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees (Fed-
eral Law Gazette 1953 II, p. 559), a foreigner may not be deported to a state in which his or 
her life or liberty is under threat on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a certain social group or political convictions; when determining whether perse-
cution according to sentence 1 exists, Article 4 paragraph 4 and Articles 7 to 10 of Directive 
2004/83/EC shall be applied complementarily.”4  
 
A similar reference is foreseen in the draft provisions on subsidiary protection.5 
It may seem surprising to see that only some of the core provisions of the Quali-
fication Directive are referred to in the German transposition provision quoted above 
while others remain unmentioned. The possible intention of the legislator is probably 
to take up in this provision everything which is not regulated elsewhere in German 
asylum law. Moreover, as indicated in the introduction, another core provision had 
already been taken up previously in the Residence Act – an equivalent to Article 6 lit. 
c Qualification Directive on agents of persecution had already been inserted into the 
Residence Act by the Immigration Act 2004. Other provisions of the Directive have 
their origin in other parts of the German system: in particular, Section 28 Asylum 
Procedures Act has been the model for Article 5 Qualification Directive on interna-
tional protection needs arising sur place.  
For other provisions, in particular, other parts of Article 4 Qualification Directive, 
it is difficult to find parallels in the German Residence Act or the Asylum Procedures 
Act. As a consequence, the selective reference to Articles of the Qualification Direc-
tive will lead to new challenges for interpretation and application with immediate 
effect. Moreover, the reference to a bulk of articles is likely to decrease the chances of 
arriving at an application which fully reflects the systematic approach adopted by the 
Qualification Directive and the Geneva Convention for reviewing refugee status. In 
this regard it would have been preferable to introduce a number of new provisions 
                                                        
by the Federal Ministry of Interior, containing quotations from the draft legislation as of mid 
October (“Hinweise des Bundesministeriums des Innern zur Anwendung der Richtlinie 2004/ 
83/EG des Rates vom 29. April 2004 über Mindestnormen für die Anerkennung und den Sta-
tus von Drittstaatsangehörigen oder Staatenlosen als Flüchtlinge oder als Personen, die ander-
weitig internationalen Schutz benötigen, und über den Inhalt des zu gewährenden Schutzes 
(ABl. EU L 304 vom 30. September 2004, S. 12 ff.) in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 
13. Oktober 2006”; subsequently to be referred to as “Application Guidelines”). Any translation 
of respective provisions is that of the author.  
4  Extract from draft consolidated version of Section 60 (1) Residence Act according to the Ap-
plication Guidelines, p. 4. 
5  See draft consolidated version of Section 60 (7) 3 Residence Act according to the Application 
Guidelines, p.16. Reference is made to Articles 4 (4), 5 (1) and (2), 6 to 8 Qualification Direc-
tive. 
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systematically transposing the norms of the Qualification Directive one by one. This 
would have required some fundamental changes in the German system in particular 
by putting an end to the systematic anchoring of refugee status in the provisions on 
protection against deportation and dispersing other rights to various corners of aliens 
legislation rather than establishing a right to refugee status and the ensuing rights 
including the right not to be deported to the country of persecution in a coherent 
manner. This, however, politically was not feasible only about two years after Ger-
many had seen its entire system of aliens and refugee law reformed after years of 
heated debates. 
Another shortcoming of the transposition provision inserted in Section 60 (1) 
Residence Act as quoted above pertains to the “complementary” application of the 
provisions of the Directive to which the Act refers. From the viewpoint of European 
Law this approach is simply not correct. The wording of the transposition provision 
was chosen in order to allow for a continued application of the German provisions 
and concepts in relation to refugee protection. This is not limited to the attempt to 
maintain the restrictive parts of these concepts as far as possible but serves as well for 
preserving other specific concepts e.g. the provision on gender based persecution 
which is supposedly wider than the provision in Article 10 (1) d Qualification Direc-
tive.6 However, the wording may provoke confusion in the application of the provi-
sions in the individual case. Such confusion could have been avoided by using a 
wording which takes up Article 3 Qualification Directive. This provision unequivo-
cally allows retaining more favourable standards. A wording inspired by this Article 
would have been fully in line with the alleged legislative intention to state that any 
German provision going beyond the scope of protection required by the Qualifica-
tion Directive remains untouched by the provisions of the Directive. The situation 
under European Law is sufficiently clear: If the provisions of the Directive referred 
to in German law leads to an interpretation more favourable for the asylum seeker 
than the respective German provisions or case law the European provision will pre-
vail. It is open to doubt whether the confusing wording chosen for the transposition 
legislation will always lead to the correct results. 
2.2 Selective Transposition 
Looking at the draft transposition provisions in detail one may encounter various 
examples of selective transposition of the Directive. One has been mentioned above 
regarding Article 4 Qualification Directive of which only its paragraph 4 is explicitly 
referred to. Other examples are the omission of certain parts of the provisions on 
protection by other UN agencies (Article 12 (1) lit. a Qualification Directive) or on 
subsidiary protection (Article 15 lit. c Qualification Directive).  
The most striking example for a selective transposition concerns Article 12 (1) lit. 
a Qualification Directive which takes up Article 1 D of the 1951 Convention. 
Whereas the first sentence of Article 12 (1) lit. a Qualification Directive is proposed 
                                                        
6  The respective German provision (Section 60 (1) 3 Residence Act) states that persecution for 
reasons of gender is sufficient to constitute persecution for being a member of a particular so-
cial group. 
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for transposition in its entirety thereby excluding those persons benefiting from the 
protection of a UN agency other than UNHCR, the second sentence was omitted 
entirely in a first draft of the Transposition Act7 and in its central legal meaning in the 
latest draft.8 According to the second sentence of Article 12 (1) lit. a Qualification 
Directive, those persons having lost the protection mentioned in the first sentence 
are included in the protection by the Directive ipso facto. According to the latest 
draft, refugee status of the persons no longer under the protection of another UN 
agency is made dependant on a positive review of the refugee criteria according to 
Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention.9 Consequently, the ipso facto approach of 
the Directive is turned into an ordinary review of refugee criteria. In other words, the 
inclusion provision of Article 12 (1) lit. a Qualification Directive is not foreseen to be 
fully transposed into German law. 
The lack of conformity of the draft German provisions on subsidiary protection 
with the Qualification Directive will be discussed in some detail below. However, the 
phenomenon of selective transposition may be observed here: The term “indiscrimi-
nate violence” of Article 15 lit. c Qualification Directive is omitted in the draft of the 
German transposition provision. Even though the term concerned may seem rather 
vague such differences in wording between the Directive and a provision transposing 
a certain aspect of the Directive into national law will give rise to interpretative prob-
lems and uncertainty among those applying the law – a fortiori if such a central legal 
term of a provision of the Directive is omitted in the transposition norm. In particu-
lar, the omission of the term “indiscriminate violence” bears the danger that German 
practitioners will keep applying the test of whether the risk is related to an intentional 
act directed at a specific person; this approach cannot be reconciled with the term 
“indiscriminate violence”.  
However, taking into account the function of the Qualification Directive as an in-
strument establishing minimum standards there seems to be only one interpretation 
of this omission which would be in line with European Law. By omitting a certain 
term the transposing Member State excludes any restrictions on the application of the 
respective clause potentially going along with term omitted: a national provision 
which is at variance with the text of the Qualification Directive can only be identical 
or more generous in its protection scope than the Directive. If a specific term of the 
text is omitted identity with the scope of the Directive cannot be intended. Conse-
quently, only a more favourable scope is perceivable. Regarding more specifically the 
conditions for subsidiary protection under Article 15 lit. c Qualification Directive, the 
omission of the term “indiscriminate violence” therefore has to be interpreted in the 
way that an individual threat of serious harm may emanate from any kind of violence 
                                                        
7  Section 3 (3) Asylum Procedures Act according to the Draft Transposition Act of 3 January 
2006. 
8  Cf. draft consolidated version of Section 60 (8) Residence Act according to the Application 
Guidelines, p. 11 et seq. 
9  The new German provision transposing on Article 12 (1) lit. a Qualification Directive refers to 
the criteria of  Section 60 (1) Residence Act. Even though this provision deals with the protec-
tion against refoulement and is worded along the lines of Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention 
it is established practice of German courts that this provision is to be applied in a manner tak-
ing into account the refugee criteria of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention. 
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in the context of an armed conflict; any qualification of the violence in question must 
not form a criterion for providing protection in the German system if the transposi-
tion will take the form of the draft. Even if the German legislator may have another 
interpretation in mind, this is the only possible interpretation in line with European 
Law. 
3. Impact of the Qualification Directive on the German System of Criteria 
for Granting Refugee Status or Subsidiary Protection  
3.1 Closing Protection Gaps 
3.1.1 Act of Persecution: Cumulative Effect  
According to German case law, acts relevant for refugee protection always had to 
relate to an interference with the same human right. An overall analysis of a number 
of smaller infringements would not lead to the granting of refugee status.10 This ap-
proach will have to change according to Article 9 (1) lit. b Qualification Directive 
which determines that the cumulative effect of “various measures, including viola-
tions of human rights” may amount to an act of persecution. 
3.1.2  Religious Persecution 
So far, the German concept of persecution for reasons of religion had been signifi-
cantly limited. According to the standing case law of both the Federal Constitutional 
Court11 and the Federal Administrative Court,12 only certain aspects of religious free-
dom deserved protection. In those cases in which future persecution could be 
avoided by restricting the exercise of religion to the so called “forum internum”, i.e. 
to exercise in private including private meetings with other believers, refugee protec-
tion was refused. In so doing, German courts often did not clearly differentiate be-
tween the act of persecution and the reasons for persecution.13 In particular, German 
courts frequently failed to examine possible sanctions as acts of persecution if they 
were related to the exercise of religious freedom in public.14 
According to the Qualification Directive, refugee claims based on religious perse-
cution are not exclusively related to the exercise of religious freedom in private but 
also cover persecution on grounds of the exercise of religious freedom in public (Ar-
ticle 10 (1) b Qualification Directive). Of course, protection will only be granted if 
there is an act of persecution which fulfils the requirements of Article 9 Qualification 
Directive, in particular regarding the severity of the violation of human rights. In 
                                                        
10  See most recently, Higher Administrative Court of Schleswig-Holstein, judgement of 24 March 
2005 – 1 LB 45/03. 
11  Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (official collection of the Federal Constitutional Court) 
76, 143 (at 158 et seq.). 
12  Federal Administrative Court, BVerwGE (official collection of the Federal Administrative 
Court) 74, 31 (at 38, 40). 
13  For a detailed analysis see R. Bank and N. Schneider, Durchbruch für das Völkerrecht, Supple-
ment to Asylmagazin 6/2006, p. 10 et seq. 
14  See for instance, Federal Administrative Court, judgment of 20 January 2004, – 1 C 9/03. 
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most cases, a look at the sanctions prompted by a particular exercise of religious 
freedom will suffice to show a possible act of persecution in this sense: in practice, 
certain acts such as public demonstrations of one’s religious beliefs or proselytising 
will be punished with most severe sanctions from incarceration to corporal punish-
ment or even death. What needs careful review in such cases is whether the incrimi-
nated act indeed forms part of the personal beliefs of the applicant in the sense that 
he or she feels religiously obliged to exercise such acts. If this is the case, he or she 
cannot be expected to suppress these religious convictions in the country of origin in 
order to escape persecution;15 rather, the person concerned has to be recognised as a 
refugee. 
Only in those cases, in which the respective sanctions as such do not amount to 
an act of persecution, a violation of the right to religious freedom will have to be 
reviewed as to whether it is sufficiently severe to constitute an act of persecution as 
such. For instance, if the sanction for being a member of a Christian church or for a 
specific religious behaviour is a moderate fine or leads to an exclusion from certain 
tax benefits the sanction is not as severe as to constitute an act of persecution in the 
sense of the Qualification Directive. It may, possibly, constitute an act of discrimina-
tion which – if forming part of a broader policy – may amount to an act of persecu-
tion in the sense of the Qualification Directive together with other measures adopted 
against the applicant. Regarding the violation of the right to religious freedom as such 
going along with the prohibition of a certain religious behaviour, this may only con-
stitute an act of persecution if it is considered to be sufficiently severe to pass the 
threshold of Article 9 Qualification Directive. This may in particular be the case if 
religious freedom is violated in a way forcing the applicant to deny his religious faith 
altogether.16 Transferring the German approach to this question would mean that 
only if the existential minimum of religious freedom (equated with the “forum inter-
num”) – defined according to a human dignity core pertaining to each and every 
human right – was interfered with the violation would be sufficiently severe as to 
require international protection. 
3.1.3 Internal Protection Alternative 
Even though posing numerous questions of interpretation of the details, Article 8 
Qualification Directive clearly imposes as criteria for the application of the internal 
protection alternative safety from persecution as well as reasonableness of the stay in 
the safe part of the country. According to the German approach, the second criterion 
was only considered relevant if the situation of living conditions in the region of the 
                                                        
15  The assumption made by German courts that, if future persecution depends on future behav-
iour of the applicant, the applicant may be required to abstain from the incriminated behaviour, 
meets with some distinct opposition in the international jurisprudence: United Kingdom Court 
of Appeal, Buxton LJ, Z v Secretary of State [2005], IAR 75; High Court of Australia, NABD of 
2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 29 (26 May 
2005), Judge Kirby, paragraphs 58, 106, 113, 113 et seq. (The majority of judges in this case re-
jected the appeal but on reasons of fact without principally rejecting Kirby’s arguments.) 
16  See, for instance, Federal Administrative Court, judgment of 22 February 2005, – 1 C 17/03. 
The case concerned a marriage concluded under yezidic faith which could only be officially rec-
ognised in Syria if the faith was denied. 
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protection alternative was worse than in the region of origin.17 This practice was 
based on the assumption that a causal link between the persecution and the bad living 
conditions in the area of the protection alternative had to be established. Conse-
quently, the German concept was based on the comparison between the situation in 
the region of origin and the region of the protection alternative within the country of 
origin.  
Particularly striking were the results of this approach in cases concerning asylum 
seekers from Chechnya who frequently were denied protection because of a pre-
sumed protection alternative elsewhere in the Russian Federation. Of course, in spite 
of an important degree of discrimination and often very difficult practical living con-
ditions of refugees from Chechnya elsewhere in the Russian Federation, the living 
conditions in the Chechen Republic have been regularly assessed to be worse than 
the conditions in other parts of the Federation. In the respective judgments the fact 
that the situation in Chechnya and the resulting living conditions were strongly inter-
twined with the overall situation of widespread persecution was usually not taken into 
account.18  
The concept of the Directive does not support a concept comparing the situation 
in the region of alternative protection with any other region – be it the region of 
origin or the situation in the country of asylum as it is promulgated by the case law of 
some countries.19 The wording of the Directive is clearly limited to taking into ac-
count the living conditions in the region of the protection alternative: the wording of 
Article 8 (1) and (2) speaks of reasonableness only with a view to “that part of the 
country” which is under consideration as an alternative protection area. 
3.1.4 Subsidiary Protection 
The concept of subsidiary protection will add significant new protection aspects to 
the concepts applying so far in Germany.  
Currently, German law provides for subsidiary protection in cases involving one 
of the following risks: 
-  execution of a death penalty (Section 60 (3) Residence Act); 
-  torture (Section 60 (2) Residence Act); 
-  deportation in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (Section 
60 (5) Residence Act); 
-  individual threat to life or liberty; access to this individual protection is barred, 
however, in situations involving dangers to which the population or the segment 
of the population to which the foreigner belongs are generally exposed (Section 
60 (7) Residence Act); according to German jurisprudence, only in cases of ex-
treme danger involving a very high probability of imminent death or severest in-
                                                        
17  Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 10 July 1989, BVerfGE (official collection of judge-
ments and decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court) 80, p. 315 et seq. 
18  Cf. for instance Higher Administrative Court of North-Rhine Westphalia, judgment of 12 July 
2005, – 11 A 2307/03.A, B II.4 
19  See Federal Court of Canada, Ramanathan v Canada (1 September 1998 – Docket: IMM-5091-
97), Judge Hugessen; Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand, Refugee Appeal No 
71684/99. 
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jury upon return, an exception to this rule applies and an individual may find pro-
tection also in situations of general risks. 
 
The draft Transposition Act contains amendments with a view to include the imposi-
tion of the death penalty as well as inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
the respective provisions. Moreover, a sentence on Article 15 lit. c Qualification Di-
rective will be inserted in the Residence Act.  
Significant changes in the scope of protection may be expected with a view to 
protection against deportation in cases involving a risk of torture, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment according to Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive 
since both the scope of protection and the standards of probability under the Direc-
tive are broader than the German concept applying so far.  
Protection in cases involving indiscriminate violence in situations of armed con-
flict under Article 15 lit. c Qualification Directive is insufficiently reflected both un-
der current German law and in the draft Transposition Act. The current as well as the 
future legal situation under German law in principle provide for individual protection 
only in cases in which there is no general danger for the entire population or seg-
ments of it. Exceptions to this principle are only foreseen in cases of extreme danger, 
i.e. if returning a person to his country of origin would expose him or her almost 
certainly to death or most severe injury. The Directive goes far beyond this approach 
and consequently requires a different scope of protection to be granted by German 
authorities and courts. 
3.1.4.1 Risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
In order to fully understand the German transposition of subsidiary protection re-
garding protection against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment the legal require-
ments under the Directive and international law have to be taken into account. Three 
layers of protection have to be differentiated in the EU Member States which may 
apply in case of a risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment: firstly, refugee 
status in line with the Qualification Directive and the 1951 Convention going along 
with specific rights set out in the Directive and the 1951 Convention is granted if the 
well-founded fear of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is combined with a 
reason for persecution in the sense of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention and 
Article 10 Qualification Directive and no exclusion grounds apply; secondly, subsidi-
ary protection status under the Qualification Directive going along with certain rights 
specified in the Directive is granted if the real risk of the incriminated treatment is 
not related to a reason of persecution and no exclusion grounds under Article 17 
Qualification Directive apply; and, thirdly, protection against deportation under hu-
man rights law, in particular, Article 3 ECHR, without providing any status rights is 
granted in every other case of a real risk of such treatment. Consequently, protection 
against deportation under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is 
outside the ambit of the Qualification Directive. It remains applicable also in situa-
tions where subsidiary protection is excluded under the Directive, for instance for 
war criminals. However, since Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive and Article 3 
ECHR are worded in identical terms, the interpretation of these criteria for subsidiary 
protection under the Qualification Directive will have to reflect the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights on Article 3 ECHR.  
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The draft German transposition act correctly transposes this concept by establish-
ing a provision prohibiting deportation in cases involving a real risk of torture, inhu-
man or degrading treatment; the general rules of Chapter II of the Directive are ex-
plicitly made applicable to the said provision.20 At the same time the provision on 
protection against deportation under the ECHR remains excluded from the applica-
tion of these general provisions.21 
Since the German provision on protection in cases of a risk of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment as well as Article 15 lit. b Qualification Direc-
tive are worded equivalently to Article 3 ECHR, the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights will have to be taken into account more accurately by the 
German authorities and courts when reviewing cases for protection under this angle. 
If they failed to do so they may be corrected by rulings of the ECJ. So far, German 
courts have declined to follow the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights in some aspects thereby developing a distinctly German interpretation of pro-
tection against deportation under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. In particular, dangers emanating from non-state sources were not regarded as 
giving rise to protection under that provision.22 The new legal situation means that in 
cases of a threat of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment emanat-
ing from non-state actors international protection must be granted as subsidiary pro-
tection under the Qualification Directive (see Article 6).  
Moreover, concepts of inhuman or degrading treatment which are broader than 
the German interpretation of Article 3 ECHR will apply in the framework of subsidi-
ary protection under the Qualification Directive. In particular, this would include 
protection in cases in which the danger in question does not go back to an intentional 
attack on human rights but refers to the circumstances of a particular situation.23 
Arguments to exclude any acts which are not intentionally directed towards the per-
son affected are grounded on the wording of Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive 
(“torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of the applicant in the coun-
try of origin”, emphasis added) and the fact that Article 6 Qualification Directive refers 
to actors of serious harm. As will be demonstrated below, both arguments are not 
convincing. 
By reference to the country of origin in Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive, it 
seems, the drafters have sought to avoid that the act of deportation may be the point 
of reference for the violation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. In the context of the obligations under Article 3 ECHR it is the act of 
deportation which gives rise to the responsibility of the member state for a violation 
of the Convention. Sometimes the argument is made that because of referring to the 
treatment in the country of origin Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive is not in-
tended to cover circumstances or situations. This argument is based on the supposi-
                                                        
20  Cf. consolidated Section 60 (2) Residence Act according to the Application Guidelines, p. 15. 
21  The Draft Transposition Act does not contain an amendment of Section 60 (5) Residence Act 
on protection against deportation if that was contrary to the ECHR. 
22  See especially Federal Administrative Court, judgment of  17 October 1995, 9 C 15.95 and 
judgment of 15 April 1997, 9 C 38.96, 
23  ECHR, D v UK, Reports 1997-III, p. 777, paragraphs 52 et seq. 
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tion that the reasons for granting protection from deportation under the ECHR also 
in cases involving dangers of being exposed to circumstances or situations as in con-
trast to suffering intentional acts directed against the applicant was that deportation 
constituted the intentional act.  
This supposition is wrong for two reasons. Firstly, under either approach, what 
constitutes an incriminated treatment has to be established independently of whether 
the applicant is exposed to the treatment in an EU member state or in a third coun-
try. Since “inhuman or degrading treatment” need not be intentional according to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights24 there is no reason arising 
from a systematic comparison with the Convention to assume that non-intentional 
treatment violating the said provision was outside the ambit of Article 15 lit. b Quali-
fication Directive. Moreover, it is recognised that also a violation of positive obliga-
tions may lead to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.25 Of course, such positive obliga-
tions do not apply to the countries of origin which are not member states of the 
ECHR. However, the absence of positive measures may lead to a situation violating 
the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment all the same. For instance, 
if a country of origin does not provide care for orphans, an unaccompanied minor 
applicant may be in danger of neglect and suffering if returned which is inhuman or 
degrading. This state of neglect and suffering would be contrary to Article 3 ECHR 
and should therefore prompt access to protection under Article 15 lit. b of the Quali-
fication Directive. 
Secondly, the concept of subsidiary protection of the Directive goes far beyond 
protection against deportation by providing for a number of positive rights in its 
Chapter VII. It is therefore logical if the criteria for granting protection are not focus-
sed on the act of deportation as it is the case in the context of the ECHR. In that 
context, the act of deportation is the necessary link to establish the responsibility of 
the member state of the Convention. Under the Qualification Directive, non-
deportation is one of several legal consequences following from subsidiary protection 
status. However, this difference in the approaches does not imply a different scope of 
protection. 
There is much more merit to the argument that the requirement of intentional 
treatment aiming at a specific person as in contrast to “circumstances” or “situations” 
follows from Article 6 and 7 Qualification Directive. Article 6 provides an enumera-
tion of actors of serious harm. Moreover, Article 7 establishes a framework for 
counter-measures to be taken by the home-state against non-state persecution or 
serious harm, in particular through prosecution and punishment of those responsible. 
                                                        
24  In particular, detention conditions are frequently reviewed by the European Court of Human 
Rights for their compatibility with Article 3 ECHR, cf. Valasinas v Lithuania, No. 44558/98, 
paragraph 102. Whereas the deprivation of liberty is intentional, insufficient detention condi-
tions need not be intended. Moreover, circumstances or situations may give rise to positive ob-
ligations of the Member States.  
25  There is ample case law by the European Court of Human Rights on this question. Cf. for 
instance as one of the leading cases European Court of Human Rights, Z v United Kingdom, Re-
ports 2001-V, p. 1, paragraph 74. A profound general analysis of the positive obligations under 
the Convention is provided by C. Droege, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention (2003). 
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At a first glance, also such counter-measures seem to be directed against an inten-
tional behaviour or at least acts as in contrast to circumstances or situations: the 
wording of the provision refers to “acts constituting … serious harm”. However, 
these counter-measures are only examples for the protection to be provided by the 
member state which do not limit the scope of serious harm to acts.  
The condition of “intentionally aiming at a specific person” (i.e. specifically at the 
applicant) currently applied as a requirement for subsidiary protection under German 
law is definitely too narrow to conform to the Article 15 lit. c Qualification Directive: 
It is part of the character of indiscriminate actions that they do not necessarily aim at 
a specific person. And, while protection against threats emanating from certain actors 
may be the rule, this does not exclude exceptional cases in which the protection need 
is based on circumstances or situations. If the requirement of an intentional act di-
rected against the applicant cannot be maintained with a view to Article 15 lit. c, nei-
ther can it apply to Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive.  
The core argument, however, is that the terms used in Article 15 lit. b Qualifica-
tion Directive and Article 3 ECHR are identical. To interpret one of the core values 
of European and universal human rights law – the absolute protection against torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment – differently in order to arrive at different statuses 
would be less than convincing. The central difference between the protection under 
the Directive and that under the corresponding provision of the ECHR is that pro-
tection under the Directive may be excluded (Article 17 Qualification Directive) and 
therefore the subsidiary protection status in line with Articles 20 et seq. Qualification 
Directive can be denied on exclusion grounds. In contrast to that, protection under 
Article 3 ECHR is absolute and guarantees non-deportation also in cases in which the 
person concerned fulfils the requirements of an exclusion ground. This result does 
not warrant any differences in interpreting the terms “torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment”. 
Consequently, as in contrast to the German practice under Section 60 (5) Resi-
dence Act which provides protection against deportations involving a violation of the 
ECHR, situations and circumstances which may be in violation of the prohibition of 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment must prompt protection 
under Article 15 lit. b Qualification Directive. 
3.1.4.2 Individual risk of harm because of indiscriminate violence in armed 
conflicts 
The German legal situation concerning protection against individual dangers for life, 
limb or liberty will undergo substantial changes because of the application of Article 
15 lit. c Qualification Directive. Currently, access to individual protection is barred if 
dangers arise to which the population or the segment of the population to which the 
foreigner belongs are generally exposed (Section 60 (7) Residence Act). In such cases, 
protection against deportation is possible only on the basis of a general deportation 
ban adopted by a German State; such a decision does not lead to a legal residence 
permit but persons affected remain in Germany on a toleration permit (Section 60 a 
(1), (3) Residence Act) which excludes access to integration. Such general deportation 
bans are adopted in practice only very rarely.  
Exceptions to this rule applying in cases of general dangers are only applied if the 
dangers are so extreme as to expose the individual concerned almost certainly to death 
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or most serious injuries upon return. Thereby, a very high threshold is applied regard-
ing the standard of probability required to obtain individual protection. This ap-
proach is maintained in the current proposals for the respective part of the Transpo-
sition Act.26 
The result of barring individual protection cannot be maintained in situations 
within the scope of Article 15 lit. c of the Qualification Directive. It is emphasised in 
the Directive (Recital no. 26) that “risks to which a population of a country or a sec-
tion of the population is generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an 
individual threat which would qualify as serious harm.” However, it remains clear by 
the wording of the recital that in such situations the access to individual protection is 
not generally barred altogether (“normally … in themselves”). On the contrary, Arti-
cle 15 lit. c of the Directive is related to protection in situations of indiscriminate 
violence in armed conflicts and consequently as such is designated for situations 
involving general dangers.  
The German Ministry of Interior seems to suppose that the existing legal provi-
sions – no access to individual protection unless there is an extreme danger of death 
or most serious injuries – are in line with the Qualification Directive.27 However, the 
standard of probability applied in the German “extreme danger” approach cannot be 
applied under the Directive at least in cases in which the person concerned had suf-
fered serious harm or had been threatened directly by such harm. Such cases are 
addressed in Article 4 (4) Qualification Directive. This provision requires that previ-
ous risk of serious harm is taken as a serious indication for a real risk of suffering 
serious harm upon return, unless there are good reasons to consider that such harm 
will not be repeated. Even though the standard of probability in cases of real risks of 
serious harm is not explicitly set out in the Directive, it is clear that the standard ap-
plied in Germany so far is much too high in cases covered by Article 15 lit. c Qualifi-
cation Directive: Firstly, the term “threat” clearly shows that a danger is sufficient; 
otherwise the term would be superfluous and the wording could have been restricted 
to referring to the (certain) fact of death or injury upon return. Secondly, dangers 
arising sur place cannot be evaluated in such extreme difference to the standard ap-
plying after the experience of pre-flight threats in accordance with Article 4 (4) Quali-
fication Directive. It would be absurd to require applicants potentially exposed to 
post-flight dangers not amounting to a highly probable or even certain violation of the 
rights to life or physical integrity to first experience the immediate threat of serious 
harm before being able to find protection. 
In addition to this change of standards in situations in which the German system 
applies a bar to individual protection in situations of general dangers, the standard of 
probability applied under the German system for individual protection in situations 
of individual dangers will need to be changed. Whereas the German authorities and 
                                                        
26  See Federal Ministry of Interior, Application Guidelines, p. 16. 
27  The Federal Ministry of Interior underlines that in order to find protection under the Directive, 
the violation of life or person must be “equivalent to being unavoidable” (“gleichsam un-
ausweichlich”), Application Guidelines, p. 16. This section of the Application Guidelines is not 
limited to exceptions to the barring effect of general dangers in the German system but is di-
rectly applied to Article 15 lit. c Qualification Directive as a requirement for an individual 
threat. 
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courts used to apply the standard of a considerable probability (“beachtliche Wahr-
scheinlichkeit”) of suffering the harm from which protection is sought, this standard 
cannot be applied anymore in situations covered by Article 4 (4) Qualification Direc-
tive.  
3.2 Revisiting Concepts 
Other provisions of the Directive will inspire a review of German concepts applying 
so far without, however, already prescribing definitely different results. 
3.2.1 Act of Persecution: Severe Violation of Basic Human Rights 
According to the German concept of what constitutes an act of persecution – or as it 
is put in German terminology, an interference relevant for asylum (“asylrelevanter 
Eingriff”) – authorities and courts used to differentiate between the interferences 
with the rights to life, liberty or physical integrity on the one hand and interferences 
with other rights on the other hand. Whereas interferences with the first group of 
rights used to be qualified as relevant for asylum without any additional criteria, inter-
ferences with other rights used to fulfil the conditions for protection according to the 
German system only if the dimension of human dignity forming the core of protection 
in the respective fundamental right was interfered with. Under the German concept 
of fundamental rights, Article 1 of the Constitution provides that human dignity must 
not be violated. This provision is perceived as bearing on all other provisions on 
fundamental rights in the Constitution which all have a core part protecting human 
dignity and a wider part protecting those aspects of a right which are not relevant for 
human dignity. Only interferences with the wider parts of a fundamental human right 
may be justified; interferences with the core part of a fundamental right may not be 
justified since this would constitute an interference with human dignity which is not 
permitted under any circumstances.  
In Article 9 (1) lit. a Qualification Directive neither of the elements of the Ger-
man approach is explicitly used. Instead of that, the Directive refers to a “severe 
violation of basic human rights”.  
Regarding the criterion of a basic human right, the Directive provides examples 
by pointing at the non-derogable provisions of the ECHR.28 In addition to these 
examples the Qualification Directive remains open for other rights to be qualified as 
basic human rights. This openness is further underlined in Article 9 (2) lit. b Qualifi-
cation Directive stating that also protection against discrimination may constitute a 
basic human right.  
At first glance, the German concept of rights relevant for persecution would seem 
broader than that under the Directive. According to German practice, an interference 
                                                        
28  Thereby the prohibition of killing in contravention of Article 2 (unless in the context of legal 
warfare), the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the pro-
hibition of slavery as well as the principle of nulla poena sine lege are clearly designated as basic 
human rights. To these rights explicitly mentioned one might first add also the rights designated 
as non-derogable in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Article 4 (2)), in-
cluding the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to the list of basic human 
rights. 
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with any human right can be relevant for persecution. However, by applying the hu-
man dignity criterion to all such infringements, the German approach boils down to 
only including infringements of human dignity in the concept of an act of persecu-
tion. Therefore, the German approach of an act of persecution is limited to interfer-
ences with the rights to life, physical integrity, liberty and human dignity. There can 
be little doubt that all of these rights would qualify as a basic human right in the sense 
of Article 9 (1) of the Directive.29 The Qualification Directive goes beyond these 
rights in its openness for qualifying other human rights as basic human rights. 
If a violation of a basic human right in the sense of the Directive has been estab-
lished, the next question is whether the violation is sufficiently severe. Under the sever-
ity test it would have to be examined whether the type of act constituting a violation 
of a basic human right is carried out in a manner which is sufficiently severe to pass 
the threshold of Article 9 (1) lit. a Qualification Directive. However, violations of 
certain basic human rights may always pass the severity test. Some of the rights ex-
plicitly referred to in the Directive as examples for basic human rights are protected 
in absolute terms allowing for little differentiation as to the severity implied. For 
instance, it cannot be argued that treatment to be characterised as inhuman would be 
sufficiently severe while treatment “only” characterised as degrading would not. In 
addition to the absolute nature of the protection under Article 3 ECHR, also the case 
law on “degrading treatment” which includes very severe violations speaks against 
such a differentiation.30 Moreover, having in mind that a danger of any treatment in 
the country of origin constituting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment prompts 
subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive (Article 15 lit. b) it would be 
surprising to regard the same treatment as not qualifying as sufficiently severe for 
granting refugee protection.31  
Having in mind that therefore the criterion of severity of the violation would al-
ways be fulfilled in the case of some basic human rights there can be little doubt that 
any violation of the rights usually referred to in the German system would fulfil the 
criteria of Article 9 Qualification Directive: Unjustified infringements of the physical 
integrity or the right to liberty have been acknowledged to constitute violations of 
Article 3 ECHR in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights; violations 
of the human dignity would constitute a “degrading treatment” under Article 3 
                                                        
29  Regarding human dignity, this follows from the systematic position as the first right set out in 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as from the protection of human dignity 
as protection against degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR. This provision counts among 
the rights explicitly referred to as basic human rights by Article 9 (1) lit. a Qualification Direc-
tive. 
30  See for instance, European Court of Human Rights, No. 47095/99, paragraphs 97 et seq. – 
Kalashnikow v Russian Federation (2002). The Court qualified the detention conditions involving 
extreme overcrowding, lack of hygiene, including the accommodation together with inmates 
suffering from transmittable diseases for almost 5 years as “degrading treatment”. 
31  Whereas similar considerations apply to the protection of the right to life and freedom from 
slavery, the situation is less clear regarding the nulla poena provision. For instance, there may be 
violations of the nulla poena sine lege principle leading to a modest fine only which may have to 
be qualified as not sufficiently severe.  
ROLAND BANK 
124 
ECHR.32 An unjustified killing would contravene Article 2 ECHR and always consti-
tute a severe violation of a basic human right.  
The question is, however, whether the concept of severe violation of a basic hu-
man right allows for taking into consideration acts which do not constitute an in-
fringement of human dignity. The fundamental difference between the two concepts 
is that the aspect of human dignity entails a qualitative assessment (is the measure in 
question denying the quality of the applicant as a subject?)33 of the violation of a 
human right whereas the “severe violation” approach seems to rely exclusively on a 
quantitative approach (is the violation in question carried out in a manner above or 
below the threshold of severity?). Unless the requirements for the severity of the 
violation are interpreted very restrictively, there will be cases in which the violation is 
sufficiently severe in the sense of the Qualification Directive without interfering with 
the human dignity core of the fundamental right affected. As a consequence, there 
are likely to be cases which are covered only by the Directive. 
3.2.2 Post Flight Reasons and Denial of Refugee Status 
Another aspect which may have to be revisited is the question of rejecting – as a rule 
– refugee status in the case of subsequent applications based on reasons created by 
the applicant. There is a German provision prescribing such results (Section 28 (2) 
Asylum Procedures Act) which obviously formed the background for Article 5 (3) 
Qualification Directive. It provides that any reason for refugee status created only 
after a previous final decision in an asylum procedure “shall normally” not lead to 
granting refugee status. This wording leaves room for providing for refugee status in 
exceptional cases without, however, giving an idea what these exceptional circum-
stances may be. Given the fact that the provision aims at fighting abuse, refugee 
status would have to be granted under the German provisions at least in cases not 
involving any such abuse. 
Some German courts have ruled that the German provision was in conflict with 
the 1951 Convention if it was applied without modification. The argument was that 
the granting of refugee status was related to a well-founded fear of persecution for a 
Convention reason and did not contain any conditions as to how and when the situa-
tion leading to a well-founded fear had arisen.34 To follow the rule of the said provi-
sion was regarded as being contrary to the purpose of the Immigration Act 2004 
which sought to put the 1951 Convention into the focus of analysis when reviewing 
the criteria of refugee status.35  
These arguments may find additional support in Article 5 (3) Qualification Direc-
tive and its explicit reference to the 1951 Convention. Since the Convention does not 
                                                        
32  For a comparison of the concept of degrading treatment under the ECHR and the human 
dignity concept under the German Constitution, see R. Bank, ‘Das Verbot von Folter, un-
menschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung oder Strafe’, in: R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds.), 
EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, p. 479, para-
graphs 37 et seq. 
33  Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (official collection) 30, 1 (at 25 et seq.). 
34  Cf. also UNHCR-Handbook, paragraphs 94 et seq. 
35  Cf., for instance, Administrative Court Stuttgart, judgment of 18 April 2005, A 11 K 12040/ 
03.A. 
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allow for exceptions to the rule that a well-founded fear of persecution for a Conven-
tion reason qualifies the asylum seeker for refugee status irrespective of an eventual 
bad faith of the applicant in provoking the danger,36 the application of Article 5 (3) of 
the Directive poses serious problems. These problems, of course, are inherent in the 
Directive and should lead to a review of the compatibility of Article 5 (3) Qualifica-
tion Directive with the 1951 Convention with which it has to conform due to the 
standards imposed by Article 63 (1) EC Treaty. The fact that the Member States were 
quite uncertain whether the rule established in Article 5 (3) Qualification Directive 
was in accordance with the 1951 Convention is not only demonstrated by the text of 
Article 5 (3) (“[w]ithout prejudice to the Geneva Convention”) but also by Article 20 
(6) Qualification Directive. This latter provision explicitly presupposes that a person 
is a refugee also in cases in which post-flight activities were undertaken only with a 
view to creating the necessary conditions for the recognition as a refugee. In such 
cases, Article 20 (6) Qualification Directive allows for a modification of the rights 
granted to refugees under Chapter VII of the Directive without, however, going be-
low the standard guaranteed in the 1951 Convention. 
How these provisions will be reconciled with each other and with the require-
ments of the 1951 Convention in practice remains to be seen. Whereas it seems 
unlikely that German practice is going to change immediately with the direct applica-
tion of the Qualification Directive the final outcome of the interpretation on the 
European level will have its bearing on the German concept as well. 
4. Conclusion 
The application of the Qualification Directive in German Law with direct effect since 
10 October 2006 as well as the future transposition legislation will lead to some sig-
nificant changes in the German system of asylum and refugee law. In particular, cu-
mulative acts (“an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human 
rights”) will have to be taken into account when analysing the question of whether an 
act of persecution is at stake; moreover, protection in cases involving persecution on 
the grounds of religion is widened; the scope of the concept of an internal protection 
alternative is more limited and consequently will lead to a rejection of less applicants 
than under the current German approach; and, subsidiary protection in all three vari-
ants under Article 15 of the Qualification Directive significantly adds protection as-
pects to the German provisions applying so far.  
Finally, some aspects of German law may have to be given a second thought in 
view of new provisions in the Qualification Directive: the question of what consti-
tutes an act of persecution will have to be reviewed taking into account that the con-
cept of severe violation of a basic human right not always requires a violation of hu-
man dignity. Moreover, the recognition of refugees sur place will need to be analysed 
                                                        
36  Cf. UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83 of 29 April 2004, 
Article 5 (3). While recognising the aim of fighting abuse UNHCR draws the attention to the 
fact that in many cases, the questions can be addressed by a thorough review of the credibility 
of the claim. 
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in further detail to ensure that the decision practice is in accordance with the re-
quirements of the 1951 Convention. Without having discussed this in this article, also 
the German decision practice on cessation of refugee status – carried out in thou-
sands of cases in which it cannot yet be expected from the persons concerned to avail 
themselves of the protection of their home state – as well as that on exclusion from 
refugee status will have to be revisited in the light of the practice of other Member 
States under the Qualification Directive and finally any interpretations given by the 
ECJ. 
It will be the task of the authorities – in particular, the Federal Office for Migra-
tion and Refugees which is responsible for deciding on the applications for interna-
tional protection as a first instance – and the administrative courts to apply and fur-
ther interpret the respective provisions. It is foreseeable that important questions of 
interpretation will remain under discussion for significant periods in future, and it is 
to be hoped that national last instance courts will readily refer questions to the ECJ in 
the framework of the preliminary ruling procedure modified with regard to legal 
provisions adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty.37 However, since this still may 
take a longer time, it may be hoped that the referral of questions of interpretation by 
the Commission, the Council or a Member State under Article 68 (3) EC Treaty will 
become relevant in practice with a view to speeding up harmonisation by authorita-
tive rulings on the part of the ECJ. 
 
                                                        
37  Proposals to adapt the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 68 EC Treaty which modifies 
criteria for jurisdiction on issues and instruments related to Title IV EC Treaty to the general 
requirements applying under Article 234 are under discussion, see in particular Commission 
Communication COM (2006) 346 final. 
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Implementation of the EU Qualification Directive in the 
Republic of Lithuania 
 
 
Lyra Jakuleviciene* 
1. Introduction 
Differently from the European Union (EU) old Member States, Lithuania has started 
incorporating into its national law the provisions of then draft EU legislation on 
asylum even before its formal adoption by the Council. At the time when the EU 
Qualification Directive (Directive)1 was pending adoption, the aliens legislation in 
Lithuania was undergoing reform. This allowed to already take into account some of 
the norms of the Directive in the new version of the Law on Legal Status of Aliens of 
the Republic of Lithuania (Aliens Law), adopted on the same day as the Directive.2 
As a result, some provisions in the Aliens Law reflect provisions of the Commission 
Proposal for Council Directive3 and not of the final text of the Directive (e.g. con-
cerning the grounds for subsidiary protection, the Aliens Law recognises violations of 
human rights as a ground for subsidiary protection,4 while such a ground has disap-
peared from the final text of the Directive). Provisions of the Directive can be found 
in the Aliens’ Law, even if the law has no reference to the Directive, as well as im-
plementing legal acts (e.g. the Order on the Examination of the Asylum Claims, ap-
proved by the Minister of Interior on 15 November 20045).  
                                                        
*  Lyra Jakuleviciene is an Associate Professor at Mykolas Romeris University in Lithuania. 
1  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who other-
wise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. O.J. L 304, 
30/09/2004. 
2  Law on Legal Status of Aliens in the Republic of Lithuania of 29 April 2004, No. IX-2206, 
“State News”, No. 73-2539, 2004. 
3  Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need interna-
tional protection, COM/2001/0510 final-CNS 2001/0207; O.J. 51E, 26.2.2002, p. 325-334. 
4  Article 87. Granting  Subsidiary Protection  
1. Subsidiary protection may be granted to an asylum applicant who is outside his country of 
origin and is unable to return to it owing to a well-founded fear that: 
1) he will be tortured, subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
2) there is a threat that his human rights and fundamental freedoms will be violated; 
3) his life, health, safety or freedom is under threat as a result of endemic violence which spread 
in an armed conflict or which has placed him at serious risk of systematic violation of his hu-
man rights.  
5  Order of the Minister of Interior concerning  the Approval of the Order for Examination of 
Foreigners‘ Applications to Grant Asylum, taking decisions and its implementation thereof of 
15 November 2004, No. 1V-361, „State News“ No. 168-6196, 2004. 
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2. Legal and Institutional Framework for Qualification of Persons as 
Refugees and Beneficiaries of Subsidiary Protection in Lithuania 
Before Lithuania’s entry into the EU, only one form of protection, namely refugee 
status, was established by the legislation as a result of ratification of the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 
New York Protocol in 1997. Refugee definition corresponded to that of the 1951 
Convention. No other alternative forms of protection existed in the laws, but a num-
ber of persons falling out of the refugee definition could not be deported due to 
refugee related reasons and were accumulating in a legal limbo situation. This situa-
tion could not continue for a very long time and the Government decided in 2000 to 
start issuing them with temporary residence permits on humanitarian grounds under 
Article 19(3) of then still in force the Law on Legal Status of Aliens.6 But as this was 
an artificial temporary solution, those persons practically faced legal problems in 
accessing social and economic rights, because other laws were not adapted to reflect 
their specific situation. These reasons, combined with the legislative process in the 
EU leading to the adoption of the Qualification Directive (which introduced for the 
first time the legal grounds for subsidiary protection) has lead to reforms in the aliens 
legislation of that time. One of the results of these reforms was a new version of the 
Aliens Law, adopted on 29 April 2004.  
Currently, there are three forms of protection (asylum) recognised by the Lithua-
nian legislation: refugee status, subsidiary protection and temporary protection.7 Arti-
cle 86(1) of the Aliens Law provides that refugee status shall be granted to “the asy-
lum applicant who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwill-
ing to avail himself of the protection of that country or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, unless there are 
conditions specified in Article 88 of this Article” [exclusion clauses]. Furthermore, 
Article 87(1) stipulates the grounds for qualification for subsidiary protection. Pursu-
ant to the Law,  
 
“subsidiary protection may be granted to an asylum applicant who is outside his country of 
origin and is unable to return to it owing to a well-founded fear that: 
1) he will be tortured, subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
2) there is a threat that his human rights and fundamental freedoms will be violated; 
3) his life, health, safety or freedom is under threat as a result of endemic violence which 
spread in an armed conflict or which has placed him at serious risk of systematic violation 
of his human rights”. 
 
                                                        
6  Law on Legal Status of Aliens in the Republic of Lithuania of 17 December 1998, No. VIII-
978, “State News”, No. 115-3236, 31.12.1998 (no longer in force).  
7  Article 2(23) of the Aliens’ Law. 
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Temporary protection is regulated by a separate section in the Law and will not be 
analyzed here, as it falls outside the scope of the Qualification Directive and thus this 
publication.  
There is no explicit requirement in the Aliens Law that criteria for refugee status 
be examined first. But in practice, asylum officials start analyzing the need for refugee 
status and only then continue examining whether the person would need protection 
on other grounds. Notwithstanding, the practice would still benefit from an explicit 
provision in the Law that subsidiary protection can be granted to a person, not fulfill-
ing the criteria for refugee status, but in need of protection on other grounds, in or-
der to ensure that subsidiary protection is indeed complementary and not replacing 
the refugee protection enshrined in the 1951 Convention.8 
Decisions on refugee status or subsidiary protection are taken by the Migration 
Department to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania (Migration De-
partment) and can be appealed to Vilnius District Administrative Court with a possi-
bility of further appeal to the Higher Administrative Court of Lithuania. 
During 2005, 410 persons applied for asylum in Lithuania. 15 of them were 
granted refugee status and 328 received subsidiary protection (this number also in-
cludes the renewals of subsidiary protection status, not only first arrivals). Absolute 
majority of persons granted refugee status came from the Russian Federation 
(Chechnya), while those granted subsidiary protection originated also mostly from the 
Russian Federation (Chechnya) and Afghanistan.  
 
Year Refugee status Subsidiary  protection* 
Rejected 
applications 
for asylum 
Terminated 
examination 
of applica-
tions 
1997 6 - 53 - 
1998 28 - 116 108 
1999 11 - 171 104 
2000 15 80 113 200 
2001 3 266 58 97 
2002 1 287 37 55 
2003 3 485 56 230 
2004 12 407 50 91 
2005 15 328 30 7 
Total 94 1,853 684 892 
*  Before 30 April 2004, foreigners were issued temporary residence permit to reside in Lithuania 
on humanitarian grounds. This number includes also renewals of subsidiary protection, not only 
first arrivals. 
 
                                                        
8  Paragraph 24 of the Preambule and Article 2(e) of the Qualification Directive. 
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The table above illustrates the distribution of persons in need of protection according 
to the type of status granted since 1997 when the asylum procedure in Lithuania 
started operating until the end of 2005.9 
Tendencies for the first half of 2006 look very similar׃10 
 
Decisions 
Status granted Citizenship 
Refugee 
status 
Subsidiary 
protec-
tion* 
Rejected
Terminated 
examination 
of application
Total 
Afghanistan  19   20 
Pakistan   1  1 
Belarus 2  1  3 
Nigeria  1 9  10 
Ukraine   1 1 2 
Russia 8 185 4 1 198 
Iraq  1   1 
Philippines   1  1 
Ghana   5  5 
Liberia   2  2 
Somalia  3   3 
Sri Lanka  1   1 
Stateless  1   1 
Total 10 211 24 2 248 
*  This number includes also renewals of subsidiary protection, not only first arrivals. 
3. Main Concerns in National Law and Practice in Relation to the 
Qualification Directive 
A few points of a general concern could be mentioned in the beginning. Firstly, the 
Aliens Law is limited to the enumeration of grounds when refugee status or subsidi-
ary protection can or cannot be granted, but beyond that, it does not include such 
important provisions introduced by the Qualification Directive, as e.g. acts of perse-
cution within the meaning of Article 1A of the 1951 Convention11, definition of the 
actors of persecution12, refugee sur place definition13 and others. Some of these provi-
sions are mentioned only in the implementing legislation of the Law, namely the 
Order on the Examination of Asylum Claims.14 In particular, the definition in the 
                                                        
9  Information of the Migration Department, “Migracijos metraštis 2005”, available in Lithuanian 
only at: http://www.migracija.lt/MD/metrastis2005.htm#_Toc136333066  
10  Information of the Migration Department, http://www.migracija.lt/MD/PRSTAT/2006/2006 
%20I%20pusmetis%20lt.htm.  
11  Article 9 of the Directive. 
12  Article 6 of the Directive. 
13  Article 5 of the Directive. 
14  Paragraphs 66.1 and 66.4 of the Order. 
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Law of possible acts of persecution contained in Article 9 of the Qualification Direc-
tive, would assist the harmonisation of interpretation within administrative institu-
tions and courts. Furthermore, the notion of internal flight alternative in Lithuania 
needs harmonisation with definition of this notion contained in the Qualification 
Directive. The definition is embodied in the Order on the Examination of Asylum 
Claims, where internal flight alternative is defined as a “[…] real possibility for asylum 
seeker to relocate to another living place within the territory of the country of origin, 
where he can obtain state protection from persecution”.15 Meanwhile, the Directive 
establishes stricter requirements for application of the notion, i.e. that there would be 
no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm 
and that the applicant could reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the coun-
try. Also, in applying this notion, regard should be taken to both the general circum-
stances prevailing in that part of the country, as well as to the personal circumstances 
of the applicant.16 
Among the more serious concerns with regard to transposition and implementa-
tion of the Qualification Directive, three particular issues could be mentioned: 
1. Interpretation of refugee definition: assessment of claims of people coming from 
the civil war situations and in respect of gender based persecution.  
2. Standards of treatment of persons granted with subsidiary protection status. 
3. Wide interpretation of exclusion and cessation clauses. 
 
3.1 Interpretation of Refugee Definition: Assessment of Claims of People 
Coming from the Civil War Situations and in respect of Gender-based 
Persecution 
Though the Aliens Law to a large extent reflects the provisions of the Directive con-
cerning the grounds for refugee status and subsidiary protection, practical implemen-
tation and interpretation remains of concern. For instance, one of the main groups of 
asylum seekers in Lithuania, those coming from Chechnya, continue receiving only 
subsidiary protection and not refugee status, though the situation in Chechnya in 
itself may be characterised as that leading to refugee related problems and thus in 
most cases warranting refugee status. In 2005, out of 342 Chechens who applied for 
asylum, only 15 received refugee status and 288 were granted subsidiary protection in 
Lithuania (this number includes also renewals of subsidiary protection).17 Similar 
tendencies can be observed also during the previous years. As no official policy exists 
to explain the situation, it can only be inferred by the author of this publication that 
among possible reasons there might be a prevailing presupposition that the conflict in 
Chechnya carries a non-individual nature, which means that anyone can be targeted 
for non-refugee related reasons and everyone faces just the general consequences of 
the war and instability. At the same time, there might be explanations related to the 
                                                        
15  Paragraph 2 of the Order.  
16  Article 8(1-2) of the Directive. 
17  Information of the Migration Department, Migracijos metraštis 2005, available in Lithuanian 
only at: http://www.migracija.lt/MD/metrastis2005.htm#_Toc136333066.  
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proximity of Lithuania to Russia and the sensitivity that may surround the official 
recognition of persons as refugees who might be viewed as enemies of the official 
regime in their own country and thus not allegedly deserving support of another 
country through the protection of refugees. Though this sensitivity for granting refu-
gee status as such in Lithuania seems to have already diminished during the recent 
years, because the asylum procedure has been operating for almost ten years, asylum 
and other officials have acquired experience and the numbers of asylum seekers have 
not proved to be enormous as initially foreseen.  
Another tendency in relation to claims of persons coming from the civil war situa-
tions is that the refugee definition is interpreted in a restrictive manner by the admin-
istrative institution in that it is more likely for the person to get asylum if he has al-
ready experienced persecution, in comparison with those who fled in fear of persecu-
tion. This practice may run counter the requirements of international refugee law and 
at the same time of the Directive,18 according to which the fact that the applicant has 
already been subject to persecution is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-
founded fear of persecution, but not an absolute condition to require to establish 
that. 
Secondly, while for the past few years a number of women and girls have been 
granted Convention status on the family unity ground, there has been only few cases 
of recognition of a refugee woman as a principal applicant, even though a number of 
female asylum seekers is rather large among all applicants. In the period of 1998-2000 
there were 6 cases, when female asylum seekers were granted refugee status on the 
basis of gender based claim. Other few cases were only in 2005-2006.19 There might 
be several reasons explaining the current situation in view of the author of this publi-
cation, though no one may be taken as a definite and unquestionable, because gender 
based persecution may be invisible not only within the country of origin of the appli-
cant, but also during examination of the claim in the asylum procedure in the country 
of asylum, thus difficult to record. Among possible reasons, lack of appropriate iden-
tification mechanisms and skills of responsible persons dealing with asylum seekers 
and foreigners in general can be mentioned, as well as little knowledge and under-
standing of certain cultural aspects that may be involved and make the identification 
of gender based claims more difficult. It may be questioned, whether the procedures, 
established by the legislation can ensure equal opportunities for both male and female 
applicants to properly present the claim. The interview technique applied in Lithua-
nia, which is of interrogative nature, as well as strict and formalised format of ques-
tions to be asked during the interview may limit the possibilities of identifying the 
gender based claims. Not even talking about the need to mainstream gender and 
culture sensitivity issues not only among the asylum officials and asylum judges, but 
in particular border guard, police, detention and reception centres’ staff whom the 
asylum seekers are most frequently firstly faced with.  
                                                        
18  Article 4(3b) and 4(4) of the Directive. 
19  Among those who received refugee status during the recent years were a few Chechen women 
and one separated girl, who were granted refugee status in 2005, as well as one woman from 
Belarus, who received refugee status in 2006.   
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In this respect, adoption of the guidelines on how to deal with gender claims, in-
cluding identification, processing and interpretation, which would be available for all 
officials dealing with foreigners and refugees, might result in emergence of an in-
creased number of gender based claims. Such guidelines are adopted by some of the 
EU Member States (e.g. Sweden, the United Kingdom) and their experience may be 
of value in Lithuania as well. Also, it would be worthwhile introducing specific provi-
sions concerning gender based persecution and child specific persecution as a basis 
for refugee status in the legislation or at least to interpret the refugee definition in 
practice in the spirit of the Directive. 
3.2 Standards of Treatment of Persons granted with Subsidiary Protection 
Status 
Standards of treatment of persons granted refugee status in Lithuania correspond to a 
large extent to the requirements of the Qualification Directive. On the contrary, stan-
dards of treatment of persons granted alternative form of protection to refugee status 
has been a concern in Lithuania for a number of years already, as most of Lithuania’s 
legal acts regulating provision of social welfare, health care and housing support con-
dition access to such services with the status of a permanent resident in Lithuania. In 
effect, even though the Qualification Directive provides for access to social assistance 
to persons granted with subsidiary protection on the same grounds as nationals of the 
asylum country,20 persons with subsidiary protection, who hold the status of tempo-
rary residents in Lithuania, are not guaranteed with adequate social support after the 
end of their integration period supported by special measures of the state.  
Social integration of persons granted asylum in Lithuania (including refugees and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection) is regulated by the Order of the Minister of 
Social Security and Labour on Integration of Foreigners Granted Asylum in the Re-
public of Lithuania of 11 January 2006 (Order on State Support for Integration).21 
This Order provides that integration is financed from the state budget and includes 
measures in the field of language studies, employment, accommodation, social secu-
rity, social welfare support, health care and others.22 This is not the first legal act on 
integration of persons granted asylum. The first one was adopted by the Government 
back in 1998 and was applied only to persons granted refugee status,23 second one 
was approved also by the Government on 17 May 2001,24 while the third one was 
                                                        
20  Art. 28 (1) of the Directive. 
21  Order of the Minister of Social Security and Labor Amending Order No. A1-238 of 21 October 
2004 concerning the Approval of Order on State Support for Integration of Foreigners 
Granted Asylum in the Republic of Lithuania, 11 January 2006, No. A1-13, “State News”, No. 
5-167, 14.01.2006. 
22  Paragraph 4 of the Order on State Support for Integration. 
23  Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 26 February 1998 on Approval 
of the Order on Social Integration of Refugees, No. 239, “State News”, No. 22-546, 04.03.1998 
(no longer in force). 
24  Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2001 on Approval of 
the Order on Social Integration of Foreigners Granted Asylum, No. 572, “State News”, No. 43-
1518, 2001 (no longer in force). 
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approved by the ministerial order in 2004.25 According to the current Order, the 
duration of state supported integration varies depending on the existence of special 
needs. For example, those foreigners granted asylum who do not have special needs, 
may enjoy state support for integration in the reception centre up to 6 months after 
the granting of a residence permit (with a possibility of extension to 12 months) and 
for additional 12 months after being transferred from the reception centre to the 
municipality. Persons with special needs (e.g. with disability) may enjoy state support 
for integration even up to 30 months after the date of their settlement in the munici-
pality. Foreigners, who are unaccompanied minors, may be allowed to receive sup-
port in the reception centre until they turn 18 years.26 State support may be provided 
only for one time for the same person according to the integration rules.27 The legis-
lative concern in Lithuania is that a separate social integration system is created for 
foreigners granted asylum instead of attempting to integrate them into the existing 
state social support and health care systems. As a result, when state supported inte-
gration comes to an end, the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection do not smoothly 
pass to the general state support system as would be in case of permanent residents 
and refugees.  
Recently, a few attempts were undertaken to ensure access of persons with sub-
sidiary protection to particular social services and health care. For instance, amend-
ments made to the Law on Health Care System on 28 April 2005,28 provided that 
state guaranteed (free of charge) health care services also for foreigners granted sub-
sidiary or temporary protection in Lithuania are paid from compulsory health insur-
ance fund, state or municipal budget or funds of special programmes of municipali-
ties designated to support the health care of society. Another important amendment 
was adopted to the Law on Health Insurance and the Law on Health Care System in 
2005. Amendments to Article 6 of the Law on Health Insurance, adopted on 28 April 
2005,29 envisaged that compulsory health insurance would apply also to: 
1)  foreigners who are unaccompanied minors; 
2)  those foreigners, who are granted subsidiary or temporary protection in Lithuania 
and who are below 18 years of age, or who have been diagnosed with an illness or 
state of health included in the list approved by the Ministry of Health Care, or 
who are single parents with minor children, women during pregnancy period of 
70 days (who turn to 28 and more weeks of pregnancy) before delivery and 56 
days after delivery, persons who reached a pension age in accordance with the 
laws of the Republic of Lithuania. 
                                                        
25  Order of the Minister of Social Security and Labour No. A1-238 of 21 October 2004 on Ap-
proval of the Order on State Support to Integration of Foreigners Granted Asylum in 
Lithuania, “State News”, No. 157-5741, 28.10.2004 (no longer in force). 
26  This provision was introduced by the supplement to the Order on State Support for Integration 
on 10 July 2006. 
27  Paragraph 11 of the Order on State Support for Integration. 
28  The Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Amendment of Article 47 of the Law on Health Care 
System, No. X-179, “State News”, No. 61-2160, 14.05.2005. 
29  Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Amendment of Article 6 of the Law on Health Insur-
ance, No. X-178, “State News”, No. 61-2159, 14.05.2005.  
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By virtue of this amendment, vulnerable individuals were integrated into the general 
system of health care of the state and this solution seems to work also in practice. For 
all others, according to the amendment to the Law, costs of health care services shall 
be covered from the state budget in case of subsidiary and temporary protection in 
accordance with the order determined by the Government or an institution author-
ised by it. However, such an order has never been adopted, which means that the 
potential for persons to face problems in practice remains acute. Therefore, these 
amendments ensure access to the services for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection 
with special needs only, but not to any person granted protection.  
Furthermore, as a consequence of adoption of the Law on Social Services in 
January 2006,30 foreigners temporary staying in Lithuania were given access to social 
services (social supervision and social guardianship). Notwithstanding these impor-
tant amendments, the implementation of other social-economic rights at the moment 
is not fully guaranteed in Lithuania. 
Another issue of concern is a narrow interpretation of core benefits in case of 
limiting social assistance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status, 
which does not correspond to the notion of core benefits in the Qualification Direc-
tive, which cover at least minimum income support, assistance in case of illness, preg-
nancy and parental assistance.31  
Last, but not least, problems of implementation of the Directive in Lithuania may 
occur in relation to the establishment of a permanent guardianship for unaccompa-
nied minors, who are granted asylum in Lithuania. At the moment of writing this 
publication, they are guaranteed temporary guardianship only for the purpose of the 
asylum procedure, but not permanent one, which is required by the Directive after 
granting of refugee status or subsidiary protection to a minor.32 
3.3 Wide Interpretation of Exclusion and Cessation Clauses 
Some of the provisions of the Qualification Directive (in particular Article 14 (para-
graphs 4-5) dealing with a possibility of exceptions from residence rights on national 
security grounds) can be viewed in the Lithuanian context as having encouraged legis-
lative developments that raise serious concern not only in respect of proper imple-
mentation of the Directive, but even the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
Draft amendments to the Aliens Law, currently being discussed in the Parliament of 
Lithuania (at the moment of preparing this publication in November 2006), suggest 
introducing an additional exclusion clause in the Law. The suggested amendment 
provides that an asylum seeker shall not be granted refugee status or subsidiary pro-
tection “if his presence in the Republic of Lithuania may cause danger to the national 
security or public order or he has been convicted by a final judgement for a particu-
                                                        
30  Law on Social Services of the Republic of Lithuania No. X-493 of 19 January 2006, “State 
News”, No. 17-589, 11.02.2006. 
31  Paragraph 34 of the Preamble of the Directive. 
32  Article 30(1) of the Directive.  
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larly serious crime”.33 Consequently, refugee status could be withdrawn on these 
grounds as well.34 Identical provision is proposed to be added to the cessation 
clauses. These proposals may be viewed as not fully in line with Articles 11 (1) and 12 
(2) of the Directive, which embody an exhaustive list of exclusion and cessation 
clauses. Even though the proposals for legislative amendments in Lithuania may 
remind of paragraphs 4-5 in Article 14 of the Directive, the proposals seem to con-
fuse the concept of exclusion, residence permit withdrawal and expulsion, which 
UNHCR strongly opposed in the negotiations on the Directive with their position 
had been taken into account in the final wording of those provisions. According to 
UNHCR, paragraph 4 and 5 of Article 14 refer to a status granted to a refugee, while 
other provisions of the Directive use the term refugee status. The reason for using dif-
ferent terminology is to distinguish refugee status in the context of the 1951 Conven-
tion from national status being granted to recognised Convention refugee according 
to the procedure established by national laws of the Member States. In other words, 
while the Directive does not allow Member States to exclude third country nationals 
from refugee status (Article 12 of the Directive) on the ground of alleged threat to 
national security or public order, it does allow states to invoke these considerations as 
a ground not to grant a legal (residence) status to the refugee concerned.35 
4.  Conclusion 
In assessing the impact of the Qualification Directive on legislation and practice in 
Lithuania so far, it can be observed that a number of provisions have already been 
taken into account even before the adoption of the Directive. But as no formal trans-
position has yet taken place, a number of provisions remain to be introduced into 
Lithuanian legislation. Therefore, it can be concluded that Lithuania did not meet the 
transposition deadline of 10 October 2006 mentioned in the Directive.36  
Secondly, the Directive had undoubtedly an impact on legislation both in a posi-
tive sense, but also in view of restrictions. Among the positive effects of transposi-
tion was the introduction for the first time of subsidiary protection status with rather 
clearly defined list of grounds, more precise definition of some concepts of interpret-
ing the refugee definition, emergence of a number of positive legislative develop-
ments in the field of standards of treatment of persons with various protection 
statuses and others. At the same time, a number of issues remain of concern. Some 
of the important provisions (e.g. definition of acts of persecution, sur place refugee 
concept, actors of persecution, etc.) should find their place in the legislation and not 
in the ministerial legal acts, as it is currently the case. More substantial concerns could 
                                                        
33  Article 28(2) of the Draft Law on Amendments to the Aliens Law, text of the Draft is available 
in Lithuanian only at: www.lrs.lt. 
34  Article 29 of the Draft Law on Amendments to the Aliens Law, text of the Draft is available in 
Lithuanian only at: www.lrs.lt.  
35  Refer for more details to UNHCR Comments on the Draft Law on the Amendments to the 
Aliens Law of the Republic of Lithuania (XP-1062(2)) (unpublished). 
36  Article 38(1) of the Directive. 
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be grouped under the three areas regarding: interpretation (including narrow interpre-
tation of refugee definition in civil war situations and in respect of gender based 
claims, as well as evidentiary requirements to prove individual persecution which 
would be already experienced), implementation (access to social and economic rights 
and other standards of treatment of persons with subsidiary protection status), and 
general worrisome tendencies related to interpretation of exclusion and cessation 
clauses of refugee status and subsidiary protection. The Draft Law on Amendments 
seems to unlikely address all the concerns in the Aliens Law mentioned, while a 
number of provisions of the Qualification Directive will still have to go a long way to 
become a reality of practice in Lithuania. 
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COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2004/83/EC
of 29 April 2004
on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of
the protection granted
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity, and in particular points 1(c), 2(a) and 3(a) of Article
63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and
Social Committee (3),
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the
Regions (4),
Whereas:
(1) A common policy on asylum, including a Common
European Asylum System, is a constituent part of the
European Union's objective of progressively establishing
an area of freedom, security and justice open to those
who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protec-
tion in the Community.
(2) The European Council at its special meeting in Tampere
on 15 and 16 October 1999 agreed to work towards
establishing a Common European Asylum System, based
on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of
28 July 1951 (Geneva Convention), as supplemented by
the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (Protocol),
thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and
ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution.
(3) The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the
cornerstone of the international legal regime for the
protection of refugees.
(4) The Tampere conclusions provide that a Common Euro-
pean Asylum System should include, in the short term,
the approximation of rules on the recognition of refu-
gees and the content of refugee status.
(5) The Tampere conclusions also provide that rules
regarding refugee status should be complemented by
measures on subsidiary forms of protection, offering an
appropriate status to any person in need of such protec-
tion.
(6) The main objective of this Directive is, on the one hand,
to ensure that Member States apply common criteria for
the identification of persons genuinely in need of inter-
national protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure
that a minimum level of benefits is available for these
persons in all Member States.
(7) The approximation of rules on the recognition and
content of refugee and subsidiary protection status
should help to limit the secondary movements of appli-
cants for asylum between Member States, where such
movement is purely caused by differences in legal frame-
works.
(8) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that
Member States should have the power to introduce or
maintain more favourable provisions for third country
nationals or stateless persons who request international
protection from a Member State, where such a request is
understood to be on the grounds that the person
concerned is either a refugee within the meaning of
Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention, or a person who
otherwise needs international protection.
(9) Those third country nationals or stateless persons, who
are allowed to remain in the territories of the Member
States for reasons not due to a need for international
protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate
or humanitarian grounds, fall outside the scope of this
Directive.
(10) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and
observes the principles recognised in particular by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In
particular this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for
human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for
asylum and their accompanying family members.
(11) With respect to the treatment of persons falling within
the scope of this Directive, Member States are bound by
obligations under instruments of international law to
which they are party and which prohibit discrimination.
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(1) OJ C 51 E, 26.2.2002, p. 325.
(2) OJ C 300 E, 11.12.2003, p. 25.
(3) OJ C 221, 17.9.2002, p. 43.
(4) OJ C 278, 14.11.2002, p. 44.
(12) The ‘best interests of the child’ should be a primary
consideration of Member States when implementing this
Directive.
(13) This Directive is without prejudice to the Protocol on
asylum for nationals of Member States of the European
Union as annexed to the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community.
(14) The recognition of refugee status is a declaratory act.
(15) Consultations with the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees may provide valuable guidance for
Member States when determining refugee status
according to Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.
(16) Minimum standards for the definition and content of
refugee status should be laid down to guide the compe-
tent national bodies of Member States in the application
of the Geneva Convention.
(17) It is necessary to introduce common criteria for recog-
nising applicants for asylum as refugees within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.
(18) In particular, it is necessary to introduce common
concepts of protection needs arising sur place; sources of
harm and protection; internal protection; and persecu-
tion, including the reasons for persecution.
(19) Protection can be provided not only by the State but
also by parties or organisations, including international
organisations, meeting the conditions of this Directive,
which control a region or a larger area within
the territory of the State.
(20) It is necessary, when assessing applications from minors
for international protection, that Member States should
have regard to child-specific forms of persecution.
(21) It is equally necessary to introduce a common concept
of the persecution ground ‘membership of a particular
social group’.
(22) Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations are set out in the Preamble and Articles 1
and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and are,
amongst others, embodied in the United Nations Resolu-
tions relating to measures combating terrorism, which
declare that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism are
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations’ and that ‘knowingly financing, planning and
inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations’.
(23) As referred to in Article 14, ‘status’ can also include
refugee status.
(24) Minimum standards for the definition and content of
subsidiary protection status should also be laid
down. Subsidiary protection should be complementary
and additional to the refugee protection enshrined in the
Geneva Convention.
(25) It is necessary to introduce criteria on the basis of which
applicants for international protection are to be recog-
nised as eligible for subsidiary protection. Those criteria
should be drawn from international obligations under
human rights instruments and practices existing in
Member States.
(26) Risks to which a population of a country or a section of
the population is generally exposed do normally not
create in themselves an individual threat which would
qualify as serious harm.
(27) Family members, merely due to their relation to the
refugee, will normally be vulnerable to acts of persecu-
tion in such a manner that could be the basis for refugee
status.
(28) The notion of national security and public order also
covers cases in which a third country national belongs
to an association which supports international terrorism
or supports such an association.
(29) While the benefits provided to family members of bene-
ficiaries of subsidiary protection status do not necessarily
have to be the same as those provided to the qualifying
beneficiary, they need to be fair in comparison to those
enjoyed by beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status.
(30) Within the limits set out by international obligations,
Member States may lay down that the granting of bene-
fits with regard to access to employment, social welfare,
health care and access to integration facilities requires
the prior issue of a residence permit.
(31) This Directive does not apply to financial benefits from
the Member States which are granted to promote educa-
tion and training.
(32) The practical difficulties encountered by beneficiaries of
refugee or subsidiary protection status concerning the
authentication of their foreign diplomas, certificates or
other evidence of formal qualification should be taken
into account.
(33) Especially to avoid social hardship, it is appropriate, for
beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status,
to provide without discrimination in the context of
social assistance the adequate social welfare and means
of subsistence.
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(34) With regard to social assistance and health care, the
modalities and detail of the provision of core benefits to
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status should be
determined by national law. The possibility of limiting
the benefits for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
status to core benefits is to be understood in the sense
that this notion covers at least minimum income
support, assistance in case of illness, pregnancy and
parental assistance, in so far as they are granted to
nationals according to the legislation of the Member
State concerned.
(35) Access to health care, including both physical and
mental health care, should be ensured to beneficiaries of
refugee or subsidiary protection status.
(36) The implementation of this Directive should be evalu-
ated at regular intervals, taking into consideration in par-
ticular the evolution of the international obligations of
Member States regarding non-refoulement, the evolution
of the labour markets in the Member States as well as
the development of common basic principles for integra-
tion.
(37) Since the objectives of the proposed Directive, namely to
establish minimum standards for the granting of interna-
tional protection to third country nationals and stateless
persons by Member States and the content of the protec-
tion granted, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale
and effects of the Directive, be better achieved at Com-
munity level, the Community may adopt measures, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out
in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the prin-
ciple of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this
Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order
to achieve those objectives.
(38) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the posi-
tion of the United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing
the European Community, the United Kingdom has noti-
fied, by letter of 28 January 2002, its wish to take part
in the adoption and application of this Directive.
(39) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the posi-
tion of the United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Ireland has notified, by letter
of 13 February 2002, its wish to take part in the adop-
tion and application of this Directive.
(40) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on
the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and to the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Denmark is not taking part in the
adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or
subject to its application,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE,
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Subject matter and scope
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down minimum stan-
dards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need interna-
tional protection and the content of the protection granted.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) ‘international protection’ means the refugee and subsidiary
protection status as defined in (d) and (f);
(b) ‘Geneva Convention’ means the Convention relating to the
status of refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as
amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967;
(c) ‘refugee’ means a third country national who, owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a
particular social group, is outside the country of nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a
stateless person, who, being outside of the country of
former habitual residence for the same reasons as
mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear,
unwilling to return to it, and to whom Article 12 does not
apply;
(d) ‘refugee status’ means the recognition by a Member State of
a third country national or a stateless person as a refugee;
(e) ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ means a third
country national or a stateless person who does not qualify
as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds
have been shown for believing that the person concerned,
if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of
a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual
residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm
as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2)
do not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk,
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of
that country;
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(f) ‘subsidiary protection status’ means the recognition by a
Member State of a third country national or a stateless
person as a person eligible for subsidiary protection;
(g) ‘application for international protection’ means a request
made by a third country national or a stateless person for
protection from a Member State, who can be understood to
seek refugee status or subsidiary protection status, and who
does not explicitly request another kind of protection,
outside the scope of this Directive, that can be applied for
separately;
(h) ‘family members’ means, insofar as the family already
existed in the country of origin, the following members of
the family of the beneficiary of refugee or subsidiary
protection status who are present in the same Member
State in relation to the application for international protec-
tion:
— the spouse of the beneficiary of refugee or subsidiary
protection status or his or her unmarried partner in a
stable relationship, where the legislation or practice of
the Member State concerned treats unmarried couples
in a way comparable to married couples under its law
relating to aliens,
— the minor children of the couple referred to in the first
indent or of the beneficiary of refugee or subsidiary
protection status, on condition that they are unmarried
and dependent and regardless of whether they were
born in or out of wedlock or adopted as defined under
the national law;
(i) ‘unaccompanied minors’ means third-country nationals or
stateless persons below the age of 18, who arrive on
the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an
adult responsible for them whether by law or custom, and
for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of
such a person; it includes minors who are left unaccompa-
nied after they have entered the territory of the Member
States;
(j) ‘residence permit’ means any permit or authorisation issued
by the authorities of a Member State, in the form provided
for under that State's legislation, allowing a third country
national or stateless person to reside on its territory;
(k) ‘country of origin’ means the country or countries of
nationality or, for stateless persons, of former habitual resi-
dence.
Article 3
More favourable standards
Member States may introduce or retain more favourable stan-
dards for determining who qualifies as a refugee or as a person
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for determining the
content of international protection, in so far as those standards
are compatible with this Directive.
CHAPTER II
ASSESSMENT OF APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION
Article 4
Assessment of facts and circumstances
1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant
to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to
substantiate the application for international protection. In
cooperation with the applicant it is the duty of the Member
State to assess the relevant elements of the application.
2. The elements referred to in of paragraph 1 consist of the
applicant's statements and all documentation at the applicants
disposal regarding the applicant's age, background, including
that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies)
and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applica-
tions, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the
reasons for applying for international protection.
3. The assessment of an application for international protec-
tion is to be carried out on an individual basis and includes
taking into account:
(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at
the time of taking a decision on the application; including
laws and regulations of the country of origin and the
manner in which they are applied;
(b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by
the applicant including information on whether the appli-
cant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious
harm;
(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the
applicant, including factors such as background, gender and
age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant's
personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has
been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or
serious harm;
(d) whether the applicant's activities since leaving the country
of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of
creating the necessary conditions for applying for interna-
tional protection, so as to assess whether these activities
will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if
returned to that country;
(e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail
himself of the protection of another country where he
could assert citizenship.
4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to
persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such perse-
cution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant's
well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious
harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such
persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.
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5. Where Member States apply the principle according to
which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the applica-
tion for international protection and where aspects of the appli-
cant's statements are not supported by documentary or other
evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation, when the
following conditions are met:
(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his
application;
(b) all relevant elements, at the applicant's disposal, have been
submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack
of other relevant elements has been given;
(c) the applicant's statements are found to be coherent and
plausible and do not run counter to available specific and
general information relevant to the applicant's case;
(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the
earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate
good reason for not having done so; and
(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.
Article 5
International protection needs arising sur place
1. A well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk of
suffering serious harm may be based on events which have
taken place since the applicant left the country of origin.
2. A well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk of
suffering serious harm may be based on activities which have
been engaged in by the applicant since he left the country of
origin, in particular where it is established that the activities
relied upon constitute the expression and continuation of
convictions or orientations held in the country of origin.
3. Without prejudice to the Geneva Convention, Member
States may determine that an applicant who files a subsequent
application shall normally not be granted refugee status, if the
risk of persecution is based on circumstances which the appli-
cant has created by his own decision since leaving the country
of origin.
Article 6
Actors of persecution or serious harm
Actors of persecution or serious harm include:
(a) the State;
(b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substan-
tial part of the territory of the State;
(c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors
mentioned in (a) and (b), including international organisa-
tions, are unable or unwilling to provide protection against
persecution or serious harm as defined in Article 7.
Article 7
Actors of protection
1. Protection can be provided by:
(a) the State; or
(b) parties or organisations, including international organisa-
tions, controlling the State or a substantial part of
the territory of the State.
2. Protection is generally provided when the actors
mentioned in paragraph 1 take reasonable steps to prevent the
persecution or suffering of serious harm, inter alia, by operating
an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and
punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm,
and the applicant has access to such protection.
3. When assessing whether an international organisation
controls a State or a substantial part of its territory and
provides protection as described in paragraph 2, Member States
shall take into account any guidance which may be provided in
relevant Council acts.
Article 8
Internal protection
1. As part of the assessment of the application for interna-
tional protection, Member States may determine that an appli-
cant is not in need of international protection if in a part of the
country of origin there is no well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the appli-
cant can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the
country.
2. In examining whether a part of the country of origin is in
accordance with paragraph 1, Member States shall at the time
of taking the decision on the application have regard to the
general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country
and to the personal circumstances of the applicant.
3. Paragraph 1 may apply notwithstanding technical obsta-
cles to return to the country of origin.
CHAPTER III
QUALIFICATION FOR BEING A REFUGEE
Article 9
Acts of persecution
1. Acts of persecution within the meaning of article 1 A of
the Geneva Convention must:
(a) be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to
constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in par-
ticular the rights from which derogation cannot be made
under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or
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(b) be an accumulation of various measures, including viola-
tions of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to
affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a).
2. Acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1, can, inter
alia, take the form of:
(a) acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual
violence;
(b) legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which
are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented
in a discriminatory manner;
(c) prosecution or punishment, which is disproportionate or
discriminatory;
(d) denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or
discriminatory punishment;
(e) prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military
service in a conflict, where performing military service
would include crimes or acts falling under the exclusion
clauses as set out in Article 12(2);
(f) acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature.
3. In accordance with Article 2(c), there must be a connec-
tion between the reasons mentioned in Article 10 and the acts
of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1.
Article 10
Reasons for persecution
1. Member States shall take the following elements into
account when assessing the reasons for persecution:
(a) the concept of race shall in particular include considera-
tions of colour, descent, or membership of a particular
ethnic group;
(b) the concept of religion shall in particular include the
holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the
participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in
private or in public, either alone or in community with
others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms
of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated
by any religious belief;
(c) the concept of nationality shall not be confined to citizen-
ship or lack thereof but shall in particular include member-
ship of a group determined by its cultural, ethnic, or
linguistic identity, common geographical or political origins
or its relationship with the population of another State;
(d) a group shall be considered to form a particular social
group where in particular:
— members of that group share an innate characteristic,
or a common background that cannot be changed, or
share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to
identity or conscience that a person should not be
forced to renounce it, and
— that group has a distinct identity in the relevant
country, because it is perceived as being different by the
surrounding society;
depending on the circumstances in the country of origin, a
particular social group might include a group based on a
common characteristic of sexual orientation. Sexual orien-
tation cannot be understood to include acts considered to
be criminal in accordance with national law of the Member
States: Gender related aspects might be considered, without
by themselves alone creating a presumption for the applic-
ability of this Article;
(e) the concept of political opinion shall in particular include
the holding of an opinion, thought or belief on a matter
related to the potential actors of persecution mentioned in
Article 6 and to their policies or methods, whether or not
that opinion, thought or belief has been acted upon by the
applicant.
2. When assessing if an applicant has a well-founded fear of
being persecuted it is immaterial whether the applicant actually
possesses the racial, religious, national, social or political char-
acteristic which attracts the persecution, provided that such a
characteristic is attributed to the applicant by the actor of
persecution.
Article 11
Cessation
1. A third country national or a stateless person shall cease
to be a refugee, if he or she:
(a) has voluntarily re-availed himself or herself of the protec-
tion of the country of nationality; or
(b) having lost his or her nationality, has voluntarily re-
acquired it; or
(c) has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection
of the country of his or her new nationality; or
(d) has voluntarily re-established himself or herself in the
country which he or she left or outside which he or she
remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(e) can no longer, because the circumstances in connection
with which he or she has been recognised as a refugee have
ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself or herself
of the protection of the country of nationality;
(f) being a stateless person with no nationality, he or she is
able, because the circumstances in connection with which
he or she has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to
exist, to return to the country of former habitual residence.
2. In considering points (e) and (f) of paragraph 1, Member
States shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances
is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the refu-
gee's fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-
founded.
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Article 12
Exclusion
1. A third country national or a stateless person is excluded
from being a refugee, if:
(a) he or she falls within the scope of Article 1 D of the
Geneva Convention, relating to protection or assistance
from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. When
such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason,
without the position of such persons being definitely settled
in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons
shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Directive;
(b) he or she is recognised by the competent authorities of the
country in which he or she has taken residence as having
the rights and obligations which are attached to the posses-
sion of the nationality of that country; or rights and obliga-
tions equivalent to those.
2. A third country national or a stateless person is excluded
from being a refugee where there are serious reasons for
considering that:
(a) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the inter-
national instruments drawn up to make provision in
respect of such crimes;
(b) he or she has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his or her admission
as a refugee; which means the time of issuing a residence
permit based on the granting of refugee status; particularly
cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political
objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes;
(c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations as set out in the
Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
3. Paragraph 2 applies to persons who instigate or otherwise
participate in the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned
therein.
CHAPTER IV
REFUGEE STATUS
Article 13
Granting of refugee status
Member States shall grant refugee status to a third country
national or a stateless person, who qualifies as a refugee in
accordance with Chapters II and III.
Article 14
Revocation of, ending of or refusal to renew refugee
status
1. Concerning applications for international protection filed
after the entry into force of this Directive, Member States shall
revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of a third
country national or a stateless person granted by a govern-
mental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, if he or
she has ceased to be a refugee in accordance with Article 11.
2. Without prejudice to the duty of the refugee in accord-
ance with Article 4(1) to disclose all relevant facts and provide
all relevant documentation at his/her disposal, the Member
State, which has granted refugee status, shall on an individual
basis demonstrate that the person concerned has ceased to be
or has never been a refugee in accordance with paragraph 1 of
this Article.
3. Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the
refugee status of a third country national or a stateless person,
if, after he or she has been granted refugee status, it is estab-
lished by the Member State concerned that:
(a) he or she should have been or is excluded from being a
refugee in accordance with Article 12;
(b) his or her misrepresentation or omission of facts, including
the use of false documents, were decisive for the granting
of refugee status.
4. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the
status granted to a refugee by a governmental, administrative,
judicial or quasi-judicial body, when:
(a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a
danger to the security of the Member State in which he or
she is present;
(b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgement of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com-
munity of that Member State.
5. In situations described in paragraph 4, Member States
may decide not to grant status to a refugee, where such a deci-
sion has not yet been taken.
6. Persons to whom paragraphs 4 or 5 apply are entitled to
rights set out in or similar to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16,
22, 31 and 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention in so far as
they are present in the Member State.
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CHAPTER V
QUALIFICATION FOR SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION
Article 15
Serious harm
Serious harm consists of:
(a) death penalty or execution; or
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
of an applicant in the country of origin; or
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of interna-
tional or internal armed conflict.
Article 16
Cessation
1. A third country national or a stateless person shall cease
to be eligible for subsidiary protection when the circumstances
which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have
ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protec-
tion is no longer required.
2. In applying paragraph 1, Member States shall have regard
to whether the change of circumstances is of such a significant
and non-temporary nature that the person eligible for
subsidiary protection no longer faces a real risk of serious
harm.
Article 17
Exclusion
1. A third country national or a stateless person is excluded
from being eligible for subsidiary protection where there are
serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the inter-
national instruments drawn up to make provision in
respect of such crimes;
(b) he or she has committed a serious crime;
(c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations as set out in the
Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations;
(d) he or she constitutes a danger to the community or to the
security of the Member State in which he or she is present.
2. Paragraph 1 applies to persons who instigate or otherwise
participate in the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned
therein.
3. Member States may exclude a third country national or a
stateless person from being eligible for subsidiary protection, if
he or she prior to his or her admission to the Member State
has committed one or more crimes, outside the scope of para-
graph 1, which would be punishable by imprisonment, had
they been committed in the Member State concerned, and if he
or she left his or her country of origin solely in order to avoid
sanctions resulting from these crimes.
CHAPTER VI
SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION STATUS
Article 18
Granting of subsidiary protection status
Member States shall grant subsidiary protection status to a
third country national or a stateless person eligible for
subsidiary protection in accordance with Chapters II and V.
Article 19
Revocation of, ending of or refusal to renew subsidiary
protection status
1. Concerning applications for international protection filed
after the entry into force of this Directive, Member States shall
revoke, end or refuse to renew the subsidiary protection status
of a third country national or a stateless person granted by a
governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, if
he or she has ceased to be eligible for subsidiary protection in
accordance with Article 16.
2. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the
subsidiary protection status of a third country national or a
stateless person granted by a governmental, administrative,
judicial or quasi-judicial body, if after having been granted
subsidiary protection status, he or she should have been
excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection in
accordance with Article 17(3).
3. Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the
subsidiary protection status of a third country national or a
stateless person, if:
(a) he or she, after having been granted subsidiary protection
status, should have been or is excluded from being eligible
for subsidiary protection in accordance with Article 17(1)
and (2);
(b) his or her misrepresentation or omission of facts, including
the use of false documents, were decisive for the granting
of subsidiary protection status.
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4. Without prejudice to the duty of the third country
national or stateless person in accordance with Article 4(1) to
disclose all relevant facts and provide all relevant documenta-
tion at his/her disposal, the Member State, which has granted
the subsidiary protection status, shall on an individual basis
demonstrate that the person concerned has ceased to be or is
not eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with para-
graphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.
CHAPTER VII
CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
Article 20
General rules
1. This Chapter shall be without prejudice to the rights laid
down in the Geneva Convention.
2. This Chapter shall apply both to refugees and persons
eligible for subsidiary protection unless otherwise indicated.
3. When implementing this Chapter, Member States shall
take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons
such as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people,
elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor
children and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape
or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual
violence.
4. Paragraph 3 shall apply only to persons found to have
special needs after an individual evaluation of their situation.
5. The best interest of the child shall be a primary considera-
tion for Member States when implementing the provisions of
this Chapter that involve minors.
6. Within the limits set out by the Geneva Convention,
Member States may reduce the benefits of this Chapter, granted
to a refugee whose refugee status has been obtained on the
basis of activities engaged in for the sole or main purpose of
creating the necessary conditions for being recognised as a
refugee.
7. Within the limits set out by international obligations of
Member States, Member States may reduce the benefits of this
Chapter, granted to a person eligible for subsidiary protection,
whose subsidiary protection status has been obtained on the
basis of activities engaged in for the sole or main purpose of
creating the necessary conditions for being recognised as a
person eligible for subsidiary protection.
Article 21
Protection from refoulement
1. Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoule-
ment in accordance with their international obligations.
2. Where not prohibited by the international obligations
mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a
refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when:
(a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as
a danger to the security of the Member State in which he
or she is present; or
(b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgement of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com-
munity of that Member State.
3. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to
grant the residence permit of (or to) a refugee to whom para-
graph 2 applies.
Article 22
Information
Member States shall provide persons recognised as being in
need of international protection, as soon as possible after the
respective protection status has been granted, with access to
information, in a language likely to be understood by them, on
the rights and obligations relating to that status.
Article 23
Maintaining family unity
1. Member States shall ensure that family unity can be main-
tained.
2. Member States shall ensure that family members of the
beneficiary of refugee or subsidiary protection status, who do
not individually qualify for such status, are entitled to claim the
benefits referred to in Articles 24 to 34, in accordance with
national procedures and as far as it is compatible with the
personal legal status of the family member.
In so far as the family members of beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection status are concerned, Member States may define the
conditions applicable to such benefits.
In these cases, Member States shall ensure that any benefits
provided guarantee an adequate standard of living.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not applicable where the family
member is or would be excluded from refugee or subsidiary
protection status pursuant to Chapters III and V.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States may
refuse, reduce or withdraw the benefits referred therein for
reasons of national security or public order.
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5. Member States may decide that this Article also applies to
other close relatives who lived together as part of the family at
the time of leaving the country of origin, and who were wholly
or mainly dependent on the beneficiary of refugee or subsidiary
protection status at that time.
Article 24
Residence permits
1. As soon as possible after their status has been granted,
Member States shall issue to beneficiaries of refugee status a
residence permit which must be valid for at least three years
and renewable unless compelling reasons of national security
or public order otherwise require, and without prejudice to
Article 21(3).
Without prejudice to Article 23(1), the residence permit to be
issued to the family members of the beneficiaries of refugee
status may be valid for less than three years and renewable.
2. As soon as possible after the status has been granted,
Member States shall issue to beneficiaries of subsidiary protec-
tion status a residence permit which must be valid for at least
one year and renewable, unless compelling reasons of national
security or public order otherwise require.
Article 25
Travel document
1. Member States shall issue to beneficiaries of refugee
status travel documents in the form set out in the Schedule to
the Geneva Convention, for the purpose of travel outside
their territory unless compelling reasons of national security or
public order otherwise require.
2. Member States shall issue to beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection status who are unable to obtain a national passport,
documents which enable them to travel, at least when serious
humanitarian reasons arise that require their presence in
another State, unless compelling reasons of national security or
public order otherwise require.
Article 26
Access to employment
1. Member States shall authorise beneficiaries of refugee
status to engage in employed or self-employed activities subject
to rules generally applicable to the profession and to the public
service, immediately after the refugee status has been granted.
2. Member States shall ensure that activities such as employ-
ment-related education opportunities for adults, vocational
training and practical workplace experience are offered to bene-
ficiaries of refugee status, under equivalent conditions as
nationals.
3. Member States shall authorise beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection status to engage in employed or self-employed activ-
ities subject to rules generally applicable to the profession and
to the public service immediately after the subsidiary protection
status has been granted. The situation of the labour market in
the Member States may be taken into account, including for
possible prioritisation of access to employment for a limited
period of time to be determined in accordance with national
law. Member States shall ensure that the beneficiary of
subsidiary protection status has access to a post for which the
beneficiary has received an offer in accordance with national
rules on prioritisation in the labour market.
4. Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection status have access to activities such as employment-
related education opportunities for adults, vocational training
and practical workplace experience, under conditions to be
decided by the Member States.
5. The law in force in the Member States applicable to
remuneration, access to social security systems relating to
employed or self-employed activities and other conditions of
employment shall apply.
Article 27
Access to education
1. Member States shall grant full access to the education
system to all minors granted refugee or subsidiary protection
status, under the same conditions as nationals.
2. Member States shall allow adults granted refugee or
subsidiary protection status access to the general education
system, further training or retraining, under the same condi-
tions as third country nationals legally resident.
3. Member States shall ensure equal treatment between
beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status and
nationals in the context of the existing recognition procedures
for foreign diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal
qualifications.
Article 28
Social welfare
1. Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of refugee
or subsidiary protection status receive, in the Member State
that has granted such statuses, the necessary social assistance,
as provided to nationals of that Member State.
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2. By exception to the general rule laid down in paragraph 1,
Member States may limit social assistance granted to benefici-
aries of subsidiary protection status to core benefits which will
then be provided at the same levels and under the same elig-
ibility conditions as nationals.
Article 29
Health care
1. Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of refugee
or subsidiary protection status have access to health care under
the same eligibility conditions as nationals of the Member State
that has granted such statuses.
2. By exception to the general rule laid down in paragraph 1,
Member States may limit health care granted to beneficiaries of
subsidiary protection to core benefits which will then be
provided at the same levels and under the same eligibility
conditions as nationals.
3. Member States shall provide, under the same eligibility
conditions as nationals of the Member State that has granted
the status, adequate health care to beneficiaries of refugee or
subsidiary protection status who have special needs, such as
pregnant women, disabled people, persons who have under-
gone torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological,
physical or sexual violence or minors who have been victims of
any form of abuse, neglect, exploitation, torture, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or who have suffered from
armed conflict.
Article 30
Unaccompanied minors
1. As soon as possible after the granting of refugee or
subsidiary protection status Member States shall take the neces-
sary measures, to ensure the representation of unaccompanied
minors by legal guardianship or, where necessary, by an orga-
nisation responsible for the care and well-being of minors, or
by any other appropriate representation including that based
on legislation or Court order.
2. Member States shall ensure that the minor's needs are
duly met in the implementation of this Directive by the
appointed guardian or representative. The appropriate authori-
ties shall make regular assessments.
3. Member States shall ensure that unaccompanied minors
are placed either:
(a) with adult relatives; or
(b) with a foster family; or
(c) in centres specialised in accommodation for minors; or
(d) in other accommodation suitable for minors.
In In this context, the views of the child shall be taken into
account in accordance with his or her age and degree of
maturity.
4. As far as possible, siblings shall be kept together, taking
into account the best interests of the minor concerned and, in
particular, his or her age and degree of maturity. Changes of
residence of unaccompanied minors shall be limited to a
minimum.
5. Member States, protecting the unaccompanied minor's
best interests, shall endeavour to trace the members of the
minor's family as soon as possible. In cases where there may be
a threat to the life or integrity of the minor or his or her close
relatives, particularly if they have remained in the country of
origin, care must be taken to ensure that the collection, proces-
sing and circulation of information concerning those persons is
undertaken on a confidential basis.
6. Those working with unaccompanied minors shall have
had or receive appropriate training concerning their needs.
Article 31
Access to accommodation
The Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of refugee or
subsidiary protection status have access to accommodation
under equivalent conditions as other third country nationals
legally resident in their territories.
Article 32
Freedom of movement within the Member State
Member States shall allow freedom of movement within
their territory to beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protec-
tion status, under the same conditions and restrictions as those
provided for other third country nationals legally resident in
their territories.
Article 33
Access to integration facilities
1. In order to facilitate the integration of refugees into
society, Member States shall make provision for integration
programmes which they consider to be appropriate or create
pre-conditions which guarantee access to such programmes.
2. Where it is considered appropriate by Member States,
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status shall be granted
access to integration programmes.
Article 34
Repatriation
Member States may provide assistance to beneficiaries of
refugee or subsidiary protection status who wish to repatriate.
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CHAPTER VIII
ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Article 35
Cooperation
Member States shall each appoint a national contact point,
whose address they shall communicate to the Commission,
which shall communicate it to the other Member States.
Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, take all
appropriate measures to establish direct cooperation and an
exchange of information between the competent authorities.
Article 36
Staff
Member States shall ensure that authorities and other organisa-
tions implementing this Directive have received the necessary
training and shall be bound by the confidentiality principle, as
defined in the national law, in relation to any information they
obtain in the course of their work.
CHAPTER IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 37
Reports
1. By 10 April 2008, the Commission shall report to the
European Parliament and the Council on the application of this
Directive and shall propose any amendments that are necessary.
These proposals for amendments shall be made by way of
priority in relation to Articles 15, 26 and 33. Member States
shall send the Commission all the information that is appro-
priate for drawing up that report by 10 October 2007.
2. After presenting the report, the Commission shall report
to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of this Directive at least every five years.
Article 38
Transposition
1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions necessary to comply with
this Directive before 10 October 2006. They shall forthwith
inform the Commission thereof.
When the Member States adopt those measures, they shall
contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied
by such a reference on the occasion of their official
publication. The methods of making such reference shall be
laid down by Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
text of the provisions of national law which they adopt in the
field covered by this Directive.
Article 39
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union.
Article 40
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance
with the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Done at Luxembourg, 29 April 2004.
For the Council
The President
M. McDOWELL
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Proposal for a
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection
(presented by the Commission)
2EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE QUALIFICATION AND STATUS OF
THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND STATELESS PERSONS AS REFUGEES
OR AS PERSONS WHO OTHERWISE NEED INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION
50 YEARS AFTER THE GENEVA CONVENTION: CREATING THE HEART
OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
According to the Conclusions of the Presidency at the Tampere European Council in
October 1999, a Common European Asylum System is to include, in the short term, a clear
and workable determination of the State responsible for the examination of an asylum
application, common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum
conditions of reception for asylum seekers and the approximation of rules on the recognition
and content of refugee status. This is to be supplemented with measures on subsidiary forms
of protection offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such protection. In
addition, the Conclusions make clear that, in the longer term, Community rules should lead to
a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid
throughout the Union. Finally, the European Council, in Tampere, urged the Council to step
up its efforts to reach agreement on the issue of temporary protection for displaced persons on
the basis of solidarity between Member States.
• On 28 September 2000, the Council adopted a Decision (2000/596/EC) establishing a
European Refugee Fund as a solidarity measure to promote a balance in the efforts
made by Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving
refugees and displaced persons.
• On 11 December 2000, the Council adopted a Regulation (2725/2000/EC) concerning
the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective
application of the Dublin Convention on the State responsible for examining
applications for asylum lodged in one of the European Union Member States.
• On 20 July 2001, the Council adopted a Directive (2001/55/EC) on minimum standards
for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and
on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such
persons and bearing the consequences thereof;
In addition to the Proposals for the above mentioned acts approved by the Council, the
Commission has adopted:
• On 20 September 2000, a Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status;
• On 22 November 2000, a Communication on a common asylum procedure and a
uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout the Union.
• On 3 April 2001, a Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on the
reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.
3• On 26 July 2001 a Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national
As indicated in the scoreboard to review progress on the creation of an area
for freedom, security and justice in the European Union, approved by the Council on
27 March 2000, the Commission is now, in the second half of 2001, proposing a
Council Directive on minimum standards on the qualification and status of third country
nationals and stateless persons as refugees and as persons otherwise in need of international
protection. This will complete the Commission’s work on a proposed set of “building blocks”,
which jointly constitute the first step of the “Common European Asylum System” called for
by the Tampere European Council.
This Proposal has been drafted on the basis of a number of preparatory activities and
background materials.
In the preparatory phases of the legislative process leading to the current Proposal, the
Commission organised a series of bilateral consultations with Member States. These
consultations were held on the basis of a discussion paper, drafted with a view to facilitating
discussions with Member States on how best to legislate in EC legal instruments, rules on the
recognition and content of refugee and subsidiary protection status.
In its November 2000 Communication, entitled “Towards a common asylum procedure and a
uniform status, valid throughout the Union for persons granted asylum” (the Asylum
Communication), the Commission wrote that “representatives of civil society, associations,
non-governmental organisations and local authorities and communities must also be partners
in the new system as actors and vectors of asylum values in Europe”. Within this context the
Commission consulted in addition to Member States, UNHCR, expert non-governmental
organisations in the field such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)
and Amnesty International, specialised non-governmental organisations such as the
European Women’s Lobby and Save the Children, academic experts such as the ODYSSEUS
academic network for legal studies on immigration and asylum in Europe, and representatives
of the judiciary such as the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, on the basis of
the aforementioned discussion paper.
On 23 and 24 April 2001 a Seminar, held in Norrköping, and entitled “International protection
within one single asylum procedure” was organised by the Swedish Presidency of the
European Union. This seminar dealt with the following three issues: the interpretation of the
refugee definition, subsidiary forms of protection and a single asylum procedure. The
discussion held there and the main findings of the seminar, as well as the different
background papers prepared for this Seminar were important sources of inspiration in drafting
the current Proposal.
Where it relates to the issue of the refugee definition, the present Proposal also draws on a
recent academic study undertaken by the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford for
the European Commission. This Proposal incorporates the findings of an expert meeting that
was organised to discuss this study as well as various relevant national, European and
international texts and jurisprudence. It also reflects various recent comparative Council and
CIREA overviews of Member States practices regarding the issue of subsidiary protection.
42. SCOPE OF THE PROPOSAL
With regard to the Common European Asylum System, it was agreed at the
Tampere European Council that it “should include the approximation of rules on the
recognition and content of the refugee status and should be complemented by measures on
subsidiary forms of protection offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such
protection”. The main aim being to ensure that a minimum level of protection is available in
all Member States for those genuinely in need and to reduce disparities between
Member States’ legislation and practice in these areas. Any differences not solely connected
with family, cultural or historical factors, likely to influence in one way or another the flows
of asylum applicants, should as far as possible disappear between the Member States, where
such movement is purely caused by differences in legal frameworks.
This Proposal relates to an instrument for part of the “first-step” of a Common European
Asylum System, which is to be “based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva
Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the
principle of non-refoulement”. The Proposal therefore lays down rules for determining which
applicants for international protection qualify for refugee status and which qualify for
subsidiary protection status. It does not extend to cover those third country national or
stateless persons present in the territory of Member States who Member States currently allow
to remain in their territory for reasons not related to a need for international protection, such
as compassionate or humanitarian ones.
In the interests of greater harmonisation and limiting unwarranted secondary movement of
asylum seekers, this Directive includes provisions on the minimum rights and benefits to be
enjoyed by the beneficiaries of refugee and subsidiary protection status. In the main, the rights
and benefits attached to both international protection statuses are the same, to reflect the fact
that the needs of all persons in need of international protection are broadly similar. However,
some differentiation has been made, in recognition of the primacy of the Geneva Convention
and the fact that the regime of subsidiary protection starts from the premise that the need for
such protection is temporary in nature, notwithstanding the fact that in reality the need for
subsidiary protection often turns out to be more lasting. In order to reflect this underlying
premise and reality entitlement to some important rights and benefits has been made
incremental, requiring that a brief qualification period be served before a beneficiary of
subsidiary protection status becomes eligible to claim them.
This Proposal does not address the procedural aspects of granting and withdrawing refugee
status or subsidiary protection status. The procedures for asylum applicants are laid out in the
Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status. Article 3 of that Directive makes the applicability of
the Directive to applications for international protection, not made specifically in relation to
the Geneva Convention, optional. This leaves a potential gap in the European protection
regime and allows for differences in Member State practice in this area to continue with a
possible negative affect on the goal of limiting unwarranted secondary movement of asylum
seekers within the European Union. Member States are therefore encouraged to apply the
optional Article 3 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status to all applications
for international protection in a similar manner in the interests of harmonisation
5In the Asylum Communication the Commission states that at the end of this first step of the
harmonisation process of EU asylum policy, and whatever the result, it will be necessary to
consider whether mechanisms can be developed to correct certain differences that might
remain or to prevent the phenomenon of divergent interpretation of Community rules.
Specific questions related to the issues covered in this Proposal were also already identified in
the Communication as being in need of further clarification, such as: should the EU aim for
transposing the Geneva Convention status into Community law, should the EU envisage one
or more uniform personal statuses and what kind of documents, rights, freedom of movement
and right of residence in another Member State should refugees and others in need of
international protection have. These questions are not covered by this Proposal because it is
envisaged that they will be tackled in the second step of the harmonisation process.
3. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union reiterated the right to asylum in its
Article 18. Flowing from this the Proposal reflects that the cornerstone of the system should
be the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, complemented by measures
offering subsidiary protection to those persons not covered by the Convention but who are
nonetheless in need of international protection. It is argued that the wording of the definition
of who is a refugee, as contained in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Geneva Convention, as well
as the Convention itself, remains relevant today and is sufficiently flexible, full and inclusive
to offer a guarantee of international protection to a significant proportion of those persons in
need of it. This approach is in accordance with the principles of interpretation as codified in
Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, requiring that a
"treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose".
The Directive takes as a starting point the “Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonised
application of the definition of the term "refugee" in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of
28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugee”. (hereinafter the Joint Position). Other sources
of reference were the “Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status”
of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter the
Handbook), drafted with a view to assisting States party to the Convention in interpreting the
Convention’s refugee definition, and the EXCOM Conclusions. However, the primary point
of reference is the Geneva Convention itself.
The subsidiary protection measures proposed are considered complementary to the protection
regime enshrined in the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol and are to be implemented
in such a manner that they do not undermine but instead complement the existing refugee
protection regime. The definition of subsidiary protection employed in this Proposal is based
largely on international human rights instruments relevant to subsidiary protection. The most
pertinent of them being (Article 3 of) the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR), (Article 3 of) the UN Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, and (Article 7 of) the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Though no specific EU acquis on the issue of subsidiary protection exists, the ECHR and the
case law of the European Court on Human Rights provide for a legally binding framework,
informing the Commission’s legislative work on this issue. Partly in response to the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights and general principles of international humanitarian
6law, Member States have developed schemes of “subsidiary” or “complementary” protection.
This Proposal has drawn from the disparate Member State systems and has attempted to adopt
and adapt the best ones. Rather then creating new ratione personae protection obligations
incumbent on Member States, the Proposal is clarifying and codifying existing international
and Community obligations and practice.
4. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSAL
With this Proposal for a Directive, the Commission is pursuing the following aims:
1. Implementing point (1)(c), 2(a), and 3(a) of the first paragraph of Article 63 of the
Treaty, paragraph 38(b)(i and ii) of the Vienna Action Plan, Conclusion 14 of the
Tampere European Council and relevant references in the Scoreboard presented to the
Council and the Parliament in March 2000;
2. Setting out minimum standards on the qualification and status of applicants for
international protection as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status;
3. Ensuring that a minimum level of protection is available in all Member States for those
genuinely in need of international protection and to reduce disparities between
Member States’ legislation and practice in these areas as the first step towards full
harmonisation.
4. Limiting secondary movements of applicants for international protection influenced
solely by the diversity of the applicable rules on recognising refugee status and granting
subsidiary protection status;
5. To guarantee a high level of protection for those who genuinely need it, whilst at the
same time preventing abuses of asylum applications which undermine the credibility of
the system, often to the detriment of applicants in genuine need of protection
5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS IN THE PROPOSAL
This Proposal is composed of seven Chapters:
(a) The first group of provisions concerns the most general aspects of the Proposal,
including its objective and scope as well as the definitions of the concepts that are
relevant for a clear understanding of the Proposal.
(b) The second set of rules focuses on the general nature of international protection,
identifying the many common characteristics of its two constitutive elements, refugee
status and subsidiary protection status. It outlines general rules on establishing how to
determine whether a claim for international protection is well founded or not. Its
guiding principle is that international protection of any sort is a type of surrogate
protection to be provided in lieu of national protection only when the realistic
possibility of obtaining protection from an applicant’s country of origin is absent.
(c) A third group of rules is specific to the qualification as a refugee. It focuses in particular
on the definition of “persecution” and offers an interpretation of this central notion,
including the five grounds on which it can be predicated, based on Article 1 (A) of the
Geneva Convention. It also contains rules laying down the circumstances in which
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required as well as rules for excluding applicants from such status.
(d) The fourth group of rules provides a framework for identifying three categories of
applicants for international protection who do not qualify as refugees but are eligible for
the supplementary status of subsidiary protection. The three categories are based on
Member States existing obligations under human rights instruments, as well as existing
Member State practice in this area, and are designed to complement the refugee
protection regime. It also contains rules laying down the circumstances in which
Member States may withdraw subsidiary protection status when such status is found no
longer to be required as well as rules for excluding applicants from such status.
(e) A fifth set of rules lays down the minimum obligations that Member States shall have
towards those to whom they grant international protection. These obligations include
the duration and content of the status flowing from recognition as a refugee or as a
beneficiary of subsidiary protection status. The benefits accruing to both categories of
international protection status shall be very similar with a few important exceptions
with regard to the duration of the status, and certain rights which depend on a
qualification period in the case of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to reflect the
potentially more temporary nature of this category.
(f) Finally, the Proposal outlines in its two final Chapters several rules to ensure the
Directive’s complete implementation. If the final aims of the future directive are to be
met, the instruments that are put in place to reach these aims have to be checked,
revised and adjusted to be sure they are going to produce the expected results. It is
important that a national contact point is designated and that appropriate measures are
enacted to establish direct Cooperation and an exchange of information between the
competent authorities. At Community level, it is important to assess whether the
purposes of this Directive are met or if there is room for improvement.
The Commission, for its part, envisages the introduction of one Contact Committee. This
Contact Committee will facilitate the transposition and the subsequent implementation of this
and other Directives in the field of asylum through regular consultations on all practical
problems arising from its application. It will help avoid duplication of work where common
standards are set and to adopt complementary strategies in combating abuse of the protection
regime. In addition, the Committee will facilitate consultation between the Member States on
reaching similar interpretations of the rules laid down on international protection that they
may lay down at national level. This would greatly help the construction of a Common
European Asylum System as envisaged by the Conclusions of the Presidency at the Tampere
European Council in October 1999. Lastly, the Committee will advise the Commission, if
necessary, on any supplements or amendments to be made to this Directive or on any
adjustments deemed necessary.
6. THE CHOICE OFLEGAL BASIS
The choice of legal basis is consistent with the amendments made to the Treaty establishing
the European Community by the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999.
Points (1)(c) and 2(a) of the first paragraph of Article 63 of the EC Treaty provides that the
Council shall adopt measures on asylum in accordance with the Geneva Convention of
28 July 1951, the Protocol of 31 January 1967 and other relevant human rights instruments,
relating to minimum standards on the qualification and status of refugees and persons who
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EC Treaty provides that the Council is to adopt measures relating to “conditions of entry and
residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long-term visas and
residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion”. As this Article applies
equally to refugees as to other categories of third country nationals, it constitutes the legal
basis for the inclusion in this Proposal of the conditions of residence of refugees, including
their rights such as employment and education.
Article 63 is accordingly the proper legal basis for a Proposal to establish minimum standards
for the qualification and status of refugees and persons who otherwise need international
protection in Member States.
Title IV of the EC Treaty is not applicable to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, unless those
Member States decide otherwise in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Protocol
on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaties. Title IV is
likewise not applicable to Denmark, by virtue of the Protocol on the position of Denmark
annexed to the Treaties.
7. SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY: JUSTIFICATION AND VALUE
ADDED
Subsidiarity
The insertion of the new Title IV (Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to
free movement of persons) in the Treaty establishing the European Community
demonstrates the will of the High Contracting Parties to confer powers in these matters on the
European Community. But the European Community does not have exclusive powers here.
Consequently, even with the political will to implement a common policy on asylum and
immigration, it must act in accordance with Article 5 of the EC Treaty, i.e. the Community
may take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects
of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. The proposed Directive
satisfies these criteria.
The establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice entails the adoption of measures
relating to asylum. The specific objective of this initiative is to lay down minimum standards
on the qualification and status of refugees and persons who otherwise need international
protection in Member States. The standards laid down in this Proposal must be capable of
being applied through minimum conditions in all the Member States. Minimum Community
standards have to be laid down by the kind of action proposed here. They will help to limit
secondary movements of asylum applicants that result from disparities in Member States
practices and legislation. Henceforth, applicants for asylum will be less inclined than before
to decide on their country of destination on the basis of different protection regimes. They
will also be less inclined than before to choose their country of destination on the different
level of rights and benefits that Member States attach to recognition of a form of international
protection. The continued absence of approximated rules on the qualification and status of
refugees and persons who otherwise need international protection would have a negative
effect on the effectiveness of other instruments relating to asylum.
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who otherwise need international protection are in place, the operation of, inter alia, an
effective system for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an
asylum application is fully justified. Applicants for international protection who cannot
choose in complete freedom where to lodge their application should expect their claims for
international protection to be assessed in a similar way in any Member State of the
European Union and for successful recognition of such a claim to result in a comparable set of
rights and benefits. The idea of a single Member State responsible for examining an
application for international protection becomes fairer to applicants if the same minimum
standards exist across all Member States. At the same time, minimum standards on the
qualification and content of the two protection regimes should limit the importance of factors
that determine secondary movements within the Union and, in this way, would help to
establish the effectiveness of the mechanisms according to which the responsible
Member State is chosen.
Establishing common minimum standards on the qualification and status of refugees and
persons who otherwise need international protection is a fundamental tool in making national
asylum systems more effective and a Common European Asylum System more credible.
Proportionality
The form taken by Community action must be the simplest form allowing the Proposal to
attain its objectives and to be implemented as efficiently as possible. In this spirit, the legal
instrument chosen is a Directive, which allows minimum standards to be laid down, while
leaving national authorities the choice of the most appropriate form and methods for
implementing it in their national system. The Proposal concentrates on a set of minimum
standards that are strictly necessary for the coherence of the planned action without laying
down standards relating to other aspects of asylum. The Proposal refers to the Proposal for a
directive on minimum standards on common asylum procedures (COM(2000) 578), to the
Proposal for a Directive laying down minimum standards on the reception of applicants for
asylum in Member States (COM(2001)181), the Proposal for a Council Regulation
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country
national (COM(2001) 447), the Council Directive (2001/55/EC) on minimum standards for
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons
and bearing the consequences thereof , the amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the
right to family reunification (COM(2000) 624) and to the Proposal for a Council Directive
concerning the status of third country nationals who are long term residents
(COM(2001) 127) to ensure consistency within the Common European Asylum System and
with other Proposals for Community instruments in the field of immigration. Finally, several
rules require Member States only to comply with certain aims (e.g. they are asked to integrate
considerations specific to the applications for international protection from persons having
special needs) but leave Member States completely free to choose the means used to achieve
this aim. The Proposal, therefore, does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objective of the Directive.
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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES
CHAPTER I
Subject matter, definitions and scope
Article 1
This Article defines the purpose of the Directive, which is to provide a framework for an
international protection regime, based on existing international and Community obligations
and current Member States practice, and separated into the two complementary categories of
refugee and subsidiary protection in order to maintain the primacy of the Geneva Convention
in such a regime. It lays down minimum standards for the qualification and subsequent status
of third country nationals and stateless persons who fall into these categories but does not
legislate for persons whom Member States chose to grant a status on strictly humanitarian or
compassionate grounds.
Article 2
Definitions
This Article contains definitions of the various concepts and terms used in the provisions of
the Proposal.
(a) Throughout the Proposal, the term “international protection” refers to the protection
applied for by third country nationals or stateless persons, or given to them by
Member States, instead of protection previously provided by an individual’s country of
origin or habitual residence. The whole concept of “international protection” is
comprised of the two separate but complementary elements of refugee status and
subsidiary protection status.
(b) Throughout the Proposal, the term “Geneva Convention” refers to the Convention
relating to the status of refugees of 28 July 1951, as supplemented by the New York
Protocol of 31 January 1967. All Member States are parties to both without any
temporal or geographical limitations.
(c) A “refugee” is a person who fulfils the requirements of Article 1(A) of the
Geneva Convention.
(d) “Refugee status” means the status granted by a Member State to a third country national
or stateless person who is a refugee and is admitted as such to the territory of this
Member State;
(e) Throughout the Proposal “person eligible for subsidiary protection” means a person
who does not qualify as a refugee but otherwise satisfies the rules regarding
international protection set out in Chapters II and IV of this Directive. The term refers
to someone who has established a well founded fear of being subjected to other serious
harm in their country of origin for one or more of the reasons set out in Chapter IV but
does not qualify as a refugee.
(f) “Subsidiary protection status” is a form of international protection status, separate but
complementary to refugee status, granted by a Member State to a third country national
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or stateless person who is not a refugee but is otherwise in need of international
protection and is admitted as such to the territory of this Member State;
(g) An “application for international protection” or an “application” is a request by a third
country national or a stateless person for protection from a Member State, which can be
understood to be on the grounds that he or she is a refugee or a person in need of
subsidiary protection. Any application for international protection shall fall to be
considered under the provisions of the Directive on minimum standards on procedures
in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, and is presumed to be an
application for asylum unless a third country national or a stateless person explicitly
requests another kind of protection that can be applied for separately;
(h) “Application for asylum” is defined with reference to the definition of a refugee in the
Geneva Convention, set out in Chapters II and III of this Directive
(i) “Application for subsidiary protection” is defined with reference to the interpretation of
three categories of person considered to be in need of international protection according
to Member States obligations under certain human rights instruments or drawn from
previously existing and widespread Member State practice, which cannot be understood
to be on the grounds that he or she is a refugee.
(j) The definition of “family members” contains provisions for maintaining family unity
drawn from the Proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum standards on
the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.
(i) This subparagraph concerns spouses or unmarried partners (who may be of the
same sex) but the provision relating to unmarried partners is only applicable in
Member States where such relationships are treated in the same way as married
couples for legal purposes. This provision generates no actual harmonisation of
national rules on the recognition of unmarried couples; it merely allows the
principle of equal treatment to operate. To prevent possible abuse, unmarried
partners must be in a stable relationship, backed up by evidence of cohabitation or
by reliable testimony.
(ii) This subparagraph concerns the children of a married or unmarried couple, who
are themselves unmarried and dependent, whether or not they are minors. No
distinction is made in the treatment of children born outside marriage, of a
previous marriage or who are adopted. Unmarried children who are not minors are
therefore covered if they are dependent, either because they are objectively unable
to meet their own needs or because of their state of health
(iii) This subparagraph concerns family members not already covered if they were
dependent on the applicant at the time of departure from the country of origin.
They must therefore be objectively unable to meet their own needs or may have
serious health problems or have undergone particularly traumatic experiences.
They can be grandchildren, grandparents, great-grandparents or other adults
dependent on the applicant.
(k) The notion of accompanying family members is defined in relation to the definition of
family members set out in paragraph (k) and to the fact that they are present in the
host country in relation to the application for asylum. This is to exclude from family
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unification, under this Directive, family Members that are in the host country for
different reasons (e.g. work) or that are in another Member State or in a third country.
(l) The concept of “unaccompanied minor” is drawn from the definition in the Council
Resolution of 26 July 1997 on unaccompanied minors who are nationals of
third countries.
(m) A "residence permit" refers to any formal documentary authorisation to reside for a
limited or indefinite period in the territory of a Member State.
(n) The notion of “Country of origin” refers to the country of nationality or former
habitual residence of the applicant.
Article 3
Scope
This Article concerns the scope of the Directive.
The use of the term “third country nationals and stateless persons” relates to the language
used in Article 63(1)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Article 4
More favourable provisions
This Proposal for a Directive focuses only on minimum standards on qualification and status
of third country national and stateless persons as refugees or persons who are otherwise in
need of international protection. The relevant provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty should not
be understood as precluding the Member States from granting more than the agreed minimum
standards in this field, particularly in terms of the rights and benefits accorded to those
recognised as being in need of international protection. This Article accordingly allows
Member States to grant applicants for international protection more favourable conditions
insofar as they are compatible with the minimum standards laid down in this Directive.
CHAPTER II
Qualification for international protection
Section 1
International protection
This Chapter sets out the shared underlying necessary requirements for an applicant to qualify
for either forms of international protection outlined in this Directive. It draws on and
elaborates the principles that underlie qualification for refugee status and subsidiary
protection status. It takes as its guiding principle the idea that an individual only has a well-
founded fear of being persecuted or otherwise suffering serious harm, and is therefore entitled
to protection from a Member State, if protection from a domestic source, most usually the
applicant’s home state, is not reasonably available.
13
Article 5
The elements of international protection
This Article sets out the two separate but complementary types of beneficiary of international
protection, namely “refugee” and “beneficiary of subsidiary protection”.
(1) This paragraph outlines a definition of a refugee that is consistent with the
Geneva Convention and further elaborated in Chapter III of this Directive. It affirms the
concept of a refugee as someone who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted only
for one or more of five broadly defined reasons: race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group and political opinion. The fear must be such that it makes
the applicant unwilling or unable to avail him or herself of the protection of the country
of nationality.
(2) This paragraph outlines the definition of who should be eligible for subsidiary
protection and directs that the category should be interpreted further by reference to
Chapter IV of this Directive. Although the Geneva Convention is thought to be
sufficiently broad and inclusive to provide protection for a significant number of those
in need of it, international human rights instruments and Member State practice in this
area have extended the scope of international protection still further. The Directive’s
aim is to provide that a minimum standard of subsidiary protection is available to
complement the Geneva Convention in all Member States to reflect what has been
existing practice at Member State level and as a step towards harmonisation.
The phrase “serious unjustified harm” is used here as part of the integrated approach
taken to the whole concept of “international protection” and its two separate but closely
linked components of refugee status and subsidiary protection. Persecution is defined as
being a type of serious unjustified harm, which is causally linked to one or more of the
five grounds mentioned in the Geneva Convention. Where there is a well-founded fear
of serious unjustified harm for a reason not covered by the Geneva Convention then,
subject to the criteria in Chapter IV of the Directive, an applicant will be found to be
otherwise in need of international protection and granted subsidiary protection status.
Whereas the phrase “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is used as a shorthand term
of reference in relation to refugees, the complimentary phrase “well founded fear of
(suffering) other serious (unjustified) harm” is used in a similar manner throughout the
text in relation to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
The term “unjustified” is added to the definition of “serious harm” in order to reflect
that the re are circumstances in which a state may be justified in taking measures that
cause harm to individuals, such as in the event of a public emergency or national
security. Such instances of “justified” harm are likely to be rare but it would be contrary
to human rights instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, to exclude the possibility that some proportionate derogation
from human rights standards may, in limited and particular circumstances, be justified,
most commonly in the interests of the wider common good.
Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are not necessarily any less ‘deserving’ of
protection than refugees but in order to respect the call for a “full and inclusive
application of the Geneva Convention” and in recognition that the Geneva Convention
is sufficiently broad and inclusive to cover a significant number of those genuinely in
need of international protection, consideration of whether an applicant qualifies for
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subsidiary protection shall only normally take place after it has been established that he
or she does not qualify as a refugee.
The exception to this rule is when an applicant for international protection lodges an
application on grounds that specifically exclude the Geneva Convention. In such a case,
qualification should be considered under Chapters II and IV of this Directive, without
reference to Chapter III. The provisions of this paragraph are also without prejudice to
Member States constitutional obligations (such as Constitutional asylum)
(3) This paragraph links the elements of international protection as set out in Section 1 with
the assessment of the applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to serious and
unjustified harm in the country of origin, pursuant to Section 2.
Article 6
Extension of international protection to the accompanying family members
This Article provides for the extension of international protection to all accompanying family
members defined in Article 2 of this Directive.
(1) This Paragraph makes clear that dependant family members are entitled to a status equal
to that of the main applicant for asylum and that such entitlement is derived simply from
the fact that they are family members.
(2) This Paragraph provides for an exception to the principle set out in paragraph 1. It
allows for a family member who would otherwise qualify for a protection status to be
excluded from the orbit of this Directive if rules laid out in Chapter III and IV of the
Directive, relating to the Exclusion Clauses detailed in the Geneva Convention, apply to
them.
Section 2
Assessment of the applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to other serious and
unjustified harm
Article 7
Assessment of applications for international protection
This Article addresses the application for international protection and the assessment of
whether the application is objectively well founded. It sets out rules to help in establishing
whether an application for international protection is well founded or not. In deciding which
rules were relevant close attention was paid to the Geneva Convention, the Joint Position, and
the Handbook.
(a) This pointh reflects the principle that applications for international protection should be
examined on a case by case basis in relation to the objective conditions known to exist
in the country of origin or habitual residence. Although the burden of proof in principle
rests with the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts is shared
between the applicant and the Member State responsible for considering the application.
15
(b) This paragraph states the principle that the need for international protection is forward
looking and that the applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to serious and
unjustified harm in the country of origin may be well founded if it is objectively
established. If there is a reasonable likelihood of the fear being realised after an
applicant is returned to the country of origin then the fear is well founded. The relevant
enquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of the fear of persecution or
otherwise suffering serious harm being realised. A fear of being persecuted or otherwise
subjected to serious harm may be well-founded even if there is not a clear probability
that the individual will be persecuted or suffer such harm but the mere chance or remote
possibility of it is an insufficient basis for the recognition of the need for international
protection.
(c) This paragraph relates to the fact that if an applicant for international protection has
already been subject to persecution or serious and unjustified harm, or to direct threats
of persecution or serious and unjustified harm this shall be taken as a serious indication
of the risk of being persecuted unless a radical and relevant change of conditions has
taken place since then in the applicant’s country of origin, or in his or her relations with
the country of origin.
(d) This paragraph reflects the principle that in assessing applications for international
protection, a holistic assessment must be made of the factual context surrounding the
application. For example, where the applicant is a child or adolescent, the assessment of
whether a given risk is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution or other serious
harm shall take account of child-specific forms of human rights violation.
With the reference to age this paragraph draws particular attention to the potential
vulnerability and unique circumstances of a minor’s application for international
protection. According to Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Right of the
Child of 1989, “In all actions concerning children … the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration”. This mandatory principle, implicit in this paragraph, is
referred to explicitly in the recitals so that it can be used as a tool for the interpretation
of all the provisions of this Proposal for a Directive that concern minors. More
specifically, in assessing an application for international protection Member States
should take into consideration:
(a) the fact that the age and maturity of the child and his or her stage of development form
part of the factual context of the application
(b) the fact that children may manifest their fears differently from adults
(c) the fact that children are likely to have limited knowledge of conditions in their country
of origin
(d) the existence of child specific forms of persecution, such as recruitment of children into
armies, trafficking for sex work, and forced labour.
Within this context, the refugee definition, in particular the five grounds for persecution,
is thought to be sufficiently broadly defined as to potentially include refugee children.
They should not automatically be granted subsidiary protection simply because they are
children.
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In particular, where the applicant for international protection is a woman, account shall
be taken of the fact that persecution, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention,
may be effected through sexual violence or other gender-specific means. Where the
form of persecution is gender-specific this should not obscure the reason why the
persecutory act occurred. For example, sexual violence can be inflicted on refugee
women because, for instance, of their religion, political opinion or nationality. In these
cases sexual violence is purely a form of persecution and any of the Convention
grounds elaborated in Article 12 may be applicable. However, sexual violence to
refugee women, such as Female Genital Mutilation can also be inflicted for the one and
only reason of their gender. In such situations, the persecution ground “membership of a
particular social group” could apply.
The Commission acknowledges the importance and usefulness of specific “Guidelines”
for assessing claims of minors, as well as from women applicants for international
protection. However it does not deem the first stage of the Common European Asylum
System, or the instrument of a Directive as being appropriate for introducing such
guidelines at EU level now. It therefore encourages Member States to develop such
guidelines at national level in consultation with UNHCR
(e) An application for international protection may also be based on credible evidence that
laws or regulations in force in the country of origin authorise or condone the
persecution or other serious harm of the applicant as an individual, or of a relevant
group of which the applicant is shown to be a member and there is a reasonable
possibility that such laws or regulations will be applied. There shall be no well founded
fear if the law is obsolete and not applied in practice.
Article 8
International protection needs arising sur place
This Article concerns the issue of an application for international protection which is made
sur place, in cases where the need for such protection arises only after an applicant is already
in the territory of Member State, most frequently as a result of a change of circumstances in
the country of origin.
(1) This paragraph explains that a fear of persecution or otherwise suffering serious harm
need not have existed when an individual left his or her country of origin but a sur place
claim based on relevant changes in the individual’s country of origin since departure
shall be recognised only insofar as those changes are shown to give rise to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted or suffering other serious harm on the part of the
individual.
(2) This paragraph addresses the issue of sur place claims based on the individual’s
activities since leaving his or her country of origin. A claim shall be most readily
established where the activities relied upon constitute the expression and continuation of
convictions previously held in the country of origin, and which are related to the need
for international protection. Continuity of this kind is not however an absolute
requirement but may give an indication as to the credibility of the application.
This paragraph also addresses the issue of abuse in sur place cases. The fact that a fear
of persecution or otherwise suffering serious harm was manufactured, does not in itself
necessarily mean that such a fear cannot be well founded and therefore sufficient to
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warrant the grant of a international protection status. However, where it can be
established to a reasonable degree of certainty that the activities since leaving the
country of origin were engaged in for the purpose of manufacturing the necessary
conditions for being granted an international protection status, Member States are
entitled to start from the premise that these activities do not in principle furnish grounds
for such a grant and shall have serious grounds for questioning the credibility of the
applicant. Member States should ensure though that the competent authorities recognise
applicants as persons in need of international protection if the activities of the kind
referred to in this paragraph may reasonably be expected to come to the notice of the
authorities of the individual’s country of origin, be treated by them as demonstrative of
an adverse political or other protected opinion or characteristic, and give rise to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted or suffering serious and unjustified harm.
Article 9
Sources of harm and protection
This Article is about the concept of State protection and follows the argument that the main
rationale behind the Geneva Convention and regimes of subsidiary protection is that everyone
is entitled to be free from persecution or other serious harm, and in the face of such harm
should be able to acces effective State protection.
(1) This paragraph follows the practice of the vast majority of Member States and other
global actors by affirming that the fear of being persecuted or suffering serious
unjustified harm may also be well founded where the risk of it emanates not only from
the State but also from parties or organisations controlling the State or from non-state
actors where the State is unable or unwilling to provide effective protection. The source
of the persecution or serious unjustified harm is deemed irrelevant. The relevant enquiry
is whether or not an applicant may obtain effective protection against the harm, or threat
of harm, in the country of origin. If persecution or other serious unjustified harm stems
from the State then such fear is well founded because de facto there is no viable avenue
of protection available in the country of origin. If it stems from non-state agents then
any such fear is only well founded if the State is unwilling or effectively unable to
provide protection against such risk of harm.
(2) This paragraph is about the evaluation of the effectiveness, including the availability, of
State protection. There must be in place a system of domestic protection and machinery
for the detection, prosecution and punishment of actions which constitute persecution or
other serious harm. The issue at stake is whether such a system as a whole offers a
sufficient and accessible level of protection to all members of the population. For the
system to offer effective protection, the State must be able and willing to operate it,
such that there is no significant risk of persecution of other serious harm being realised.
In the first part of this evaluation, relating to the determination of whether or not the
State has taken, or could be reasonably expected to take, adequate steps to control or
combat the infliction of harm, Member States should consider the following factors:
(a) General conditions in the country of origin
(b) The State’s complicity with respect to the infliction of harm at stake
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(c) The nature of State’s policies with respect to the harm at stake, including whether
there in force a criminal law which makes violent attacks by persecutors
punishable by sentences commensurate with the gravity of their crimes
(d) The influence the alleged persecutors have with State officials
(e) Whether any official action taken is meaningful or merely perfunctory , including
an evaluation of the willingness of law enforcement agencies to detect, prosecute
and punish offenders
(f) Whether there is a pattern of State unresponsiveness
(g) A denial of State’s services
(h) Whether any steps have been taken by the State to prevent infliction of harm
In the second part of this evaluation, relating to the determination whether the applicant
has reasonable access to State protection, Member States should consider the following
factors:
(i) Evidence by the applicant that the alleged persecutors are not subject to the
State’s control
(j) The qualitative nature of the access the applicant has to whatever protection is
available, bearing in mind that applicants as a class must not be exempt from
protection by the law
(k) Steps, if any, by the applicant to obtain protection from State officials and the
State response to these attempts
(3) This paragraph continues from the logic employed in the previous one. Having accepted
that it is possible to have a well founded fear of being persecuted or otherwise suffering
serious harm at the hands of non-state agents, this Article sets out the limited conditions
where non-state bodies can be considered as potential protectors in a similar manner to
recognised states. This requires that an international organisation such as the UN or
NATO or a stable State-like authority controls the territory of proposed return and is
willing and able to give effect to rights and protect an individual from harm in a manner
similar to an internationally recognised state for as long as is necessary.
Article 10
Internal protection
This Article is about the potential for flight or protection from persecution or other serious
harm within the territory of the country of origin. On the principle that international
protection from harm is only required as a secondary alternative to domestic protection, this
provision allows Member States to reject applications for international protection if it can be
established that effective protection is available in at least part of the country of origin to
which the applicant can reasonably be returned.
(1) This paragraph makes it a condition of the internal protection alternative that the facts
of an applicant’s claim for international protection must be considered by
Member States before they examine whether an applicant might reasonably be returned.
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Only if the application for international protection would otherwise be granted may
Member States consider the internal protection option. In other words, only if the
applicant establishes a well founded fear of being persecuted or otherwise suffering
serious harm in a part of the country of origin shall an examination be made as to
whether in another part of the country such fear would be unfounded. In this
examination the possibility that effective protection from persecution or other serious
harm may be reasonably available in the country of origin must be assessed. Because a
national government is presumed to be entitled to act throughout the whole of the
national territory, there is a strong presumption against finding internal protection to be
available if the agent of persecution is, or is sponsored by, the national government.
Internal protection is most likely to prove viable when the harm is threatened by a non-
state agent.
(2) This paragraph is about the considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether
the fear of return to a part of the country of origin is well founded. As part of that
process it lays down some minimum conditions for establishing if an applicant for
international protection may reasonably be refused status and returned to a part of the
territory of the country of origin or habitual residence as referred to in paragraph (1). In
establishing the reasonableness of return to the proposed site, consideration should be
given to the security, political and social circumstances prevailing in that part of the
country and to any particular vulnerabilities of the applicant.
CHAPTER III
Qualification for refugee status
The previous Chapter laid down the general pre-conditions necessary for either refugee status
or subsidiary protection status to be granted and elaborated the notions of well-foundedness
and sources of harm and protection. This Chapter focuses on those factors that are unique to
qualification as a refugee, particularly the concept of persecution and its grounds, and is
guided very much by the Joint Position and the Geneva Convention, although persecution is
not actually defined by the Geneva Convention.
Article 11
The nature of persecution
This Article is about the nature of persecution and lays down some principles for its
interpretation.
(1) As the concept of persecution is not grounded in time, the interpretation of persecution
outlined in this Article is intended to be flexible, adaptable and sufficiently open, in
order to reflect ever-changing forms of persecution, which may constitute a basis for
refugee status.
(a) This paragraph lays down the condition that, in order to constitute persecution,
acts must be intentional, sustained or systematic and must be sufficiently serious
to make return to the country of origin untenable. They must also be based on one
of the grounds mentioned in Article 1A of the Geneva Convention as further
elaborated in paragraphs 1-5 of Article 12. The repetition of discriminatory
measures which, taken separately, may not be serious enough to constitute
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persecution, may give rise to a valid claim for refugee status on cumulative
grounds.
(b) This paragraph is about persecution as legal, administrative, police and/or judicial
measures, which are either persecutory in themselves or have the appearance of
legality and are misused for the purposes of persecution, or are carried out in
breach of the law and are sufficiently serious to make return to the country of
origin untenable. General measures to safeguard public order, State security, or
public health will not usually amount to persecution, so long as they meet the
requirements for valid limitation of or derogation from human rights obligations
established by international law.
(c) Points (i) and (ii) of this paragraph are about legitimate law enforcement.
Criminal prosecution or punishment for breach of an ordinary law of general
application will not usually amount to persecution. It may be otherwise, however,
if the State of origin engages in discriminatory prosecution or adjudication; if it
imposes discriminatory or inhuman punishment; or if its law purports to
criminalise the exercise of a fundamental international human right or to require
an individual to commit acts which are in violation of basic norms of international
law.
(d) This paragraph is about military service. It states that prosecution or punishment
for refusal to meet a general obligation to perform military service, whether for
conscientious objection, absence without leave, evasion, or desertion, will not
usually amount to persecution. It may be otherwise, however, if the State of origin
denies the applicant due process of law, or engages in discriminatory conscription,
assigns duties or conditions of service on a discriminatory basis, or imposes
sanctions for failure to meet military service obligations on a discriminatory basis,
hence exposing the applicant to disproportionate or excessive punishment or fails
to provide a reasonable and non-discriminatory alternative to military service for
persons with genuine political, religious, or moral convictions to military service.
In situations of war or conflict, prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform
military duties may, by itself, also amount to persecution if the person can
establish that performance of military service will require his or her participation
in military actions abhorrent to his or her genuine and deep moral, religious or
political convictions or to other valid reasons of conscience. Establishing a valid
conscientious objection may be facilitated if the military action in which the
person would be required to participate is contrary to basic rules of human
conduct and/or has been condemned by the international community. This is not,
however, indispensable and, even if the military action is generally conducted
within the limits prescribed by the laws of war, the person may have valid reasons
of conscience for not participating in it. This will be the case, for instance, if the
person is a member of an ethnic minority who may be required to participate in
military action against that minority.
(2) This Paragraph further explores the nature of (the reasons of) persecution by laying
down some guiding principles for Member States to follow. Qualification as a refugee
must in all cases link the well founded fear of persecution with at least one of the five
grounds enumerated in the Geneva Convention and set out in Article 13 of this
Directive.
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(a) This subparagraph is about the sources of persecution. Persecution is most clearly
evident when it emanates from the state itself or from parties or organisations
controlling it. In such circumstances the availability of protection from the harm
feared or suffered is, almost by definition, unavailable or ineffective. However, it
also stated that persecution can originate from non-state agents in the
circumstances where a state is unable or unwilling to provide effective protection
against such persecution. In such cases also, subject to the other qualifying criteria
set out in this Directive being met, refugee status should be granted.
(b) This subparagraph is about the attribution of a Convention reason to an applicant.
The fact that the grounds, on which a fear of being persecuted is based, are
genuine or simply attributed to the applicant by the State or non-governmental
agent of persecution is immaterial. For example, it may be sufficient that a
persecutor believes that an individual holds a certain political view, regardless of
the truth of the matter, for a persecutory act to be taken against that individual for
the single reason of imputed political opinion.
(c) This subparagraph addresses the subject of generalised oppression or violence.
There may be a tendency to exclude from refugee status applicants who have fled,
sometimes in large numbers, from situations of large scale oppression and
violence because there are so many of them or their circumstances are similar to
many others. They are nonetheless entitled to be recognised as refugees if their
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion accounts for their well-founded fear of being persecuted. Only when one
of these five reasons is not significantly implicated in relation to the fear of
persecution are Member States justified in granting subsidiary protection status
instead. While persons in flight from civil war or internal or generalised armed
conflict are not necessarily Convention refugees, Member States should ensure
that neither are they automatically excluded from refugee status
Article 12
The reasons for persecution
This Article outlines principles relating to the reasons of persecution. The Article owes much
to the Geneva Convention and the Joint Position and does not seek to create any new reasons
not explicitly or implicitly recognised by these instruments.
(a) This paragraph sets out rules for the interpretation of the concept of “race”. It should be
interpreted in the broadest of terms to include all kinds of ethnic groups and the full
range of sociological understandings of the term. Persecution is most often well-
founded on racial grounds in cases where the persecutor regards the victim of
persecution as belonging to a different racial group other than his own, by reason of real
or supposed difference, and this forms the grounds for his action or the fear of
persecution.
(b) This paragraph sets out rules for the interpretation of the concept of “religion” and
instructs Member States to interpret it so as to include the holding of theistic, non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs.. Persecution on religious grounds may occur where such
interference targets a person who does not wish to profess any religion, refuses to take
up a particular religion or does not wish to comply with all or part of the rites and
customs relating to a religion.
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(c) This paragraph sets out rules for the interpretation of the concept of “nationality”. The
term nationality is not to be understood only as citizenship, but also refers to
membership of an ethnic, cultural or linguistic group, and may overlap with the term
‘race.’
(d) This paragraph sets out rules for the interpretation of the concept of “Membership of a
particular social group”, a term that was deliberately drafted in an open way and needs
to be interpreted in a broad and inclusive manner. A group may be defined by a
fundamental characteristic, such as gender, sexual orientation, age, family relationship,
or history, or by an attribute which is so fundamental to identity or conscience that
members of the group should not be required to renounce it, such as trade union
membership or the advocacy of human rights.
The concept is not confined to narrowly defined, small groups of persons, and no
voluntary associational relationship or de facto cohesion of members is required. The
reference to gender and sexual orientation does not imply that this persecution ground
necessarily covers all women and homosexuals. Its applicability will depend on
particular circumstances and contexts in the country of origin and the characteristics of
the persecution and the persecuted.
The interpretation should also allow for the inclusion of groups of individuals who are
treated as "inferior" or as "second class" in the eyes of the law, which thereby condones
persecution at the hands of private individuals or other non-state actors, or where the
State uses the law in a discriminatory manner and refuses to invoke the law to protect
that group. This may be the case in situations where women are the victims of domestic
violence, including sexual violence and mutilations, in those States where they are
unable to obtain effective protection against such abuse because of their gender or social
status as married women, daughters, widows or sisters, in that particular society.
(e) This paragraph sets out rules for the interpretation of the concept of “political opinion”.
Holding political opinions different from those of the government is not in itself a
sufficient ground for securing refugee status. The applicant must show that the
authorities know, or are likely to come to know, about his or her political opinions or
attribute them to him or her, that those opinions are not tolerated by the authorities, and
that, given the situation in the country of origin, they would be likely to be persecuted
for holding such opinions. The political nature of an opinion is not compromised by the
objective unimportance of the applicant’s opinions or relevant actions, or by his or her
own failure or unwillingness to characterise the opinion as political. An action may also
be, or be deemed to be by a persecutor, an expression of a political opinion.
Article 13
Cessation of refugee status
(1) This Article relates to situations where it is acknowledged that refugee status is
maintained until and unless a refugee comes within the terms of one of the cessation
clauses in Article 1(C) of the Geneva Convention.
(a) Voluntary re-availment of national protection
This paragraph regulates the situation in which a refugee voluntarily seeks and obtains
from the authorities of his or her country of origin a form of diplomatic protection
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available only to nationals of that country, such as the issuance or renewal of a national
passport, may thereby cease to be in need of such status. Where the contact between a
refugee and the diplomatic mission of his or her country of origin is incidental, it is
unlikely to evince the requisite intention to secure that State’s protection
(b) Voluntary re-acquisition of nationality
This paragraph regulates the situation in which a refugee who has lost the nationality of
his or her country of origin, voluntarily seeks and receives again the nationality of that
State. Such a person thereby ceases to be a refugee. The re-acquisition of nationality de
jure alone is insufficient to justify application of this cessation clause; the Handbook
provides that the granting of nationality by operation of law or by decree does not
amount to voluntary re-acquisition of nationality, unless the nationality has been
expressly or implicitly accepted by the refugee.
(c) Acquisition of a new nationality
This paragraph provides that refugee status may be withdrawn when the refugee has
acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of new nationality.
The acquisition of nationality de jure alone is insufficient to justify application of the
cessation clause, protection from the country of new nationality must also be ensured.
The Handbook provides that where international protection status has come to an end by
virtue of the acquisition of a new nationality, and the new nationality is subsequently
lost, the status may be revived, depending on the circumstances.
(d) Voluntary re-establishment in country of origin
This paragraph regulates the situation in which a refugee returns to his or her country of
origin. If return trips can be considered to be taking place on an ongoing basis, then the
person in question would cease to be a refugee. Whether or not this is objectively
established should be assessed on a case by case basis. Generally speaking, a consistent
pattern of regular return visits to the country of origin over a certain period of time
would amount to re-establishment in that country. This is particularly so if the refugee
avails himself or herself of the benefits and facilities in the country normally enjoyed by
citizens.
(e) Change of circumstances in country of origin
This paragraph regulates situations in which refugee status comes to an end due to a
change of circumstances in the country of origin. It requires, in conformity with the
Handbook and state practice, that such a change is of such a profound and durable
nature that it eliminates the refugee’s well-founded fear of being persecuted. A
profound change of circumstances is not the same as an improvement in conditions in
the country of origin. The relevant inquiry is whether there has been a fundamental
change of substantial political or social significance that has produced a stable power
structure different from that under which the original well-founded fear of being
persecuted was produced. A complete political change is the most obvious example of a
profound change of circumstances, although the holding of democratic elections, the
declaration of an amnesty, repeal of oppressive laws, or dismantling of former services
may also be evidence of such a transition.
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A situation which has changed, but which also continues to show signs of volatility, is
by definition not durable. There must be objective and verifiable evidence that human
rights are generally respected in that country, and in particular that the factors which
gave rise to the refugee’s well-founded fear of being persecuted are durably suppressed
or eliminated. Practical developments such as organised repatriation and the experience
of returnees, as well as the reports of independent observers should be given
considerable weight.
The Member State invoking this cessation clause should ensure that an appropriate
status, preserving previously acquired rights, is granted to persons who are unwilling to
leave the country for compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution or
experiences of serious and unjustified harm, as well as to persons who cannot be
expected to leave the Member State due to a long stay resulting in strong family, social
and economic links in that country
(f) Changes of circumstances in country of habitual residence
This paragraph is identical to 1(e) except that it relates to situations where a refugee had
no nationality at the time refugee status was granted and the fear of persecution was
linked to return to the country of habitual residence rather than nationality.
(2) International refugee law and practice requires that a decision to withdraw refugee
status is based on objective and verifiable evidence and that each case is investigated on
an individual basis. Moreover, the person in question should have the opportunity to
contest the decision. Such standards are already laid down in various provisions in the
Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status. This provision, however, is limited to laying down a
minimum standard applicable to the process of assessing the case for cessation, namely
that the state wishing to withdraw protection bears the burden of proof in establishing
that it is justified to do so.
Article 14
Exclusion from refugee status
(1) This Article reiterates the principle that a person who comes within the terms of one of
the exclusion clauses in Article 1(D) (E) (F) of the Geneva Convention is excluded from
refugee status. Exclusion can also occur where the facts requiring exclusion become
known after the recognition of international protection.
This Directive does not apply to an applicant who comes within the following
situations:
(a) Assistance or protection of the United Nations
This paragraph refers to Exclusion clause Article 1(D) of the Geneva Convention,
which applies to any person who is in receipt of protection or assistance from organs or
agencies of the United Nations, other than the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. The exclusion clause was drawn up within the particular context of Palestine
refugees receiving protection from the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). For purposes of this exclusion clause,
the protection or assistance available from the United Nations agency must have the
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effect of eliminating or durably suppressing the individual’s well-founded fear of
being persecuted.
An individual is excluded from refugee status on grounds of United Nations protection
or assistance only if he or she has received such protection or assistance before seeking
asylum, and has not at any time ceased to receive such protection or assistance.
Exclusion under this clause shall not occur if an individual is prevented by
circumstances beyond his or her control from returning to the place in which he or she
is in principle entitled to benefit from United Nations protection or assistance. When
such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such
persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to
the benefits of this Directive.
(b) Rights in country of residence
This paragraph relates to situations covered by Article 1 (E) of the Geneva Convention.
It prescribes the situation in which refugee status may be denied when an applicant for
asylum is recognised by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken
residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of
the nationality of that country. Mere transient or purely temporary presence in such a
state is not a basis for exclusion. An applicant shall be excluded only if there is
guaranteed full protection against deportation or expulsion.
(c) Applicants not deserving international protection
This paragraph obliges the Member States, in order to maintain the integrity and
credibility of the Geneva Convention, not to grant refugee status to an applicant in the
situations covered by Article 1 (F) of the Geneva Convention.
(i) The crimes referred to in this subparagraph shall be interpreted as those defined in
international instruments to which the Member States have acceded, and in
resolutions adopted by the United Nations or other international or regional
organisations to the extent that they have been accepted by the Member States
(ii) In applying this particular subparagraph, the severity of the expected persecution
should be weighted against the nature of the criminal offence of which the person
concerned is suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an
allegedly political objective, may be classified by Member States as serious non-
political crimes.
(iii) This subparagraph reflects the fact that the fundamental principles laid down in
the Charter of the United Nations should govern the relations of its members with
each other and in relation to the international community as a whole. When such
principles have been violated by an applicant for asylum he or she may be
excluded from refugee status.
(2) The grounds for exclusion should be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct
of the person concerned.
(3) The person concerned is entitled to lodge a legal challenge in the Member State
concerned. The relevant procedural standards can be found in the Proposal for a
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Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status
(4) This paragraph states that the obligation not to grant refugee status to those undeserving
of it, is without prejudice to Member States’ obligations under international law, in
particular under the European Convention on Human Rights.
CHAPTER IV
Qualification for subsidiary protection status
This Chapter further defines the international protection category of “subsidiary protection”,
which has been developed to complement the category of “refugee” interpreted in Chapter III.
No specific EU acquis directly related to subsidiary or complementary protection exists but
the ECHR and the case law of the European Court on Human Rights provides for a legally
binding framework, which informed the choice of categories of beneficiary in this Proposal.
The categories and definitions of persons listed in this Chapter do not create completely new
classes of persons that Member States are obliged to protect but represent a clarification and
codification of existing practice. The three categories listed below in paragraph 2 of this
Article are drawn very much from the disparate Member State practices and are believed to
encompass the best ones.
Article 15
The grounds of subsidiary protection
After establishing, according to the rules set out in Article 5(2) that an applicant potentially
falls within the scope of this Chapter, Member States have three separate but potentially
overlapping grounds to consider when establishing whether an applicant falls to be granted
subsidiary protection status.
(a) This subparagraph relates to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
reflecting the content of Article 3 of the ECHR. In establishing whether an applicant
qualifies according to this criteria Member States should not apply a greater threshold of
severity than is required by the ECHR but in all cases an application must be well-
founded, as outlined in Chapter II.
(b) This subparagraph relates to the well-founded fear of a violation of other human rights.
When considering granting subsidiary protection status on the basis of this ground
Member States shall have full regard to their obligations under human rights
instruments, such as the ECHR, but shall limit its applicability only to cases where the
need for international protection is required. In particular they should consider whether
the return of an applicant to his or her country of origin or habitual origin would result
in serious unjustified harm on the basis of a violation of a human right and whether they
have an extraterritorial obligation to protect in this context.
(c) This subparagraph relates to situations where an individual is displaced from his or her
country of origin and is unable to return there. The definition of this subparagraph is
without prejudice to Article 11(2) (c) and is drawn from Article 2(c) of the Council
Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons. In the case of subsidiary protection though, an applicant
must still establish a well-founded fear for his or her life on an individual basis.
Although the reasons for the fear may not be specific to an individual he or she must
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still establish that the fear is well founded in their particular case. Member States are
bound to cover persons falling into this category where they arrive in a Council agreed
‘mass influx’ so it is consistent and appropriate to include them also when they arrive
individually, and do not qualify as a refugee.
Article 16
Cessation of subsidiary protection status
(1) This paragraph is about the principle that subsidiary protection status is maintained until
such time as it is established by the competent authorities that such protection is no
longer required because the reason for granting such status has ceased to exist.
(2) This paragraph reiterates the principle that subsidiary protection may be withdrawn if
the change of circumstances in the country of origin or of habitual residence is of such a
profound and durable nature that it eliminates the need for subsidiary protection. A
profound change of circumstances is not the same as an improvement in conditions in
the country of origin. The relevant inquiry is whether there has been a fundamental
change of substantial political or social significance that has produced a stable power
structure different from that under which the original well-founded fear of being
persecuted was produced. A complete political change is the most obvious example of a
profound change of circumstances, although the holding of democratic elections, the
declaration of an amnesty, repeal of oppressive laws, or dismantling of former services
may also be evidence of such a transition.
A situation which has changed, but which also continues to show signs of volatility, is
by definition not durable. There must be objective and verifiable evidence that human
rights are generally respected in that country, and in particular that the factors which
gave rise to the subsidiary protection beneficiary’s well-founded fear of suffering
unjustified harm are durably suppressed or eliminated. Practical developments such as
organised repatriation and the experience of returnees, as well as the reports of
independent observers should be given considerable weight.
Article 17
Exclusion from subsidiary protection status
(1) This Article obliges Member States not to grant subsidiary protection to an applicant in
the specific situations described in this. Exclusion can also occur where the facts
requiring exclusion become known after the recognition of international protection.
This Directive does not apply to an applicant who comes within the following
situations:
(a) The crimes referred to in this subparagraph shall be interpreted as those defined in
international instruments to which the Member States have acceded, and in
resolutions adopted by the United Nations or other international or regional
organisations to the extent that they have been accepted by the Member States.
(b) In applying this particular subparagraph, the severity of the expected persecution
should be weighted against the nature of the criminal offence of which the person
concerned is suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an
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allegedly political objective, may be classified by Member States as serious non-
political crimes.
(c) This subparagraph reflects the fact that the fundamental principles laid down in
the Charter of the United Nations should govern the relations of its members with
each other and in relation to the international community as a whole. When such
principles have been violated by an applicant for international protection he or she
may be excluded from subsidiary protection status.
(2) The grounds for exclusion should be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct
of the person concerned.
(3) The person concerned is entitled to lodge a legal challenge in the Member State
concerned. The relevant procedural standards can be found in the Proposal for a
Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status
(4) This paragraph states that the obligation not to grant subsidiary protection to those
undeserving of it, is without prejudice to Member States’ obligations under international
law, in particular under the European Convention on Human Rights.
CHAPTER V
Refugee status and subsidiary protection status
Article 18
Content of international protection
(1) This paragraph is aimed to clarify that the content of refugee status as laid down in this
Proposal for a Directive cannot be interpreted as limiting in any sense the rights set out
in Articles 3-34 of the Geneva Convention.
(2) This paragraph introduces three rules: the first one is aimed to make clear that the rules
laid down in this Chapter apply to both categories of persons in need of international
protection defined in Article 2, unless otherwise indicated; the second one is meant to
ensure that the transition from being an applicant for international protection to being a
refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection shall in principle never result in a
decrease in the level of protection; finally, the third rule laid down in this paragraph,
requires that the level of rights granted to refugees and to the beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection is enjoyed equally by their accompanying family members.
(3) This paragraph introduces a general clause, concerning the interpretation of the rules of
Chapter V that have to be specifically adapted when they are applicable to persons with
special needs. Without being exhaustive (any other category of persons with special
needs should be taken into account) this paragraph lists the groups that in the practices
of Member States and in the relevant studies have been regarded as having special
needs in relation to psychological and health care. It was felt necessary to specify for
single women that they usually have “special needs” only if they come from countries
where they are subject to substantial gender-related discrimination. Other gender
specific health and hygiene needs, such as shaving things and condoms for men, or
sanitary towels and contraceptives for women, are no special needs.
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Article 19
Protection from refoulement and expulsion
In accordance with Articles 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention, this Article confirms the
Member States’ obligation not to expel refugees and to respect, in relation to them, the
principle of non-refoulement. It confirms, in accordance with The European Convention on
Human rights, the same obligation in relation to the victims of torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Finally, it requires Member States to not expel the
beneficiaries of the other forms of subsidiary protection and to respect, in relation to them, the
principle of non-refoulement within the same limits laid down in Articles 32 and 33 of the
Geneva Convention.
Article 20
Information
This Article provides for persons enjoying international protection to receive the necessary
information on the rules governing such protection. This is also in line with the relevant
provisions in the other asylum-related (Proposal for) Directives.
Article 21
Residence permits
(1) The five-year period proposed in this paragraph reflects a balance between the different
practices of Member States. The permit is subject to the criteria set out in the cessation
and exclusion clauses of this Directive.
(2) This paragraph addresses the issue of the duration of residence permits that are granted
to the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status. This status is considered, in the
majority of Member States, as a temporary one. Accordingly the beneficiaries of
subsidiary protection should be provided with a residence permit valid for an initial
period of one year. This permit should be automatically renewed at intervals of not less
than one year, unless the granting authorities establish that the subsidiary protection is
no longer required.
Article 22
Long-term residence status
This Article obliges Member States to apply, notwithstanding its Article 3(2)(b), the Directive
concerning third country nationals who are long-term residents and make that Directive
applicable to the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status under the focus of this Proposal
for a Directive. According to the Commentary to Article 3(2)(b) of the Proposal for a
Directive concerning third county nationals who are long-term residents “Persons covered by
a form of subsidiary or additional protection are excluded. The fact that the concept of
subsidiary protection is not harmonised at Community level precludes coverage of this
category of persons in this Proposal. But the Commission believes that such persons, who are
legal residents, must have access to long-term resident status if they meet the criteria. The
Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 state that
“[refugee status] should also be completed with measures on subsidiary forms of protection
offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such protection”. The Commission is
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planning in 2001 to present a Proposal concerning subsidiary protection that could extend to
access to long-term status for this category of third-country nationals”. Accordingly, as the
concept of subsidiary protection is to a great extent harmonised by this Proposal for a
Directive it is reasonable and coherent to make it a requirement for Member States to extend
the application of the Directive concerning third country nationals who are long-term
residents to the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status falling under the scope of this
Proposal for a Directive. Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are to be treated in the same
way as refugees for the purposes of long-term residency because their needs and
circumstances are much the same and having spent the qualifying period of five years in a
Member State they will have demonstrated that their need for international protection is no
longer temporary.
Article 23
Travel document
(1) This paragraph confirms the obligation laid down in Article 28 of the
Geneva Convention requiring Member States to issue to persons that they recognise as
refugees, “travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory unless
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require”, in the form
of the Schedule to the Geneva Convention.
(2) Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection may be in a position to apply for and to receive a
travel document from the consular authorities of their country of origin or ordinary
residence (e.g. when these authorities are able to continue their work even if in the
country they represent there is a situation of widespread generalised and indiscriminate
violence arising from armed conflict). This paragraph is meant to ensure that travel
documents are issued to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status, only when they are
unable to obtain a national passport from their consular authorities (e.g. there are no
longer functioning consular authorities).
Article 24
Access to employment
(1) The Member States shall authorise refugees to engage in employed or self-employed
activities under the same conditions as nationals. This principle of equal treatment also
applies to remuneration, social security related to employed or self-employed activities,
and other conditions of employment. Access to employment encourages independence
and enables those concerned to provide for themselves and no longer require assistance.
(2) This paragraph codifies a practice in the majority of Member States to offer activities
such as employment-related education opportunities for adults, vocational training and
practical workplace experiences to refugees with a view to facilitating their integration.
(3) As a minimum standard the Commission proposes that Member States be required to
put in place rules that do not exclude the access of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
status and their accompanying family members to employed or self-employed activities
six months after they have been granted the subsidiary protection status. Access to
employment encourages independence and enables those concerned to provide for
themselves and no longer require assistance. It could also prove useful in reintegrating
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beneficiaries enjoying subsidiary protection status on their possible return to their
country of origin.
(4) As a minimum standard the Commission proposes that Member States be required to
put in place rules that do not exclude the access of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
status and their accompanying family members to employment-related education
opportunities for adults, vocational training and practical workplace experiences one
year after they have been granted the subsidiary protection status.
(5) This paragraph obliges Member States to ensure that, after access to the labour
market is granted in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, ordinary law in the
Member State applicable to remuneration, to the access to social security systems
relating to employed or self employment activities, and other conditions of employment
shall apply in the same way as they do to nationals.
Article 25
Access to education
(1) This paragraph concerns the schooling and education of minors enjoying international
protection. Reference is made to the concept of “minors” without specific reference to
“school age”, as this age varies from one Member State to another, and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child does not make the schooling of
minors conditional on their age. As the principle of equal treatment applies minors
enjoying international protection should be given free access to the public education
system. This provision lays down one of the rules that illustrate the special attention to
minors that characterise the Proposal as whole.
(2) This paragraph obliges Member States to allow adults enjoying international protection
access to the general education system, as well as to vocational training, further training
or retraining, under the same conditions as EU nationals. Adults enjoying international
protection may have been forced to abandon their studies or vocational training when
they fled their country of origin. They should therefore be allowed access to the general
education system and to vocational training, further training, or retraining during the
period of temporary protection. In addition, the knowledge they acquire in this way
could be useful in reintegrating them on their possible return to their country of origin.
(3) Persons enjoying international protection must have the same right to recognition of
their qualifications as nationals. This encompasses also the obligation of the
Member State to take into consideration all the diplomas, certificates and other evidence
of formal qualifications – i.e. including those acquired outside the EU – of the person
concerned and his relevant experience, by comparing the specialised knowledge and
abilities certified by those diplomas and that experience with the knowledge and
qualifications required by the national rules (Case C-238/98 Hocsman).
Article 26
Social Welfare
As with anyone covered by a form of protection and lacking the necessary resources,
Member States should make available to those enjoying international protection the social
welfare support and means of subsistence necessary for a normal and dignified life for the
duration of this protection. The Member States may choose the form this assistance and
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means of subsistence will take, to ensure that they are consistent with the social welfare
arrangements of the individual Member States.
Article 27
Health and psychological care
(1) In this paragraph Member States are required to provide beneficiaries of international
protection access to health and psychological care under the same conditions as
nationals of the Member State that has granted the status.
(2) This Article is about victims of torture and organised violence, and is in line with the
relevant provisions of the Directive laying down minimum standards on the reception of
applicants for asylum in Member States. This paragraph provides for special medical
help to be given by Member States to those who have been the victims of torture, rape
or other serious acts of violence. This should include victims of organised violence and
of gender related violence, to ensure that people traumatised by exposure to ethnic
cleansing are covered by the provision.
(3) Minors are often the victims of many specific forms of abuse, neglect, exploitation,
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or suffer from armed conflicts.
Member States are required to provide minors that have been victimised with
rehabilitation services, appropriate mental health care and qualified psycho-social
counselling, when it is necessary.
Article 28
Unaccompanied minors
This Article concerns the specific needs of unaccompanied minors.
(1) Member States are required to provide as soon as possible for the necessary
representation of the unaccompanied minor applying for international protection to
ensure that the minor’s needs are duly met in the enforcement of the provisions of
this Directive.
(2) In view of the minor's vulnerability and potential for abuse, the principle of regular
assessments by the appropriate welfare authorities of the actual situation of the minor is
provided for in this paragraph.
(3) This paragraph contains rules to be understood as an explicit enforcement of the
principle of safeguarding the best interests of the child in relation to reception
conditions. Member States are required to provide unaccompanied minors who lodge an
application for international protection with one of the listed forms of housing from the
moment they are admitted to the territory to the moment they have to leave the country
in which the application was lodged or in which the application is being examined.
(4) This paragraph provides for siblings to be kept together (this rule may be disregarded
only in exceptional circumstances such as the sudden mass influx of applicants for
international protection, for a brief period of time) and changes of their residence should
be kept to a minimum.
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(5) This paragraph concerns efforts to trace relatives, and the principle of confidentiality
applicable to such efforts, as far as they are in the best interest of the child.
(6) To properly meet the needs of unaccompanied minors during asylum procedures,
Member States must ensure that staff working with unaccompanied minors receive
appropriate training on their needs.
Article 29
Access to appropriate accommodation
This Article is concerned with the issue of accommodation. The minimum standards laid
down in this paragraph enable the Member States to provide accommodation or housing for
persons enjoying international protection as part of their national reception scheme. These
provisions may in some cases allow for temporary accommodation centres. They may also
take the form of collective structures or separate flats. Suitable accommodation means that for
single refugees gender segregated accommodation and sanitary installations should be
provided. Alternatively Member States may provide persons enjoying international protection
the means to obtain housing if they do not have sufficient resources.
Article 30
Freedom of movement within the Member State
This Article forbids the Member State that has granted international protection status to limit
the freedom of movement to persons who have been granted such a protection status within
its territory.
Article 31
Access to integration facilities
(1) This paragraph codifies a practice existing in most of the Member States. The
Commission welcomes the attention already given by Member States to the many
related situations (education, social welfare, health care, housing and other integration
facilities) which play a vital role in supporting successful integration of refugees into
the society and in particular into the labour market. Indeed the Commission believes
that it is necessary to provide specific support for disadvantaged groups, including many
refugees, rather than only allowing them equal access into mainstream employment and
education opportunities. In this respect, the Commission recalls Guideline 7 of the
Employment Guidelines for 2001 (Council Decision 2001/63/EC of 19 January 2001 on
Guidelines for Member States' employment policies for the year 2001), and which reads
as follows:
"7. Each Member State will:
– identify and combat all forms of discrimination in access to the labour market and
to education and training;
– develop pathways consisting of effective preventive and active policy measures to
promote the integration into the labour market of groups and individuals at risk
or with a disadvantage, in order to avoid marginalisation, the emergence of
‘working poor ’and a drift into exclusion;
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– implement appropriate measures to meet the needs of the disabled, ethnic
minorities and migrant workers as regards their integration into the labour
market and set national targets where appropriate for this purpose."
Programmes designed to facilitate the integration of refugees into the society of the
Member State could for instance include:
(a) a “tailor made plan of action” regarding employment and education;
(b) language courses;
(c) basic and advanced training courses;
(d) measures aimed at promoting self-maintenance;
(e) events organised to provide an introduction to the history and culture of the
Member State;
(f) events arranged jointly with citizens of the Member State to promote mutual
understanding.
The above programmes are potentially eligible for financing under the European
Refugee Fund.
(2) This paragraph provides for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status access to
programmes referred and elaborated upon in paragraph (1), not later than one year after
their status is granted.
Article 32
Voluntary return
This Article grants persons recognised as being in need of international protection access to
voluntary return programmes for those who wish to return on a voluntary basis to their
country of origin. Member States are encouraged to facilitate such returns. Candidates for
voluntary return must be fully informed of the conditions in which they will return. The
Member States may use exploratory visits as a way of helping candidates. Exploratory visits
enable some candidates to visit their country of origin for a short time to see for themselves
the security situation and the circumstances of reintegration, before voluntary return is fully
completed. The above programmes are potentially eligible for financing under the European
Refugee Fund.
CHAPTER VI
Administrative cooperation
Article 33
Cooperation
This Article concerns Cooperation among Member States, and between them and the
Commission.
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Member States are required to appoint a national contact point and take the appropriate
measures to establish direct Cooperation, including the exchange of visits, and an exchange of
information between the competent authorities.
Article 34
Staff and resources
This Article is about staff and material resources.
(1) This paragraph is based on the consideration that applicants for asylum are a group of
people with a specific background and needs. It must be ensured that authorities and
other organisations implementing this Directive have received the necessary basic
training with respects to their needs.
(2) This paragraph requires Member States to allocate the necessary resources in
connection with the national provisions enacted to implement this Directive to ensure
that these provisions can be enforced.
CHAPTER VII
Final provisions
Article 35
Non-discrimination
Within the target group specified in the Directive introducing international protection, there
may be persons of different race, ethnic origin, nationality, religion and believes. This
paragraph emphasises that the granting of international protection must be free of all
discrimination based on these factors and other factors such as sex, age, sexual orientation or
handicap and that the Member States must ensure that this principle is respected.
The wording is based on Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, Article 13 of the EC Treaty and
Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This provision is
without prejudice of obligations descending from international instruments such as the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 14).
Article 36
Reports
This Article is about reports. The Commission is instructed to draw up a report on the
Member States’ application of the Directive, in accordance with its role of enforcing
provisions adopted by the institutions under the Treaty. It is also given the task of proposing
possible amendments to the Directive.
A first report must be submitted no later than two years after the deadline for transposition of
the Directive in the Member States. The Member States should send the Commission all the
information that is appropriate for drawing up this report
After presenting the report the Commission must draw up a report on the application of the
Directive at least every five years.
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Article 37
Transposition
1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 30 April 2004 at the latest. They
shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When the Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this
Directive or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official
publication. Member States shall determine how such a reference is to be made.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provisions of
national law relating to the enforcement of this Directive.
Article 38
This Article lays down the date when the Directive enters into force. This Directive shall enter
into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Communities.
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2001/0207 (CNS)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular
point 1(c) , 2(a) and 3 (a) of the first paragraph of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the Proposal from the Commission1,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament2,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee3,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions4,
Whereas:
(1) A common policy on asylum, including a Common European Asylum System, is a
constituent part of the European Union’s objective of progressively establishing an
area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances,
legitimately seek protection in the Community.
(2) The European Council at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999
agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on
the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as supplemented by the New York Protocol of
31 January 1967, thus maintaining the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that
nobody is sent back to persecution.
(3) The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the international
legal regime for the protection of refugees.
(4) The Tampere Conclusions provide that a Common European Asylum System should
include in the short term the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of
refugee status.
1 OJ C
2 OJ C
3 OJ C
4 OJ C
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(5) The Tampere Conclusions also provide that rules regarding refugee status should be
complemented by measures on subsidiary forms of protection, offering an appropriate
status to any person in need of such protection.
(6) The main aim of this Directive is to ensure that a minimum level of protection is
available in all Member States for those genuinely in need of it because they cannot
reasonably rely on their country of origin or habitual residence for protection.
(7) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In
particular this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity, the right to
asylum of applicants for asylum and their accompanying family members, and the
protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition, promoting the application
of Articles 1, 18 and 19 of the Charter.
(8) This Directive should be implemented without prejudice to Member States’ existing
international obligations under human rights instruments.
(9) This Directive is without prejudice to the Protocol on asylum for nationals of
Member States of the European Union as annexed to the Treaty Establishing the
European Community.
(10) The recognition of refugee status is a declaratory act.
(11) The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provides valuable
guidance for Member States when determining refugee status according to Article 1 of
the Geneva Convention.
(12) Minimum standards for the definition and content of refugee status should be laid
down to guide the competent national bodies of Member States in the application of
the Geneva Convention.
(13) It is necessary to introduce common concepts of the criteria for recognising applicants
for asylum as refugees within the meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.
(14) In particular, it is necessary to introduce common concepts of: protection needs arising
sur place; sources of harm and protection; internal protection; and persecution,
including the reasons for persecution.
(15) In particular, it is necessary to introduce a common concept of the persecution ground
“membership of a particular social group”, which shall be interpreted to include both
groups which may be defined by relation to certain fundamental characteristics, such
as gender and sexual orientation, as well as groups, such as trade unions, comprised of
persons who share a common background or characteristic that is so fundamental to
identity or conscience that those persons should not be forced to renounce their
membership.
(16) In particular, it is necessary when assessing applications from minors for international
protection that Member States should have regard to child-specific forms of
persecution, such as the recruitment of children into armies, trafficking for sex work,
and forced labour.
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(17) Minimum standards for the definition and content of subsidiary protection status
should also be laid down. The subsidiary protection regime should be complementary
and additional to the refugee protection regime enshrined in the Geneva Convention.
(18) It is necessary to introduce criteria on the basis of which applicants for international
protection are to be recognised as eligible for subsidiary protection status. Those
criteria should be drawn from international obligations under human rights instruments
and practices existing in Member States.
(19) The approximation of rules on the recognition and content of refugee status and
subsidiary protection should help to limit the secondary movements of applicants for
asylum between Member States, where such movement is purely caused by
differences in legal frameworks.
(20) The Directive should not affect the conditions under which Member States may, in
accordance with their own domestic law, permit persons to enter or remain in their
territory where the return of those persons to their own country would endanger their
safety owing to circumstances not covered by this Directive.
(21) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States have the power to
introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for third country nationals and
stateless persons who ask for international protection from a Member State, where
such a request is understood to be on the grounds that the person concerned is either a
refugee within the meaning of Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention, or a person
who otherwise needs international protection.
(22) In accordance with Article 2 and Article 3(2) of the Treaty, this Directive, as regards
its objectives and content, aims to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality,
between men and women.
(23) The “best interests of the child” should be a primary consideration of Member States
when implementing this Directive
(24) The implementation of this Directive should be evaluated at regular intervals.
(25) Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely to establish minimum standards
for the granting of international protection to third country nationals and stateless
persons by Member States cannot be sufficiently attained by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at
Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the
principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
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CHAPTER I
General provisions
Article 1
Subject matter
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down minimum standards for the qualification and
status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise
need international protection.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) “International protection” means refugee status and subsidiary protection status.
(b) “Geneva Convention” means the Convention relating to the status of refugees done
at Geneva on 28th July 1951, as supplemented by the New York Protocol of
31 January 1967;
(c) “Refugee” means a third country national or a stateless person who fulfils the
requirements laid down by Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention and set out in
Chapters II-III of this Directive;
(d) “Refugee status” means the status granted by a Member State to a person who is a
refugee and is admitted as such to the territory of that Member State and/or permitted
to remain and reside there;
(e) "Person eligible for subsidiary protection” is a person who does not qualify for refugee
status but otherwise satisfies the rules regarding international protection set out in
Chapters II and IV of this Directive.
(f) “Subsidiary protection status” means the status granted by a Member State to a third
country national or a stateless person who is a person eligible for subsidiary protection
and is admitted as such to the territory of that Member State and/or permitted to
remain and reside there;
(g) “Application for international protection” means a request by a third country national
or a stateless person for protection from a Member State, which can be understood to
be on the grounds that the applicant is either a refugee or a person eligible for
subsidiary protection. Any application for international protection is presumed to be
an application for asylum save where the applicantexplicitly requests another kind of
protection that can be applied for separately;
(h) “Application for asylum” means a request by a third country national or a stateless
person for international protection from a Member State, which can be understood to
be on the grounds that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of Article 1(A) of
the Geneva Convention.
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(i) “Application for subsidiary protection” means a request by a third country national or
a stateless person for international protection from a Member State which cannot be
understood to be on the grounds that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of
Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention, or follows rejection of such a request, but can
be understood to be on the grounds that the applicant is a person eligible for subsidiary
protection;
(j) “Family members” means:
(i) the spouse of the applicant or his/her unmarried partner in a stable relationship,
where the legislation or practice of the Member State concerned treats unmarried
couples in a way comparable to married couples;
(ii) the children of the couple referred to in point (i) or of the applicant alone, on
condition that they are unmarried and dependent and without distinction as to
whether they were born in or out of wedlock or adopted;
(iii) other close relatives who lived together as part of the family unit at the time of
leaving the country of origin, and who were wholly or mainly dependent on the
applicant at that time
(k) “Accompanying family members” means the family members of the applicant who are
present in the same Member State in relation to the application for asylum;
(l) "Unaccompanied minors" means third-country nationals and stateless persons below
the age of eighteen, who arrive on the territory of the Member States unaccompanied
by an adult responsible for them whether by law or custom, and for as long as they are
not effectively taken into the care of such a person; it includes minors who are left
unaccompanied after they have entered the territory of the Member States;
(m) "Residence permit" means any permit or authorisation issued by the authorities of a
Member State, in the form provided for under that State's legislation, allowing a third
country national or stateless person to reside on its territory;
(n) “Country of origin” means the country of nationality or former habitual residence.
Article 3
Scope
This Directive shall apply to all third country nationals and stateless persons who make an
application for international protection at the border or on the territory of a Member State and
to their accompanying family members and to all those who receive such protection.
Article 4
More favourable provisions
Member States may introduce or retain more favourable standards for determining who
qualifies as a refugee or as a person in need of subsidiary protection, and in determining the
content of international protection, in so far as those standards are compatible with
this Directive.
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CHAPTER II
Qualification for international protection
Section I
International protection
Article 5
The elements of international protection
1. Refugee status shall be granted to any third country national who, owing toa well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of that country, and to any stateless person, who, being outside the
country of former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
2. Without prejudice to existing constitutional obligations, subsidiary protection shall be
granted to any third country national or stateless person who does not qualify as a
refugee, according to the criteria set out in Chapter III of this Directive, or whose
application for international protection was explicitly made on grounds that did not
include the Geneva Convention, and who, owing to a well-founded fear of suffering
serious and unjustified harm as described in Article 15, has been forced to flee or to
remain outside his or her country of origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
3. The applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to other serious and unjustified
harm in the country of origin shall be assessed in accordance with Section 2.
Article 6
Extension of international protection to the accompanying family members
1. Member States shall ensure that accompanying family members are entitled to the
same status as the applicant for international protection.
2. The rule laid down in paragraph 1 is not applicable where the accompanying family
Member isexcluded from refugee and subsidiary protection status pursuant to
Chapters III and IV.
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Section 2
Assessment of the applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to other serious and
unjustified harm
Article 7
Assessment of applications for international protection
In assessing an applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to other serious and unjustified
harm, Member States shall take into account, as a minimum, the following matters:
(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision
on the application;
(b) whether the applicant’s fear of being persecuted or exposed to other serious and
unjustified harm in the country of origin is objectively established, in that there is a
reasonable possibility that the applicant will be persecuted or otherwise subjected to
serious harm if returned to the country of origin;
(c) whether the applicant has already been subject to persecution or other serious and
unjustified harm or to direct threats of persecution or other serious and unjustified
harm, in that this would strongly indicate a reasonable possibility that the applicant
might suffer further persecution or harm in the future;
(d) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors
such as background, gender, age, health and disabilities so as to assess the seriousness
of persecution or harm. Where the form of persecution is gender-specific or
child-specific,account shall be taken of the fact that persecution, within the meaning of
the Geneva Convention, may be effected through sexual violence or other gender-
specific means;
(e) whether there is credible evidence that laws or regulations are in force and applied in
practice in the country of origin which authorise or condone the persecution of the
applicant or the infliction upon the applicant of other serious and unjustified harm.
Article 8
International protection needs arising sur place
1. A well-founded fear of being persecuted or otherwise suffering serious unjustified
harm may be based on events which have taken place since the applicant left his
country of origin.
2. A well-founded fear of being persecuted or otherwise suffering serious unjustified
harm may be based on activities which have been engaged in by the applicant since he
left his country of origin, save where it is established that such activities were engaged
in for the sole purpose of creating the necessary conditions for making an application
for international protection. That is not the case where the activities relied upon
constitute the expression and continuation of convictions held in the country of origin,
and they are related to the grounds for recognition of the need for international
protection.
44
Article 9
Sources of harm and protection
1. Member States shall consider that the fear of being persecuted or of otherwise
suffering unjustified harm is well-founded whether the threat of persecution or other
serious unjustified harm emanates from:
(a) the State;
(b) parties or organisations controlling the State;
(c) non-State actors where the State is unable or unwilling to provide effective
protection.
2. In evaluating the effectiveness of State protection where the threat of persecution or
other serious unjustified harm emanates from non-State actors, Member States shall
consider whether the State takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or
infliction of harm, and whether the applicant has reasonable access to such protection.
There must be in place a system of domestic protection and machinery for the
detection, prosecution and punishment of actions which constitute persecution or other
serious and unjustified harm. Where effective State protection is available, fear of
being persecuted or otherwise suffering serious unjustified harm shall not be
considered to be well founded, in which case Member States shall not recognise the
need for protection.
3. For the purpose of this Directive, “State” protection may also be provided by
international organisations and stable quasi-State authorities who control a clearly
defined territory of significant size and stability, and who are able and willing to give
effect to rights and to protect an individual from harm in a manner similar to an
internationally recognised State.
Article 10
Internal protection
1. Once they have established that the fear of being persecuted or of otherwise suffering
serious and unjustified harm is well-founded, Member States may examine whether
this fear is clearly confined to a specific part of the territory of the country of origin
and, if so, whether the applicant could reasonably be returned to another part of the
country where there would be no well-founded fear of being persecuted or ofotherwise
suffering serious and unjustified harm.
In carrying out this examination there shall be a strong presumption against finding
internal protection to be a viable alternative to international protection if the agent of
persecution is, or is associated with the national government.
2. In examining whether an applicant can be reasonably returned to another part of the
country in accordance with paragraph 1, Member States shall have regard to the
security, political and social circumstances prevailing in that part of the country,
including respect for human rights, and to the personal circumstances of the applicant,
including age, sex, health, family situation and ethnic, cultural and social links.
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CHAPTER III
Qualification for refugee status
Article 11
The nature of persecution
1. In the determination of whether a well-founded fear of being persecuted has been
objectively established, the term persecution shall be considered to cover as a
minimum any of the following situations:
(a) the infliction of serious and unjustified harm or discrimination on the grounds of
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group, sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a significant
risk to the applicant’s life, freedom or security or to preclude the applicant from
living in his or her country of origin;
(b) legal, administrative, police and/or judicial measures when they are designed or
implemented in a discriminatory manner on the grounds of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group and if
they constitute a significant risk to the applicant’s life, freedom or security or
preclude the applicant from living in his or her country of origin;
(c) prosecution or punishment for a criminal offence if, on the grounds of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group:
(i) the applicant is either denied means of judicial redress or suffers a
disproportionate or discriminatory punishment
(ii) the criminal offence for which the applicant is at risk of being prosecuted
or punished, purports to criminalise the exercise of a fundamental right
(d) prosecution or punishment for refusal to meet a general obligation to perform
military service on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or
membership of a particular social group:
(i) if the conditions stated in paragraph (c) (i) apply.
(ii) in situations of war or conflict, if the person can establish that performance
of military service will require his or her participation in military activities
which are irreconcilable with the applicant’s deeply held moral, religious
or political convictions, or other valid reasons of conscience.
2. The following principles shall, as a minimum, govern the determination of whether a
well-founded fear of being persecuted should result in the recognition of an applicant
as a refugee
(a) it is immaterial whether the persecution stems from the State, parties or
organisations controlling the State, or non-State actors where the State is unable
or unwilling to provide effective protection.
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(b) it is immaterial whether the applicant actually possesses the racial, religious,
national, social or political characteristic which attracts the persecutory action,
provided that such a characteristic is attributed to him or her by the agent of
persecution;
(c) it is immaterial whether the applicant comes from a country in which many or all
persons face the risk of generalised oppression.
Article 12
The reasons for persecution
In determining whether a well founded fear of persecution is based on reasons of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, the
following elements shall, as a minimum, be taken in account:
(a) the concept of race shall include considerations of colour, descent, or membership of a
particular ethnic group;
(b) the concept of religion shall include the holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic
beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public,
either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view,
or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious
belief;
(c) the concept of nationality shall not be confined to citizenship but shall include
membership of a group determined by its cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity,
common geographical or political origins or its relationship with the population of
another State;
(d) the concept of social group shall include a group which may be defined in terms of
certain fundamental characteristics, such as sexual orientation, age or gender, as well
as groups comprised of persons who share a common background or characteristic that
is so fundamental to identity or conscience that those persons should not be forced to
renounce their membership. The concept shall also includegroups of individuals who
are treated as "inferior" in the eyes of the law;
(e) the concept of political opinion shall include the holding of, or the being conceived of
as holding, an opinion on a matter related to the State or its government or its policy,
whether or not that opinion has been acted upon by the applicant.
Article13
Cessation of refugee status
1. Member States shall maintain refugee status until and unless the refugee:
(a) has voluntarily re-availed himself or herself of the protection of the country of
nationality; or
(b) having lost his or her nationality, has voluntarily re-acquired it; or
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(c) has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his or
her new nationality; or
(d) has voluntarily re-established himself or herself in the country which he or she
left or outside which he or she remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(e) can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he or she has
been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail
himself or herself of the protection of the country of nationality;
(f) Being a person with no nationality, he or she is able, because the circumstances
in connection with which he or she has been recognised as a refugee have ceased
to exist, to return to the country of former habitual residence.
In the cases referred to in points (a) to (f), the residence permit may be revoked.
In considering point (e), Member States shall have regard to whether the change of
circumstances is of such a profound and durable nature that the refugee’s fear of
persecutioncan no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. The Member State which has granted refugee status shall bear the burden of proof in
establishing that a person has ceased to be in need of international protection for one
of the reasons stipulated in paragraph 1.
Article 14
Exclusion from refugee status
1. Member States shall exclude from refugee status any applicant:
(a) who is at present receiving protection or assistance from organs or agencies of
the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees;
(b) who is recognised by the competent authorities of the country in which he or she
has taken up residence as having the rights and obligations attached to the
possession of the nationality of that country;
(c) wherethere are serious reasons for considering that:
(i) the applicant has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to
make provision in respect of such crimes;
(ii) the applicant has committed a serious non-political crime prior to his or
her admission as a refugee;
(iii) the applicant has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.
2. The grounds for exclusion shall be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct
of the person concerned.
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3. Member States shall ensure that persons so excluded have the right to bring
proceedings before a court against a decision to exclude them from international
protection.
4. The application of the exclusion shall not in any manner affect obligations that
Member States have under international law.
CHAPTER IV
Qualification for subsidiary protection status
Article 15
The grounds of subsidiary protection
In accordance with Article 5(2), Member States shall grant subsidiary protection status to an
applicant for international protection who is outside his or her country of origin, and cannot
return there owing to a well-founded fear of being subjected to the following serious and
unjustified harm:
(a) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or
(b) violation of a human right, sufficiently severe to engage the Member State’s
international obligations or;
(c) a threat to his or her life, safety or freedom as a result of indiscriminate violence
arising in situations of armed conflict, or as a result of systematic or generalised
violations of their human rights.
Article 16
Cessation of subsidiary protection status
1. Member States shall ensure that subsidiary protection status is maintained until such
time as it is established by the competent authorities that such protection is no longer
required, in which case the residence permit may be revoked.
2. Subsidiary protection may be withdrawn if the circumstances in the country of origin
which led to the granting of such status under Article 15, cease to exist, or if a change
in circumstances is of such a profound and durable nature that it eliminates the need
for subsidiary protection.
Article 17
Exclusion from subsidiary protection status
1. Member States shall exclude from subsidiary protection status any applicantwhere
there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) the applicant has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes;
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(b) the applicant has committed a serious non-political crime prior to his or her
admission as a refugee;
(c) the applicant has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
2. The grounds for exclusion shall be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct
of the person concerned.
3. Member States shall ensure that persons so excluded have the right to bring
proceedings before a court against a decision to exclude them from international
protection.
4. The application of the exclusion shall not in any manner affect obligations that
Member States have under international law.
CHAPTER V
Refugee status and subsidiary protection status
Article 18
Content of international protection
1. The rules laid down in this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the rights laid down
in the Geneva Convention.
2. The rules laid down in this Chapter shall apply both to refugees and persons eligible
for subsidiary protection unless otherwise indicated. The level of rights attached to a
protection status shall not be lower than that enjoyed by applicants during the
determination process and shall be enjoyed equally by the accompanying family
members of the qualified beneficiary.
3. When implementing the provisions of this Chapter, Member States shall take into
account the specific situation of persons who have special needs such as: minors in
general , unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, single parents with
minor children, victims of torture or sexual abuse or exploitation, pregnant women and
persons suffering from infirmity, whether mental or physical. Member States shall also
take into account the specific situation of single women who, are subject to substantial
gender-related discrimination in their country of origin.
Article 19
Protection from refoulement and expulsion
Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement and shall not expel persons
enjoying international protection, otherwise than in accordance with their international
obligations.
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Article 20
Information
Member States shall provide persons recognised as being in need of international protection,
immediately after status has been granted, with information, in a language likely to be
understood by them, in which provisions relating to the respective protection regimes are
clearly set out.
Article 21
Residence permits
1. As soon as their status has been granted Member States shall issue to refugees and
their accompanying family members a residence permit which must be valid for at
least five years and renewable automatically.
2. As soon as the status has been granted Member States shall issue to persons enjoying
subsidiary protection status and their accompanying family members a residence
permit which must be valid for at least one year. This residence permit shall be
automatically renewed at intervals of not less than one year, until such time as the
granting authorities establish that such protection is no longer required.
Article 22
Long-term residence status
Notwithstanding Article 3(2)(b) of Council Directive…/…EC. [concerning the status of third
country nationals who are long term residents]5 Member States shall grant persons enjoying
subsidiary protection status long term-residence status on the same terms as those applicable
to refugees under that Directive.
Article 23
Travel document
1. Member States shall issue to persons to whom they have granted refugee status travel
documents in the form set out in the Schedule to the Geneva Convention, for the
purpose of travel outside their territory unless compelling reasons of national security
or public order otherwise require.
2. Member States shall issue travel documents to persons enjoying subsidiary protection
status who are unable to obtain a national passport.
5 OJ L
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Article 24
Access to employment
1. Member States shall authorise refugees to engage in employed or self-employed
activities under the same conditions as nationals, immediately after the refugee status
has been granted.
2. Member States shall ensure that activities such as employment-related education
opportunities for adults, vocational training and practical workplace experience are
offered to refugees, under the same conditions as nationals.
3. Member States shall authorise persons enjoying subsidiary protection status to engage
in employed or self-employed activities under the same conditions as nationals no later
than six months after such status is granted
4. Member States shall ensure that persons enjoyingsubsidiary protection status have
access to activities such as employment-related education opportunities for adults,
vocational training and practical workplace experience, under the same conditions as
nationals no later than one year after such status is granted.
5. After access to the labour market is granted in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3,
refugees and persons enjoying subsidiary protection status are entitled to equal
treatment with nationals in terms of remuneration, access to social security systems
relating to employed or selfemployed activities, and other conditions of employment.
Article 25
Access to education
1. Member States shall grant full access to the education system to all those minors
enjoying international protection under the same conditions as nationals.
2. Member States shall allow adults enjoying international protection access to the
general education system, further training or retraining, under the same conditions as
nationals.
3. Member States shall ensure equal treatment as between persons enjoying international
protection and nationals with regard to the recognition of diplomas, certificates and
other qualifications issued by a competent authority.
Article 26
Social Welfare
Member States shall ensure that persons enjoying international protection receive, under the
same conditions as nationals of the Member State that has granted the protection, the
necessary assistance in terms of social welfare and means of subsistence.
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Article 27
Health and psychological care
1. Member States shall ensure that persons enjoying international protection have access
to health and psychological care under the same conditions as nationals of the Member
State that has granted the status.
2. Member States shall provide appropriate medical and psychological care to persons
enjoying international protection who have special needs, such as accompanied or
unaccompanied minors, or persons who have undergone torture, rape or other serious
forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.
3. Member States shall ensure access to rehabilitation services to minors who have been
victims of any form of abuse, neglect, exploitation, torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or who have suffered from armed conflict. To facilitate recovery
and reintegration, appropriate mental health care shall be developed and qualified
psycho-social counselling shall be provided when it is needed.
Article 28
Unaccompanied minors
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures as soon as possible, to ensure the
representation of unaccompanied minors enjoying international protection by legal
guardianship, or representation by an organisation which is responsible for the care
and well-being of minors, or by any other appropriate representation.
2. Member States shall ensure that the minor’s needs are duly met in the implementation
of the provisions of this Directive by the appointed guardian. The appropriate
authorities shall make regular assessments.
3. Member States shall ensure that unaccompanied minors are placed:
(a) with adult family members; or
(b) with a foster family; or
(c) in centres specialised in accommodation for minors; or
(d) in other accommodation suitable for minors.
4. Member States shall ensure that siblings are kept together. Changes of unaccompanied
minors’ residence shall be limited to a minimum.
5. If it is in the best interests of the child, Member States shall endeavour to trace the
members of the family of unaccompanied minors as soon as possible.
6. Member States shall ensure that those working with unaccompanied minors receive
appropriate training on their needs.
53
Article 29
Access to appropriate accommodation
The Member States shall ensure that persons enjoying international protection have access to
suitable accommodation or, if necessary, receive the means to obtain housing.
Article 30
Freedom of movement within the Member State
Member States shall not limit the freedom of movement within their territory of persons
enjoying international protection.
Article 31
Access to integration facilities
1. In order to facilitate the integration of refugees into society , Member States shall
make provision for specific support programmes tailored to their needs in the fields of,
inter alia, employment, education, healthcare and social welfare;
2. Member States shall grant persons enjoying subsidiary protection access to equivalent
programmes, not later than one year after their status is granted.
Article 32
Voluntary return
Member States shall grant persons enjoying international protection access to voluntary return
programmes for those who wish to return on a voluntary basis to their country of origin.
CHAPTER VI
Administrative cooperation
Article 33
Cooperation
Member States shall each appoint a national contact point, whose address they shall
communicate to the Commission, which shall communicate it to the other Member States.
Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, take all appropriate measures to
establish direct Cooperation and an exchange of information between the competent
authorities.
Article 34
Staff and resources
1. Member States shall ensure that authorities and other organisations implementing this
Directive have received the necessary basic training with respect to the needs of both
male and female applicants and their accompanying family members, as well as the
specific needs of minors, in particular unaccompanied minors.
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2. Member States shall allocate the necessary resources in connection with the national
provisions enacted to implement this Directive.
CHAPTER VII
Final provisions
Article 35
Non-discrimination
Member States shall implement the provisions of this Directive without discrimination on the
basis of sex, race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, health, colour, ethnic
or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other
opinions, membership of a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or sexual
orientation.
Article 36
Reports
By 30 April 2006 at the latest, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and
the Council on the application of this Directive in the Member States and shall propose any
amendments that are necessary. Member States shall send the Commission all the information
that is appropriate for drawing up that report. After presenting the report the Commission
shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive in
the Member States at least every five years.
Article 37
Transposition
1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 30 April 2004 at the latest. They
shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When the Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this
Directive or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official
publication. Member States shall determine how such a reference is to be made.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provisions of
national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
Article 38
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Communities.
55
Article 39
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the Council
The President
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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT
Policy area(s): JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
Activity(ies): Asylum and Immigration
TITLE OF ACTION: PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
THE QUALIFICATION AND STATUS OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND
STATELESS PERSONS AS REFUGEES OR AS PERSONS WHO OTHERWISE
NEED INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
1. BUDGET LINE(S) + HEADING(S)
A0 7030 (meetings)
2. OVERALL FIGURES
2.1. Total allocation for action (Part B): EUR million for commitment
2.2. Period of application:
2001(September-2006
2.3. Overall multi-annual estimate on expenditure:
(a) Schedule of commitment appropriations/payment appropriations
(financial intervention) (see point 6.1.1)
EUR million (to 3rd decimal place)
Year n n + 1 n + 2 n + 3 n + 4
n + 5 and
subs.
years Total
Commitments
Payments
(b) Technical and administrative assistance and support expenditure(see point 6.1.2)
Commitments
Payments
Subtotal (a)+(b)
Commitments
Payments
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(c) Overall financial impact of human resources and other administrative expenditure
(see points 7.2 and 7.3)
Commitments/
payments
0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.175
TOTAL (a)+(b)+(c)
Commitments 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.175
Payments 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.175
2.4. Compatibility with the financial programming and the financial perspective
X Proposal compatible with the existing financial programming
2.5. Financial impact on revenue1:
X No financial implications (involves technical aspects regarding implementation
of a measure)
Note: All details and observations pertaining to the method of calculating the effect
on revenue should be included in a separate annex.
EUR million (to 1 decimal place)
Situation following action
Budget line Revenue
Prior
to
action
(Year
n-1)
Year
n
n+1 n+2 n+3 n+4 n+5
(a) Revenue in
absolute terms
(b Change in
Revenue
∆
(Please state each budget line involved, adding the appropriate number of rows to the table
if there is an effect on more than one budget line)
1 For further information see a separate guidance paper.
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3. BUDGET CHARACTERISTICS
Type of expenditure New EFTA
participation
Participation
applicant
countries
Heading
Financial
Perspective
Comp/
Non-comp
Diff/ Non-
diff
YES/
NO
YES/NO YES/NO No
4. LEGAL BASIS
Article 63 of the EC Treaty, point 1(c) of first paragraph, and point 2(a)
5. DESCRIPTION AND GROUNDS
5.1. Need for Community intervention2
5.1.1. Objectives pursued
The aim of the Directive is to establish minimum standards on the qualification and status of
applicants for international protection as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
status;
The proposal is one of the Community initiatives on asylum related issues for the purpose of
achieving a Common European Asylum System. The November 2000 Communication of the
Commission on asylum, states that at the end of the first stage, in which the current Proposal
has been presented, and whatever the result, it will be necessary to consider whether
mechanisms can be developed to correct certain differences that might remain or to prevent
the phenomenon of divergent interpretation of Community rules.
5.1.2. Measures taken in connection with ex ante evaluation
Not applicable
5.1.3. Measures taken following ex post evaluation
Not applicable
5.2. Actions envisaged and arrangements for budget intervention
With respect to this Directive, the Commission intends to establish a Contact Committee.
The reasons to establish this Committee are the following. Firstly, the Committee is to help
the Member States implement the minimum standards in a forward-looking and Coordinating
spirit. Secondly, it is to be the forum for Member States that wish to go jointly beyond the
minimum standards at this stage of the harmonisation process. Thirdly, it is to set aside the
impediments and create the necessary conditions for achieving the objective set by the
European Council in Tampere.
2 For further information see a separate guidance paper.
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Thus, the Committee could promote further approximation of asylum policy in the future and
it could pave the way forward from minimum standards on the recognition and content of
refugee and subsidiary protection status to towards a common asylum procedure and a
uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum.
In the period before 30 April 2004 the Contact Committee will meet three times a year to
prepare transposal of the Directive and henceforth two or three times a year to facilitate
consultation between Member States on additional standards, etc.
5.3. Methods of implementation
Not applicable
6. FINANCIAL IMPACT
6.1. Total financial impact on Part B - (over the entire programming period)
(The method of calculating the total amounts set out in the table below must be explained by
the breakdown in Table 6.2. )
6.1.1. Financial intervention
Commitments in EUR million (to the 3rd decimal place)
Breakdown
Year
N
N + 1 N + 2 N + 3 N + 4 N + 5
and
subs.
Years
Total
Action 1
Action 2
Etc.
TOTAL
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6.1.2. Technical and administrative assistance, support expenditure and IT expenditure
(Commitment appropriations)
Year
N
N + 1 N + 2 N + 3 N + 4 N + 5
and
subs.
Years
Total
1. Technical and
administrative
assistance
(a) Technical assistance
(b) Other technical and
administrative
assistance:
- intra muros:
- extra muros:
of which for
construction and
maintenance of
computerised
management systems
Subtotal 1
2. Support expenditure
(a) Studies
(b) Meetings of experts
(c) Information and
publications
Subtotal 2
TOTAL
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6.2. Calculation of costs by measure envisaged in Part B (over the entire
programming period)3
(Where there is more than one action, give sufficient detail of the specific measures to be
taken for each one to allow the volume and costs of the outputs to be estimated. ).
Commitments in EUR million (to the 3rd decimal place)
Breakdown Type
of outputs
(projects,
files )
Number of
outputs
(total for
years 1…n)
Average unit
cost
Total cost
(total for years
1…n)
1 2 3 4=(2X3)
Action 1
- Measure 1
- Measure 2
Action 2
- Measure 1
- Measure 2
- Measure 3
Etc.
TOTAL COST
If necessary explain the method of calculation
3 For further information see a separate guidance paper.
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7. IMPACT ON STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
7.1. Impact on human resources
Staff to be assigned to management
of the action using existing and/or
additional resources
Description of tasks deriving
from the action
Types of post
Number of
permanent posts
Number of
temporary posts
Total
Permanent
officials or
Temporary
staff
A
B
C
If necessary, a fuller description
of the tasks may be annexed.
Other human
resources
Total
7.2. Overall financial impact of human resources
Type of human resources Amount EUR Method of calculation *
Officials
Temporary staff
Other human resources
(give budget line)
Total
The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.
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7.3. Other administrative expenditure deriving from the action
Budget line
(number and heading)
Amount EUR Method of calculation
Overall allocation (Title A7)
A07030 – Meetings 29 250 3 meetings/year at average cost
of EUR 9 750 (15 x EUR 650)
per meeting
Information systems (A-5001/A-4300)
Other expenditure - Part A (state which)
Total 29 250
The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.
I. Annual total (7.2 + 7.3)
II. Duration of action
III. Total cost of action (I x II)
EUR 29 250
6 Years
EUR 175 500
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8. FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION
8.1. Follow-up arrangements
Not applicable
8.2. Arrangements and schedule for the planned evaluation
Not applicable
9. ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES
Not applicable
